

LUCIA VAN DEN BERGH

Why peace worked

Mozambicans look back



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Foreword

It was very interesting for me to read the book written by Lucia van den Bergh, former AWEPA representative in Mozambique, who worked in this capacity for six years, demonstrating an impressive and timeless commitment.

People say that South Africa is a 'miracle'. The policy of apartheid with all its intimidation, oppression and aggression came to an end not through a bloodbath but by peaceful means. This non-violent resolution came about thanks to the wisdom of both sides, the oppressed and the oppressor.

But there are many reasons why Mozambique can be considered a miracle as well, although it went through another process than South Africa; Mozambique is viewed worldwide as a successful peace process, but not much attention has been paid to the factors that make Mozambique unique. This book does!

It is a particularly interesting book because it is based on information provided by people who played key roles in the transition period in Mozambique, from war to peace. Mozambique is unique in its combination of smooth transition from a guerrilla movement to an opposition party, effective demobilisation and the absence of a truth and reconciliation commission like in South Africa – not to mention the absence of war crimes trials!

How was this possible? What kept the peace process from breaking down? Why did a multi-party parliament work in this situation? This book tells a story which has not been told before and will be an influential work for anyone researching or analysing civil wars.

I am grateful that AWEPA had the opportunity to be intensively involved in the period after the Rome Peace Accord and I thank our partners in Mozambique who accepted AWEPA as an ally in the process of peace and development.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the AWEPA staff in Maputo, especially Obede Baloi and Telma Mahiquene, and in Amsterdam, especially Tamme Hansma, without whom we could not have made our humble contribution.

Dr. Jan Nico Scholten
President of AWEPA

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This book could not have been written without the open and honest talks that I was able to have with more than 50 people, who have been – or still are – involved in the Mozambican process for peace, democracy and political stability. I am deeply grateful to them all: the politicians, the parliamentarians, the people who conducted the elections, and last but not least, the citizens who worked for peace in their own environment as well as in civil society organisations. (See the list of interviewees.)

Many friends supported this book, reading my texts, commenting and providing suggestions. I especially want to thank Joseph Hanlon, Obede Baloi, Boaventura Zita, George Siemensma, Marijke Teeuw, Carla Schuddeboom, Mirjam Boswijk and Monique van Zijl. Each of them contributed their own special experience or knowledge. Their contributions were greatly appreciated.

And I would like to thank Jan Nico Scholten for being an inspiring president of Awepa for many years, giving support, space and confidence to the work that Awepa has done and is still doing in Mozambique. He was also the person who created the opportunity for this book to be written. In addition, the staff of Awepa in Amsterdam and Maputo deserve thanks for their continuous cooperation over many years as well as during the writing of this book. In Maputo, the Awepa representative Amarilia Mutemba supported me during my visits in 2008, as did Telma Mahiquene, Ilda Mbeve, José Matavele and others. In Amsterdam, Tatjana van den Ham and Ilona Kaandorp helped me with the technical and organisational aspects of writing, translating and publishing.



Renamo fighters and Mozambican troops fraternise shortly after the signing of the peace agreement. (António Muchave, AIM 1992)

Chapter I

Introduction

“We accepted everything, including amnesty for war crimes. We did not want to look back; we did not ask for revenge, nor for the truth. We knew the truth, but demanding to hear it in official trials would have obstructed the process; the peace agreement would never have been signed.” This comment, made by a woman kidnapped by guerrillas who later escaped, points to the highly unusual nature of Mozambique’s peace process – no trials and no Truth Commission. Healing was found in rural areas through traditional ceremonies, but in many places it was just a matter of trying to forget. The peace process in Mozambique has turned out to be one of the most successful following a civil war. It led to reintegration of the former guerrillas into society and a functioning democracy with an elected government, and has proved to be sustainable.

Fifteen years have passed since the election of the first multi-party government. In this book, people who were involved in the peace process reflect on what worked and why. In particular, this book looks at the interaction between the leaders and a civil society anxious for peace, two military-political movements which deeply distrusted each other, and a host of foreign and international organisations anxious to prevent a return to a cruel civil war. Looking back now, the people who were immersed in a sometimes

fraught and tense peace process draw unexpected conclusions. Some are specific to Mozambique, but some may hold valuable lessons for other peace processes.

Neither war nor peace happens in isolation. This ‘civil’ war had been largely dependent on initiatives and support from outside. Rhodesia and South Africa promoted civil war as a form of destabilisation, and Cold War thinking promoted further support for the destruction of Mozambique. But the war also built on internal discontent; over more than a decade, the ongoing armed conflict gained internal dynamics and momentum. The international community was aware of the apartheid system and the damage it did to the neighbouring countries; sympathy for the people and government of Mozambique was widespread, especially amongst progressive populations and governments in the countries of Northern Europe. However, peace only became a reality after the Cold War was over and the apartheid system came to an end.

Peace in 1992 between the Frelimo government and the Renamo fighters became possible in part through external influence and support. By then internal pressure and political changes, followed by direct negotiations, had already prepared the ground. The transition period took from 1992 to 1994 and was coordinated by a UN mission and a large peacekeeping force. The government, political parties, churches, organisations of women, youth, and trade unions took initiatives to prepare the population for reconciliation, dialogue and democratic inclusion of

everybody. Official language usage on the radio changed from one day to the next; 'bandits' became 'members of the Renamo political party'.

Peace agreements and UN intervention cannot work if the population does not want peace. However, the Mozambicans wanted it desperately. Consequently, they accepted the cruel past, and were prepared to include former rebels and soldiers in normal daily life. They were willing to adopt donor-backed types of democratic elections and institutions. They wanted to rebuild their country without looking back, and they wanted to include every Mozambican in the reconstruction. They did not want trials; they did not want a Truth Commission. They just wanted peace.

The transition period, which included a demobilisation programme, returning refugees, rehabilitation programmes and preparation for the elections, took two years. The first multi-party parliament had its turbulent opening ceremony in December 1994, and its first session in March 1995. But systems, institutions and procedures were not all that was needed to make democracy work. Democratic thinking and attitudes cannot be imposed; they have to be understood and integrated into life and politics. The multi-party system, with direct elections on ballot papers, was completely new to the institutions, parties and population. Legislation was based on the Portuguese law and Western way of institutionalising democracy. The system was unknown in Mozambique, which had a tradition of consensus rather than competition, rely-

ing on local traditional and political leaders rather than distant national candidates, to be elected in a secret ballot by people who could not read and write, or had been isolated in former war areas without access to information. Including the population in the process of understanding the changes after the peace agreement was one of the main challenges. Democracy would be an empty shell without that.

This book will address some key questions: why was this process successful, while it often fails in other countries? What were the crucial elements that contributed to the success, and what failed? What contribution was made by the Mozambican people? Did the international support and attention do any good, or did it take over too much from the Mozambicans? What does it mean for Mozambique now, for the problems of today, for the expectations of the people? Is stability guaranteed, are the traumas gone, or are there hidden sentiments that will erupt again years later? Was there too much of a focus on the democratic system, overlooking equal opportunities in economic and social development? Are Mozambican peace and democracy indeed sustainable? And have they contributed to a better life for the people of Mozambique?

The first chapters provide details about initiatives that made peace possible, especially inside the country, about the difficulties during the lengthy negotiations, the transition period with complicated reconciliation processes, the efforts to get the population involved in the multi-party system. The

book then also talks about the complicated preparations for the elections through the inexperienced election bodies in a vast and destroyed country. It raises questions about the functioning of the democratic institutions, and tells how parliament survived the first clashes, it analyses the changed role of civil society, and works out how the decentralisation process took shape. The last chapter is about democracy and development; it talks about poverty, seen as a possible threat to stability in the future. The conclusions provide a final reflection on the Mozambican process, but also attention points for today, and dilemma's and lessons that can be considered in other peace processes.

AWEPA(A) and the role of the author

This book is written from the perspective of my involvement as a representative of Awepa in Mozambique during the first six years after the peace agreement of 1992. I went back in 2008 to interview politicians, parliamentarians, representatives of organisations, and citizens who were involved: people who I came to know during that period 15 years ago. These people were at the heart of the process, and their views form the core of this book. Because of the trust in Awepa built up before the end of the war and the mutual respect which we developed during the post-war period, these key figures were prepared to honestly reflect on that period, talk about their experiences and doubts then, and draw conclusions now about what had been effective then and what had not worked. This book presents a unique picture of how key people

remember the end of the war and the early post-war period and how they see it now – and through their experiences are willing to summarise lessons they learned which may be useful elsewhere.

The book will not give a complete picture; it arises from my experiences working with Awepa and the willingness of my old contacts to talk now about their feelings and experiences. Awepa was not alone in Mozambique; other agencies also contributed, especially as the post-war period progressed. But Awepa was in the special position of being active in Mozambique and retaining trust during the war, playing an early part in key post-war changes, and continuing its work there ever since. Although the book is largely based on interviews, I take full responsibility for what has been written here.

AWEPAA was founded in 1984 as the Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid. Following political discussions of an economic and cultural boycott of apartheid in South Africa, parliamentarians in European countries organised actions not only to support the anti-apartheid struggle, but also to support the Front Line States, the countries neighbouring South Africa which had only recently become independent at that point and were victims of South Africa's destabilisation and aggression. They informed their governments and parliaments about the background of the Mozambican war, which ultimately caused more than a million deaths, five million refugees and

displaced persons, and a shattered country. Awepa established good relations with the Mozambican government and parliament during the anti-apartheid struggle, building trust through its clear political support for the Front Line States.

Shortly after the peace agreement, Awepa was asked by the Mozambican government and by civil society organisations to support the peace and democratisation process before and after the 1994 elections. Awepa created a team, headed by Jan Nico Scholten, president of Awepa, and supported by Tamme Hansma, a staff member in the Amsterdam head office who had worked in Mozambique in the eighties and had built up good relations through early Awepa initiatives. I (Lucia van den Bergh) had already worked in Mozambique for six years. In 1992, I joined the team as programme head and Awepa representative, and opened an office in the capital city, Maputo, working with a small Mozambican staff. One of our early tasks was to build trust with Renamo, and to play an active part in solidarity with the Mozambicans, listening to the needs and providing requested support, but on the other hand not taking over. As I will show in the book, the process was Mozambican, and initiatives and decisions had to remain in Mozambican hands.

After the 1992 peace agreement and throughout the transition and election process, Awepa sent fact-finding missions, developed an intense involvement in civic education, provided bilingual versions of key documents, distributed regular analy-

ses through its Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, and had a substantial presence in election observation. After the 1994 elections, support was provided to the newly elected democratic institutions, primarily to the Mozambican Parliament. Training in the provinces prepared political parties and civil society for the decentralisation process and the local elections. Elected local governments in the new municipalities received training and support. Financially, this work was made possible through donor support. Unusual flexibility by the EU, the northern European countries involved, and other donors made it possible for the programmes to start immediately; regular adaptation to current needs and changing situations was accepted. There was no demand for complicated bureaucratic procedures, making it possible to analyse the situation on an ongoing basis and to construct the programme one step at a time in close cooperation with the Mozambicans.

And AWEPA itself changed. After the democratic changes in southern Africa, Awepaa became Awepa, the 'Association for European Parliamentarians with Africa'. Awepa still continues to support democratic processes in Mozambique, as well as in other African countries.

December 2009

Lucia van den Bergh
Representative for Awepa in Mozambique
from 1992-1998.

Chapter 2

The war and Renamo: how could it start?

“I lived with my family in a township that was safe during the day, but not at night,” says Helena, a woman in Maputo. “Along with our neighbours, we always tried to find out if the ‘bandits’ were close, to warn each other. That night seemed peaceful, but at 22:00 my mother suddenly looked outside and saw about 50 ‘bandits’ running into our township. We tried to hide inside, but they threw a grenade into our house. My sister was wounded, lost her fingers; my brother was bleeding. My father hid, knowing they would want him, so we said he was travelling. They wanted to take my brother but then saw that it would be impractical because of all the blood. So they took me. I was taken with them to a shop where they stole everything, and I had to help to carry it. I was kept till the next day, when government soldiers came in. The confrontation that followed saved me. The ‘bandits’ lost control over the kidnapped people so we had the chance to get away. I was lucky that they did not violate me.” Helena continues, “We knew what happened in the whole country. We, the population, were the victims. Renamo did not fight the government or the troops; it fought against us, the people. In my family in Inhambane, several people were killed or kept hostage in Renamo areas. My niece was kidnapped and had a baby from rape. She had difficulties caring for the child. We tried to

convince her that you cannot blame the baby, but it was too traumatic.”

Over the course of a decade, the war had reduced Mozambique to a wreck. By 1992, more than one million people had died and more than five million had sought refuge in neighbouring countries or close to the relatively safe cities. Maputo was overcrowded; every cane hut housed large families that had fled to the city from the countryside, often 15 people in two rooms, mostly sustained by households headed by poverty-stricken women. Large camps hosted thousands of displaced people.

Renamo’s strategy was to attack the people with the aim of forcing them to withdraw their support from the Frelimo government. As a result, villages, schools, and hospitals were considered legitimate targets, destroying Frelimo successes, creating fear and bringing chaos to the country. Although Renamo gained a reputation for extreme brutality, it also managed to tap into a groundswell of discontent with the Frelimo regime, especially in the north and centre of Mozambique, where authoritarian Frelimo governors had lost popular support.

Historical background

Mozambique gained its independence in 1975, fifteen years after most of the British and French colonies in Africa. At that time, Portugal was still under the dictatorship of its powerful prime minister, António Salazar, later succeeded by Marcelo Caetano; it considered the African colonies to be Portuguese provinces. Poor families from Portugal had



Samora Machel, the first president of Mozambique. On his right: Joaquim Chissano (AIM)

settled in Mozambique, taking the land and the jobs and creating access to health and education only for themselves. The Mozambicans were excluded from everything, even such simple jobs as taxi driver or shopkeeper. Forced labour was only ended in the 1960s, under pressure from the international community. Apart from the mission schools, the black Mozambicans only had limited access to primary school. A small number of Mozambicans were allowed to become *assimilados* (the assimilated) – honorary Portuguese – and permitted to attend secondary schools. The liberation movement Frelimo rose up in the early sixties, mirroring similar movements in the other Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau and Angola. They paved the way for independence in liberated zones, convinced that justice and equality could be achieved for the population as a whole. The Portuguese response was a long colonial war, supported by Europe and the US through NATO. The position of most West European countries only changed in the seventies, primarily under pressure from civil society; the solidarity movements played an important role in this shift.

Some politicians wanted to hear the other side of the story. Dutch parliamentarians Relus ter Beek and Jan Nico Scholten, who later went on to found Awepa, accompanied the Liberation Movement PAIGC into the bush of southern Guinea Bissau in 1973, travelling secretly in canoes – a dangerous trip under the fire of the Portuguese army. They both became convinced not only that the struggle was for a just cause, but also

that the liberation movements were serious and committed. Agostinho Neto, Amílcar Cabral and Eduardo Mondlane were the founders of the three liberation movements, but were more poets (Neto), philosophers (Cabral) and academics (Mondlane) than fighters. These men inspired and led the movements. In Mozambique, after Mondlane was killed, former health worker Samora Machel took over the leadership of the struggle. When the country gained independence in 1975, he became the first president of Mozambique.

1974 was the year of the peaceful ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Portugal by young military captains tired of the useless colonial wars. The new regime changed everything: Portugal became a democracy and the colonies gained independence. Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975 under Frelimo, the sole liberation movement in that country. Frelimo followed a socialist model inspired by the East Bloc, but adopted a moderate African approach, trying to secure access to basic services and food for everybody. Since Mozambique did not want to be dependent solely on aid from Eastern Europe, the newly independent country searched for support elsewhere in Europe. Most Portuguese settlers left the country, indoctrinated and afraid as they were of ‘blacks taking over’, but some stayed to support the country. The schools and hospitals were nationalised; the abandoned big agricultural companies were taken over as Mozambican state farms, meant to provide food for the population. However, many people abandoned cotton farming; the

memories of cruel forced labour under Portuguese rule were too painful.

Mozambique had some years of relative peace in which it had time to rebuild. The country had little expertise at its disposal; educational levels were low and there were few Mozambican doctors or managers. Factories and equipment were partly destroyed by departing colonists: there was no infrastructure in the rural areas, where there were few roads, schools or hospitals. Despite these problems, a wave of enthusiasm swept through the country: Mozambicans could finally build their own country. This was supported by solidarity movements, governments and people from Brazil, Cuba and both Western and Eastern Europe: agricultural specialists, teachers, water and sanitation experts and health workers came to provide the skills that were lacking. Ministries requested the assistance of foreign specialists, on the condition that Mozambican policies would be accepted and not overruled or ignored, as had hap-

pened in several other countries. Machel promoted unity, with no tribal differences; the government tried to promote development through a strong, highly organised population in the villages and townships. Local issues were brought forward to the National Party Congresses, which made the decisions. Mozambique was praised internationally by the World Health Organisation for a switch to primary health care, providing simple clinics and schools throughout the country. Adult literacy went up from only 7% at independence in 1975 to 30% by 1986.

Punished for solidarity with its neighbours

South Africa invaded Angola two weeks after its independence in November 1975, but it did not initially attack Mozambique. That was left to white-ruled Rhodesia, which began to attack Mozambique in 1976. As a liberation movement, Frelimo had been helped by the independent government in Tanzania; now that it was in power as the



A communal village in the Limpopo valley, 1981
(Marie Reehorst)



Burnt train in Gaza province (Pieter Boersma)

government of Mozambique, it wanted to help its neighbours, supporting the liberation movements in the adjacent countries: ZANU in Rhodesia and ANC in South Africa. Unsurprisingly, this was viewed as a threat by the white governments in those countries. Mozambique applied UN sanctions against Rhodesia, which cut traffic through the Mozambican port of Beira, and Rhodesia responded with attacks in the border province of Manica. Rhodesian forces attacked refugee camps that held Rhodesian civilians fleeing the armed conflict, camps of ZANU fighters, and Mozambican re-education camps, where collaborators with the Portuguese colonial war were held in custody. The head of the Rhodesian Security Service, Ken Flowers, admitted later that after a number of unsuccessful attacks and incursions by his armed forces, he founded the Mozambican Resistance Movement (MNR), composed of black Mozambican soldiers who had been part of vicious Portuguese military units and fled after independence. The name was later changed into a Portuguese name: Renamo, *Resistência Nacional de Moçambique*.

When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, the Mozambicans felt relieved. It was a year of peace; the war with Ian Smith of Rhodesia was finally over, and resources could be returned to building up the economy. But it was not to be. Their respite was short-lived. South African military intelligence took over and a weakened Renamo was relocated to South Africa. However, this move to South Africa also changed the nature of the movement. Rhodesia had used it mainly to ac-

quire intelligence about ZANU movements in Mozambique, which required some credibility amongst the local population. South Africa seemed interested only in using it for terrorism, disruption and destruction. In late 1980, Renamo re-opened bases in central Mozambique. These bases were supplied by air from South Africa, which rapidly intensified material support and introduced forced recruitment and training. There were weekly flights in 1980-1981 as well as supply boats going up the coast; crates containing several tonnes of weapons, ammunition and other supplies were dropped at night.¹ The most important new development was the introduction of the strategy of destruction and terror. South Africa's independent black neighbour could not be allowed to be successful.

Apartheid was not the only external factor; the Cold War was equally important. The Reagan administration in the US promoted the fight against communism, and supported South Africa in its struggle against the neighbouring socialist states of Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Mozambique was strategic, because of its internationally recognised successes during the first independent years, especially related to its social policy that lifted people out of their marginalisation. But while US involvement in Angola was directly visible, most of the work in Mozambique was left to South Africa, with similarly devastating effects.

1 Hanlon, J. *Beggar your neighbours*, 1986, London, James Curry, 1986, p. 140

The atrocities: why was this war so cruel?

By 1987, the whole country was in the grip of the war; cruelty in the south, where Renamo had failed to win support, had increased substantially. I just had started my work in a Mozambican ministry at that time. It quickly became clear to me that none of my friends and colleagues had remained unaffected by the war by then. In June 1987 a friend survived the attack on the town of Homoine, running 13 kilometers through the bush while Renamo killed more than 400 people in the small town. (see Chapter 9). Roads became a particular target, with attacks on buses, lorries and cars. A lorry driver drank coffee in my kitchen before transporting a fridge for friends in Gaza province, but he was killed in an attack on the road to the north before reaching his destination, together with more than 200 others. Kidnapping children had become a regular practice. Some were forced to kill their parents, to make it impossible for them to return home. Brutality to ordinary civilians increased; I visited peo-

ple in a hospital in Xai-Xai who had their ears and genitals cut off. People slept in the towns at night and went back to their fields in the morning, hoping to find their hut still intact. Endless stories, every day.

Attacks on the roads were 'logical and rational' within the war philosophy. The Renamo and South African goal was to cut off all transport routes, both railways and main roads. It made people afraid to travel. But the government saw the importance of keeping the roads open. The army protected the civil transport by organising *colunas*, convoys of cars, lorries and buses. In Renamo's view, people travelling in military convoys were 'taking sides'. The same view was taken towards those who were lying in government hospitals; they were burned in their beds. The cities were seen as pro-government, so Renamo regularly cut off their electricity. The seemingly mindless violence of 'bandits' served a strategic military purpose: stopping travel, bringing the economy to a standstill and preventing the use of Frelimo services by creating fear. Nobody could feel safe. What could they expect; what should they be prepared for? In the end the fighters even went beyond this rationale. Personal and political motives, hatred and ways of surviving became part of the situation. Moreover, the possibility of stealing food made others join in attacks, sometimes including the starving soldiers from the Frelimo side. Although there had initially been a deliberate strategy behind the violence and cruelty, in the end it degenerated further to Mozambicans killing Mozambicans.



Food aid in Chimoio, 1991 (Kadier van Lohuizen. NIZA archive/Hollandse Hoogte)



His ear was cut off by Renamo, 1991
(Joël Chichiane, AIM)

Obede Baloi, sociologist and former Awepa staff member, says, “The map of violence shows significant variations throughout the country and across different periods of the war. Let me give one example. In Chipenhe (Gaza province) many of my interviewees spoke consistently of a low-violence incursion by Renamo guerrillas at first, which intensified as more and more local recruits were among the guerrillas. This suggests that some locally recruited or kidnapped people had the feeling: I don’t want to die alone. So one can say that even if external factors and objectives had defined the start of the war, it had undoubtedly developed an internal dynamic.”

Dissatisfaction was real

Despite the wave of enthusiasm in the first independent years, a different Mozambican reality did in fact exist. Vicente Ululu, a Renamo leader and Member of Parliament in the decade after the war, lived in

Kenya as a refugee from the colonial war, and disagreed with the socialist model from the start. “Kenya was against communism. I was married to a Kenyan wife, but wanted to go back to my country after independence. However, what became clear to me was the influence of communist Eastern Europe on the new Mozambican policy. This was not the freedom that I had longed for. The ideological concepts of Frelimo, the lack of freedom, the dissidents; we clearly did not understand each other.” Ululu was in favour of a more liberal economy, and he was not the only one; others also wanted to set up their own businesses, launch private enterprises, make a profit, run their own affairs.

Political room to accommodate differences was also lacking. Machel believed in a centralised governing system in which everybody participated. However, those who did not accept the system were excluded; there was no room for dissident voices. People who wanted to start their own political party were denied or even punished. The execution of dissident Uria Simango and his wife in a re-education camp is a significant black mark in the annals of Mozambican history.

Soon after independence, as part of a huge push to bring schools and health posts to rural areas, the Mozambican Government argued that it was difficult to provide services to isolated rural families. Its suggested alternative was that people should come together in new ‘communal villages’ where infrastructure could be provided. Some built in the first rush of excitement after



People sleeping on galleries in the town of Chimoio, seeking safety during the night, 1991 (Kadier van Lohuizen. NIZA archive/Hollandse Hoogte)

independence were popular and successful, but people in many places were unwilling to leave their land. Authoritarian governors in Nampula, Manica and other provinces forced people into villages, leading to protests, resentment and distrust. It also reminded the people of a similar policy of the Portuguese regime during the liberation war, in which people from rural areas were forced to live in *aldeamentos* with the objective of separating the rural population from the Frelimo freedom fighters.

There was worse to come, not least the 1983 *operação produção* (Operation Production). The unemployed, prostitutes and people who were seen as ‘marginal elements’ were picked up from the streets and transported to work in agriculture in the northern province of Niassa. Return was not possible; people who are angry about being sent there

can be found in Niassa even now. In 1983, a government frightened by the rapidly expanding war carried out public executions and floggings, eliciting increasingly strong national and international protest, even from countries friendly to the regime. The Protestant Council of Churches called on the government to abolish the death penalty, stating that “nobody has the right to take the life of another person” and that “the reason for introducing it, namely ‘to discourage violence’, had clearly not worked.” Frelimo relented and reversed its policy; public executions and floggings and the *operação produção* were not repeated, and the death penalty was abolished. Although the offending events did not recur, people did not forget. Abuses of power by some governors and the central government fed feelings of discontent and dissatisfaction. Frelimo’s steadfast opposition to ‘traditional leaders’ also caused opposition in more conservative rural areas. As a result, Renamo forces did not always encounter opposition when they moved into a rural area.

The Catholic church had its own reasons for dissatisfaction, stemming in part from its historic ties to the Portuguese colonial regime. Although not opposed to independence, Catholic priests were especially upset about the nationalisation of their schools and hospitals, and the lack of recognition for their religion. This only changed in the late 1980s, when the Pope was officially invited to visit Mozambique and buildings were given back. This move was not undisputed; several schools had to close because the church got ‘their’ terrain and buildings

back, without the schools having an alternative.

Would a violent Mozambican uprising have taken place without the outside intervention? Or would peaceful protest, combined with critical influence from supportive countries have led to improvements regardless? From 1983 on, Frelimo became increasingly aware of the erosion of its support. It then not only abandoned the hardest aspects of its policy (e.g. *operação produção*), but also adapted its social and economic strategies in an attempt to shore up its position. In 1983, the Frelimo Party Congress shifted its emphasis from big agricultural enterprises to support for family farming. But Mozambique was still a one-party state with no room for serious opposition. Renamo did indeed attract some people who were opposed and disaffected. However, bit by bit, it became clear that this was not the alternative that most dissatisfied people had wanted. The war was not about building up a different kind of society, or about creating room for opposition or traditional leaders; instead, while making use of Mozambican internal factors, the war was aimed at destabilisation of the entire country. It was intended prevent an independent black majority government from inspiring the liberation movements in white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa and spreading socialist ideals in the region.

Who was Renamo, and why did people join it?

I spoke to Renamo leaders in 2008, and I asked what made them join Renamo. Raul

Domingos, second-in-charge after Renamo president Alfonso Dhlakama and chief negotiator in Rome, was kidnapped in the first years of the war. “I was indeed captured; the train was stopped in the Beira corridor and Renamo took some of us. But I met Dhlakama and he gave me the choice to leave. We talked and I decided to stay. I found myself backing some of his ideas.”

Angelina Enoque, Member of the Permanent Commission, the leading committee in Parliament, joined Renamo after the Peace Agreement, but her reasons go back to her experiences during the war in Manica province. The behaviour of the SNASP security service and of the police contributed to her deep distrust. “There were many problems; people disappeared. My brother was kidnapped by Renamo.” Somebody came to warn her that the police were in her house. “They accused us, saying, ‘The armed bandits were in your house.’ They searched everything. From that moment they continued to persecute me because of my brother. We hoped that a victory by Renamo would bring democracy.” At the time when the Peace Agreement was signed, she lived in Maputo. She tells how she saw her brother on TV. “We had not seen him for 16 years. He was in a barrack with Renamo soldiers. I phoned my mother, crying, ‘He is alive, my brother is alive.’ When I met with him again, he said to me, ‘We need good people; why don’t you take on a political role?’”

Vicente Ululu discusses his involvement. “When a resistance movement was created with support from Rhodesia, I joined it. I



Refugee camp (Pieter Boersma)

spent some time in South Africa. They gave us communication systems and radios; we had the most modern and advanced systems. We survived because of the communication system.” The communication system remained in place until the end, even after South Africa discontinued most of its support. “The troops from Zimbabwe and Tanzania [that were supporting the Mozambican government in the late 1980’s] were a reason for Renamo to intensify the war,” Ululu says, “Frelimo lost ground. Strategic targets were destroyed; we destroyed the sugar factory in Luabo.” The Renamo fighters walked long distances through the bush, from Maringue to Morrumbala. “We did not have food, but the population gave it to us. We never mistreated the population. The mines were laid by Frelimo. When Chissano offered amnesty in 1986-87 to what he called ‘armed bandits’, we said: we don’t need amnesty, we never harmed the population.”

But Ululu does not deny the cruelties. “You can have idealistic views, but not everybody understands that. We recruited 25,000 soldiers, which gave power to commanders, armed men who did not understand the cause. Kids grew up in wartime. It was also an environment in which South Africa could use Renamo for its own purposes.” He visited Germany several times: “Support from Europe was disappointing. Thatcher was a friend of Machel’s. Strauss [a right-wing German politician] gave moral support – we met in 1983 and 1988 – but offered no real help. Portugal had reservations. Nobody saw that this war could be based on a cause. But we could justify this war: we wanted a democratic state. The Parliament has to be elected by the population.” I asked Raul Domingos the same question: Did you agree with the attacks against the population? “Well, there is always cruelty in a war. War is about death and destruction. People are used. Not everybody has sufficient morality to use weapons properly. Although we may have good principles, we cannot control everything. There were local commanders who took those initiatives on their own.”

Ernst Schade, who worked in Manica province during the war and transition period, thinks that there has always been a difference between the political and military wing which led to a later power struggle. “The military part was an unguided missile in the eyes of the political fighters.”

Beira, a different case

Rivalry always existed between the second city of Mozambique, Beira, and the national capital, Maputo. “Beira was always the city of opposition,” comments Verónica Chemane, now working in Maputo. “I lived there as a child, although my parents were from the South. I always felt like an outsider; the way people referred to things in Beira was different. I was told that it was the ‘armed bandits’ [as they were called by the government] who created the war, but people around me often said that it was Frelimo that occupied the country. My ideology apparently belonged to the South. I was afraid to open my mouth. Who was to blame for the war? The Mozambican security service, SNASP, was very active in Beira and created fear, saying that the ones who were causing the war had to pay for it. Men who were suspected of cooperating with Renamo were taken to prison. People did not trust each other either. If you had more food than the others, you had to hide it – who had given that to you? And at what price?” Obede Baloi, sociologist, provides more background: “Beira’s frustrations against the dominance of the capital in the South existed even in colonial times. There was always rivalry; it was always considered necessary to compete with Maputo, at that time called Lourenço Marques.”

A strong and repressive governor was placed in Beira to gain control over the opposition; this move only made things worse. It seemed a vicious cycle that continued to escalate

Longing for peace

In the early 1980s, South Africa increased its pressure and support for Renamo. In 1984, President Samora Machel negotiated with the apartheid regime. “When Machel signed the N’komati Accord with South Africa in 1984, he was criticised fiercely, but I think it was a brave move,” Boaventura Zita said in 2008. Zita is the national communication officer for CCM, the Mozambican Council of Churches. “Machel hoped that the war could be stopped if South Africa stopped its support.” Mozambique kept its promise and stopped its logistic support to the ANC, but South Africa only reduced its support for Renamo, not discontinuing it altogether. Papers found in 1985 when the former headquarters of Renamo in Gorongosa were captured show continuous South African involvement.

Samora Machel was killed in a suspicious plane crash in 1986. Joaquim Chissano took over as president. When the Frelimo government discovered that South Africa had not stopped its support, and the war could not be won, it asked for support from Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops in 1987. Although that intensified the violent reaction from Renamo, it also secured the Beira corridor, the vital transport link between Zimbabwe and the port of Beira.

Under pressure of the war and strong foreign influence, Mozambique signed an agreement in 1986 with the IMF and the World Bank. Social principles like free health care and education had to be abandoned bit by bit. Mozambique opened up

to privatisation and the free market system, which replaced the failed centralised economy. In 1987, implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (PRE) started. Queues in the shops disappeared, bread was available on a daily basis now, and many luxury products appeared in shops – at least for those who could afford them. The new system was welcomed, but it also created a division in society; most of the benefits were experienced by a small group.

“Why did you think it was enough? Why were you in favour of peace negotiations?” I ask Ululu. He responds, “The war made no sense anymore. Reforms had started with the Economic Recovery Program. Many of the aspects that I did not like had disappeared over time. Influence of Eastern Europe stopped, private enterprise was possible again, and the new constitution of 1990 opened up the country for free association and for a multi-party system. So one by one, my objections disappeared. The war was not the solution any more. We could take part in the society in the way that respected our convictions.”

At the same time, the Cold War ended and South Africa was preparing its own democratisation process. The end of South African support and drought in Mozambique made surviving in the bush increasingly difficult for Renamo. The negotiations began in Rome in 1990 and were concluded in 1992 with a detailed Peace Agreement. (AGP) The churches by then had been active for eight years to bring the leaders to

the negotiation table: ‘Let brothers speak to brothers.’ (see chapter 3).

Fear disappeared

Verónica Chemane talks about her experiences in Beira at that time: “When the Peace Agreement was signed, fear disappeared; we suddenly could speak out. All the churches and civil organisations were involved in a movement for peace, there was civic education everywhere. After the war Renamo wanted to show that ‘it was not our fault, we are not to blame’. They wanted to show that they destroyed for a cause. The government made space for them to participate in the process.” She continues, “To achieve democracy you need to have a choice, and that was what we had lacked. There was no choice, there were no alternatives. But in the preparation time for elections we were still afraid that the same would happen as in Angola [with the Unita rebel movement], entering the towns and then restarting the war.” Throughout the Mozambican transition period, there

continued to be a vivid fear of a repetition of what happened in Angola, where elections in 1992 did not consolidate peace. The losing movement Unita did not accept the outcome. It restarted the war from a stronger position, since it had gained access to the towns through the peace agreement.

“There will always be lack of clarity about the role of each person, even in Frelimo; there were always people wearing two hats,” says Alex, who worked in civil service in Manica during the war. “And many peo-

ple also criticised Frelimo. But the majority of atrocities and organised violence was by Renamo, no doubt about that. In Manica I saw complete villages set to fire.” And Ernst Schade notes, “When the war was over and the people could be honest about their sympathies, many more people were Renamo members than we thought, even in provincial government.”

Obede Baloi states, “It is important to record how things really happened. The context is different now. Many of the current explanations about the causes of the war are in fact post-facto reconstructions. They are reinterpretations. One important factor in this change of circumstances is the 1994 elections. These elections estab-

lished Renamo as a key political player in Mozambique, and remained as such, at least for three consecutive elections. Thus, one finds that many Renamo voters don’t ask questions about the past, they just oppose Frelimo.”

He continues, “The contradiction is that in spite of the way people were used, and in spite of the violence, the multi-party system was introduced in Mozambique because of the war with Renamo. It was influenced by the desire to end the conflict, making space for eventual inclusion of Renamo in the political system. Which is something else than saying that Renamo fought for a democratic country.



Demonstration: 'Help! Government and Renamo, please save us'. Maputo, May 1992
(AIM, Antonio Mucave)

Chapter 3

The involvement of the churches

“We felt that the only road to peace was bringing the brothers together to talk. The government saw Renamo as an instrument of foreign interests, while Renamo said it was fighting Marxism. What could be done to bring them together? The Mozambicans had to talk amongst themselves, independently from foreign influence. We had to consolidate what unites us,” said Bishop Dinis Sengulane when I met with him in 2008. For many years, the bishop was the President of the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), which has nine Protestant member churches. We were sitting in Sengulane’s room next to the Anglican church. Documents and files were piled up in his modest, dusty office. Elderly women in much-washed capulanas, the traditional cotton cloth wrap, were waiting in the hall to speak to him. Bishop Sengulane is still highly respected because of the role he played in the peace process, but he remains an Anglican priest first and foremost.

CCM created the Commission for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation (CJPR) in 1984. “We saw how the population suffered. In the cities there was protection by the government, but in the rural areas there was none. The attacks and kidnappings by Renamo were horrible.” CCM played a role in emergency activities for the victims of the war, and was active in the refugee camps in neighbouring countries, but they saw

that neither evangelisation nor emergency aid would be enough to stop the suffering. The churches wanted to contribute to peace and democracy. They were supported and influenced by northern European aid organisations that had an anti-apartheid policy, including Awepa. European parliamentary delegations visited the refugee camps and received information from Bishop Sengulane and Reverend Lucas Amosse, who was equally involved in the peace process.

“When President Samora Machel signed the N’komati Accord with South Africa in 1984, he was criticised fiercely by many African countries, including allies, but I think it was a brave move, and strategically correct, in the sense that President Machel didn’t want to give the apartheid regime reason to crush Mozambique,” says Boaventura Zita, communication officer with CCM; he also coordinates civic education programmes. Machel hoped that the war could be stopped if South Africa discontinued its support. Three months after the Accord, the churches sent a letter to Samora Machel to praise him for his initiative. “But the churches thought that was not enough; the same courage needed to be found to talk with the other Mozambicans who were causing suffering in the countryside. We said to the government, please talk to the others,” says Zita. The churches were received by Samora Machel in 1985, but talking to Renamo was not acceptable in his eyes.¹ In 1987, a third letter was sent to the President, who was Joaquim Chissano

¹ Sengulane, D.S. *Vitória sem Vencidos*, 1994, Maputo, p. 9

at that point. “It is not important where the bullets come from, or which uniform is using them; it is the Mozambicans who are dying in this wave of terror.” Steps should be taken to prepare for dialogue, the letter stated: “even with the ones who are used by external forces” and: “dialogue is not the same as legitimising the destabilisation; it is simply an acknowledgement of the suffering.”

Bishop Sengulane and the Catholic Bishop of Beira, Dom Jaime Gonçalves, both played an influential role in bringing about peace and reconciliation. However, the two men used different approaches, drawing from different histories. In Portuguese colonial times, the Catholic church was officially recognised as part of the system and had a formal agreement with Salazar’s fascist regime, while the Protestant churches in Mozambique were the targets of official discrimination and had to maintain an independent position. Consequently, the latter developed a better understanding of the position of the black population. The Protestant churches used local languages and were often at least sympathetic to the liberation struggle. Protestant church schools educated many of the children that later became the leaders of the liberation movement. This difference also influenced their positions after independence.

Dom Jaime, Bishop of Beira, spoke in a radio interview in 1999 of how he came back from a study in Rome just before independence. “I was intended to be the spiritual leader of the preparatory theological

seminary.”² When independence came, the Portuguese missionaries left the country. Dom Jaime was shocked by the Mozambican government’s promotion of atheism and the nationalisation of schools and hospitals that had been in the hands of the church. The government invited the Catholic church leaders for discussions several times. As Dom Jaime relates, “We talked and talked but did not agree. They wanted me to change my ideology.” As the war worsened, the Catholic church was not supportive of Renamo’s violence, but there was definitely more sympathy and understanding for Renamo’s opposition to the Frelimo government. In full secrecy, Dom Jaime sought contact with Dhlakama, and finally met him in his base in Maringue, long before other contacts had been established.

While the Catholics had better access to Renamo, the CCM was better equipped to influence the ruling government. CCM forged ties with the Archbishop of Maputo, Dom Alexandro dos Santos, and both Catholics and Protestants tried to convince the two parties that talking was necessary. They both wanted peace. “We did it in the pastoral style,” said Sengulane, “not in public. This was different from the Catholic approach; they did not talk to the government, but put pressure on them in a pastoral letter saying: the government *has* to talk.” He continues, “But the Mozambican Catholics also wanted peace. The Archbishop of Maputo asked us to talk to the government.”

2 Manhique, E. *Gente da nossa terra*; 1999, Radio Moçambique Maputo, p. 121

In 1987, Chissano recognised the need for action and invited the religious leaders to explore the possibilities. The churches then received an invitation from the US Senate. “They wanted to know: ‘who are those communists who want to talk? We answered, ‘There are no communists; there is a social system that we want to restore.’ We hoped that direct contact could be promoted through the US. But the American churches did not understand what we wanted.” He smiles. “However, we did have the opportunity to talk to somebody who knew somebody who had contacts with somebody with contacts with Renamo.” That became the start of trips to Kenya and other countries by a delegation of two Catholic and two Protestant church leaders. It took until February 1989 for them to meet with two political leaders from Renamo: Raul Domingos and Vicente Ululu. “We said to them: we don’t want to be mediators, we just ask both sides to talk directly to each other.”

The meeting created an opening. “When we finally met the Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama in August 1989, we were able to bring a twelve-point discussion paper from the government to the table. It was answered by a sixteen-point Renamo statement, which we took back to the government. That was the only thing we did. We did not interpret anything. It was highly confidential.” CCM leader Reverend Amosse, who was present at that meeting, says now: “Of the 16 points raised by Renamo, the question of communism was the most important; other issues were exclusion, lack of respect for traditions, no recognition of traditional authorities.”

In the end, the negotiations took place in Rome. “We did not want to be part of the negotiations themselves,” says Bishop Sengulane. “Dom Jaime was present. I never went. One of us was enough.”

CCM then became more openly involved in preparations for peace amongst the population in the country’s interior and in the refugee camps, preparing people for peace and reconciliation. “We talked with them about going back and forgiving.” After the peace agreement it took part in nation-wide reconciliation and civic education programmes. “The wounds were deep; women had been taken away from their homes and forced to stay with Renamo. The main question here was how to involve the people themselves, how to integrate them,” says Bishop Sengulane.

The first priority was to involve the member churches in the whole country. The main concern for CCM was helping the population accept inclusion of the enemy. Reconciliation and forgiveness were the most important issues at first. Cooperation with Awepa started in 1991, developing from 1993 on into a nation-wide programme that created possibilities for people to speak out and to discuss the new situation, but also to be informed about the new political situation, the multi-party democracy and the elections. (See Chapter 7.) The CCM provincial delegations served as a platform for the provincial training and activities. Boaventura Zita writes in 2009: “The programme gave a new encouragement to the work of the CJPR, the peace and reconciliation

commission of the Protestant churches. Awepa brought specialists from other countries into the training seminars, who brought essential experience with them, as well as questions about human rights and democracy.” CCM perspective over the years had changed into a more political approach. As Zita says in his notes, “CCM saw that it was necessary to also consider the causes of the emergency situation.”³

CCM also launched a nation-wide ‘swords for ploughshares’ campaign, creating opportunities for voluntary disarmament. Bishop Sengulane explains, “There are still many arms in the country, although there are no armed groups with political intentions.” The weapons are destroyed or given

to artists who use them in creative projects. “We don’t ask where the arms come from. Unfortunately, not everybody wants to hand in their weapons. But the situation is not as serious as in Angola, where people in the diamond areas were heavily armed. We are lucky that Mozambique had no links between war and natural resources. Nobody profited from the war.”

“There is never a justification for such violence, even if the cause is accepted,” Sengulane concludes. “80% of the fighters were kidnapped and forced to kill. People paid with their own lives. The problem now is that history is rewritten; no-one wants to take the blame.” (See Chapter 9.)

3 Zita, B. *A Cooperacao entre o CCM e a Awepa*, 2009, CCM, Maputo

Chapter 4

Negotiations and agreement

On the 4th of October 1992, we all saw it on TV: Chissano and Dhlakama hugged in Rome; the General Peace Agreement (AGP) was signed. The last days of the peace talks had been tense; the signing had been scheduled for 1 October, but Dhlakama delayed his arrival because of unresolved issues related to the local administration in Renamo-controlled areas. But talking, pressure, and a new draft about the subject helped persuade him past his final objections. Filipa Baltazar da Costa, Frelimo MP, who held a leading position in women's organisation OMM, will never forget how they came back. "Chissano wanted peace. He had said before he left: 'I will not return without a signed peace agreement'. I can still see him coming out of the airplane, back from Rome, triumphantly holding that piece of paper in his hand. It was an emotional moment."

Euphoria, unbelief and fear followed: would it work? Would they really stop fighting? War had just broken out again in Angola after successful elections in September. In Mozambique, the peace agreement achieved its intended aim; the fighting did indeed come to an end. Renamo relied on a sophisticated communication system, allowing their leadership to notify all Renamo units over the next few days, and the units followed the order to cease fighting.

Tired of war

Anselmo Victor was Renamo's national political officer at the time of the Peace Agreement. He now holds a seat in the Mozambican Parliament. When we met in the Renamo parliamentary office, he told me: "I was a guerrilla in the Beira region. There were many clandestine Renamo members. Peace did not come as a surprise to me; everybody was tired of the war, and both sides knew that they had to accept it. The international community was also interested in supporting the end of the war, and the EU played a role in the process as well."

"There was a serious drought during the last years of the war," says Manuel Pereira, also an MP, who was the political delegate for Renamo in Beira in 1992. "The bases did not have food any more. People were starving." Vicente Ululu, former Renamo negotiator, and leading figure in parliament for years, confirms this assessment of the situation just before the peace agreement. "Both sides were tired. We wanted the war to stop."

But the main negotiator, Raul Domingos, does not believe that the war stopped because everybody was tired. "The guerrillas obeyed their orders; they knew that it was time for peace. I don't believe that they were tired. In other countries, fighting does not stop just because they are tired; some leave but others take their place. But the people believed in their leaders, so the war stopped."



Press conference during the peace talks in Rome, announcing the agreement about the ceasefire. Left: President Joaquim Chissao, middle: mediator Mario Raffaelli, right, Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama, 1992 (Joel Chiziane, AIM)

South Africa withdraws and the Cold War ends

Frelimo had abandoned Marxism and was discussing the multi-party system to be included in the 1990 Constitution. But the outside world was changing too. The Cold War and apartheid were in their final years. Mandela was released in 1990 and the Berlin Wall had fallen; Namibia achieved independence from South Africa after long negotiations. And indications had already been given earlier. The Gorongosa papers, found in 1985 in former Renamo headquarters, showed that South Africa had already started to lose interest in Mozambique by that point: official minutes from the visit of 'Colonel Vanikerke' (which probably refers to Van Niekerk) to Dhlakama in May 1985 describe how he proposes a visit from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. "Louis Nel is still interested in the search for peace in Mozambique." He also asks Renamo not to attack the South Africa-Maputo railway and the Cabora Bassa power lines, "but the most important point is to ask for a resumption of Renamo/Frelimo talks." But he also conveys a message from General Viljoen: "I assure Mr. President [Dhlakama] that Renamo still has friends in the South African military. I hope that Mr. President understands the difficulties that we South Africans have with our politicians."¹

Anselmo Victor continues: "After 1984, the South African support diminished. One of

the strong points that remained was the communication system, but a war never survives on external support only. Weapons, equipment and medicines are difficult to distribute from outside. The N'komati Accord also created agitation; new fronts were opened." Raul Domingos was unhappy with the South African attitude, saying in reference to the Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Pik Botha did not want to continue any more. We felt betrayed; they had abandoned us. They had their own interests to pursue." But Pastor Mutungamira in the central Sofala province says now, "When the outside world lost its interest in the war, we thought to ourselves: what is left? We did not want this war."

Frelimo and Renamo talk

In May 2008, I spoke with former Renamo negotiators Raul Domingos and Vicente Ululu. Domingos explains: "Frelimo wanted a ceasefire, wanted the Renamo side to hand in their weapons before starting negotiations. If we would recognise the official institutions, they would give us amnesty. This was unacceptable to Renamo; we did not want to relinquish our position from the outset. The Kenyan government understood our concerns, saying that 'peace cannot be imposed; it has to be negotiated until there is consensus'." They then had to find a place where they could negotiate. "An initial attempt was made in Malawi. But Malawi had troops in the Nacala corridor. Frelimo sent a delegation to Malawi, and the President of Kenya offered a jet to bring Renamo. But Dhlakama refused, so it was a fiasco. Kenya played a role on our side. President Arab

¹ *The origins of armed banditry in Mozambique; (Extracts) Gorongosa papers, 3rd edition, Notebook 2, p. 1-2*



President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama shake hands after Dhlakama's arrival in Maputo, 1993 (Alfredo Mueche, AIM)

Moi had contacted the Renamo leadership and we were offered Kenyan passports." It became important to find neutral ground. "The Renamo proposal to hold the negotiations in Kenya was not accepted by Frelimo, and the proposal for Zimbabwe was refused by Renamo."

Then Don Matteo Zuppi of Sant'Egidio, an Italian church organisation with representation in Mozambique, took the initiative to mediate. Vicente Ululu explains, "The Italian government wrote to Chissano with the proposal to hold the negotiations there. Frelimo and Renamo both accepted." Italy was a good choice, reducing US influence and giving the negotiations a Mozambican character. South Africa's involvement was

very limited, as its attention was occupied with its own democratisation process.

The negotiations in Rome

In February 1990, the news that negotiations had started became public knowledge. The first direct meeting in Rome was on 8-10 July 1990, with a delegation of four Frelimo and four Renamo representatives. Armando Guebuza, Minister of Transport, headed the Frelimo delegation; its other members were Francisco Madeira, presidential diplomatic advisor, Aguiar Mazula, Minister of Labour and Teodato Hunguana, Minister of Information. The Renamo delegation was led by Raul Domingos, chief of the external relations department, who was accompanied by Vicente Ululu, head of the department of Information, Agostinho

Murrial, political affairs, and Joao Almirante from Dhlakama's cabinet. It was a remarkable fact, and an indication of the seriousness of the peace talks, that neither side replaced any of the delegation members throughout the two years of negotiations. The meetings were attended by observers: one representative from the Italian government, Mario Raffaelli, two from the community of Santa Egidio, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi, and Dom Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira. The observers later took on a new role, acting as mediators.

The initial points raised by Renamo and by Frelimo, and exchanged through mediation of the churches, had made it clear that both sides raised principles that could serve as a basis for dialogue: a peaceful solution, democracy based on freedom of expression and association, recognition that people have the right to choose their government, and a desire for national reconciliation. Renamo did not rule out accepting the legitimacy of the government, the constitution and the laws in force.² "When we came to the negotiation table, our first conditions were multi-party democracy, free elections and justice," says Domingos. "We also did not want the Zimbabwean attacks in the Beira corridor to continue." Domingos refers to the road between the port of Beira and land-locked Zimbabwe, protected by Zimbabwean troops. The Malawian army protected the northern corridor between Malawi and the Nacala port. "But the Ma-

lawians did not attack," says Domingos. The first meeting concluded with a joint statement on the 10th of July 1990. For the first time, both sides publicly expressed their intention to seek peace.

There was a long way to go. During the first hour, Guebuza and Domingos had made opening statements to introduce the members of their delegations and to express a commitment to dialogue. Both avoided contentious remarks, and the atmosphere was good.³ Various countries sent delegations that held separate meetings with both sides. The US in particular claimed a role. They operated in parallel to the mediators, holding their own meetings with both parties and urging them to sign an agreement without a provision on military use of the corridors.⁴ But the two parties wanted a more detailed accord. In the third round in November 1990, the negotiators changed their approach. The Italian observers became mediators, chairing the meetings and proposing the agenda. Two issues had priority: the Zimbabwean troops, and setting the agenda for further discussions. The agenda needed to include the negotiations about the political and military conditions for peace, a calendar for the cease-fire and for the elections, and the international guarantees.

"On 1 December 1990, we achieved agreement about the role of the Zimbabwean forces in the period prior to the cease-fire. This was an important step," says Raul

2 Hume, C. *Ending Mozambique's war*, 1994, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. p. 29

3 Hume, idem, p. 33

4 Hume, idem, p. 45

Domingos. The document known as the 'Agreement on Partial Cease-fire' diminished warfare for the first time. The role of the Zimbabwean troops in the Beira corridor decreased substantially, and Renamo promised to not attack the Beira and Limpopo corridor anymore. A Joint Verification Commission was created to monitor implementation of the agreement.

In more than ten rounds of negotiations, the agreement was discussed issue by issue, encountering tense moments, inflexibility and some drafts from Renamo that seemed to be introduced just to "complicate the process and make an early agreement impossible".⁵ It was far from simple. There was a will to negotiate, but mistrust was deep and abiding. It made the negotiations lengthy. The slow construction of the protocols to reach a consensus led to impatience in the national and international community.⁶ However, the result was an accord with very detailed guidelines. It provided a strong foundation during the sensitive and fragile transitional period, and served as a useful tool in many difficult situations.

Although there was continuous pressure from outside, the negotiations took place between the Mozambicans. Both the Frelimo government and Renamo were keen to assure that. In a letter to Raul Domingos in May 1991 about the 'basic principles',

Dhlakama wants to confirm the rules. He stresses that the draft is the work of the US and Frelimo, and that it looks the same as "what 'the Americans and the Soviets' did in Angola, where they forced MPLA and UNITA [the two sides in the conflict] to sign the agreement that they had elaborated." He expresses his dismay that they now wanted to do the same thing with Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique. "That will not work in Mozambique."⁷

Although this comment expressed a fear that the US would disproportionately support Frelimo, while that was never the case, the effect was the same: it was clear that both sides wanted the agreement to be Mozambican. And indeed, the poorly constructed agreement in Angola and its minimal execution, together with the biased attitude of the US and the UN favouring the UNITA rebels, were amongst the reasons that the Angolan peace process failed just one year after Dhlakama's observation.

The concluding factor in the last phase was the series of meetings with African leaders, especially President Mugabe. These meetings reduced fear and granted African legitimacy to the negotiating process. States that had once been involved in the conflict amongst Mozambicans now wanted to foster reconciliation.

In an interview in Mozambican newspaper *Magazine* published in June 2008, Raul Domingos concludes that the negotiations

5 Hume, C. *Ending Mozambique's war*, 1994, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., p. 77

6 Mazula, B. *Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*, Maputo 1995, p. 30-31

7 Mazula, idem, p. 31



President Chissano arrives at Maputo airport after signing the 4 October General Peace Agreement in Rome, 1992 (Antonio Muchave, AIM)

were a success. “Given the context, the peace accord was negotiated well. No accord can completely satisfy both sides.” The only thing he would have done differently now is incorporate the security component, the police and a non-partisan public service. “But in short, the Peace Agreement was negotiated in detail, and included knowledge about the causes of the war and the way to reach a definitive solution.”

Anselmo Victor says now that he was happy to have peace. “The war created barriers. People could not easily visit each other. There was a different climate from 1992 on. I wanted to be part of the process.” He became a member of the Joint Verification Commission appointed to oversee the partial cease-fire agreement, and he was on the

CNE, the National Election Commission during the transition period.

The Agreement

The agreement on Partial Cease-Fire was signed on the 1st of December 1990.

The General Peace Agreement, signed on the 4th of October 1992, consisted of seven protocols, which were agreed on different dates.

I	Basic principles	18-10-91
II	Political parties	13-11-91
III	Principles of the Electoral Act	12-03-92
IV	Military questions	04-10-92
V	Guarantees	04-10-92
VI	Cease-fire	04-10-92
VII	Donor conference	04-10-92

ONUMOZ, the UN peace-keeping mission, was assigned an important role in guaranteeing the execution of the Peace Agreement. The detailed protocols were executed and controlled by joint commissions composed of members from the two Mozambican sides, as well as international members.

CSC: Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, headed by the UN Special Representative

CCF: Cease-fire Commission

CCFADM: Joint Commission for the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force

CORE: Reintegration Commission

The agreement was extremely detailed, and none of the parties could anticipate the full scope of the organisational, logistic and financial consequences. The election date was set for the end of 1993, but that later proved to be impossible. One of the

important points was the consensus about the new joint army, consisting of 15,000 soldiers from each side, to be fully trained and in place before the elections, and the rapid assembly and demobilisation of all remaining troops. The actual constitution and government remained in place until the elections. This created stability during the transition period.

Dialogue and reconciliation now had to progress beyond the signing of the agreement. A different period had commenced. Mozambique opened up; people started talking, meeting each other, travelling. Refugees returned to their homes and families were reunited. Freedom of expression took on a whole new meaning. Independent newspapers sprang up and everybody wanted to discuss, study and learn. As if the many lost years had to be compensated.

Chapter 5

Reconciliation: “If we start punishing, where would we end?”


A lift from a lorry in Quelimane was almost the only way to reach the interior of the province of Zambezia in December 1992. Fighting had stopped immediately following the October Peace Agreement and the roads had opened up. Trade from the city shops had started to reach the isolated provincial towns. Gurue was our destination. The road was bad; grooves in the road marked the places where cars had been forced to slow down, and the burnt out wrecks showed what had happened afterwards. Tiny women came out of the bush shyly, peeping at us from behind a tree, amazed by the sight of a normal car passing without a problem. They were clothed only in bark and too afraid to come closer.

I made a second trip that month, this time to Morrumbala, a destroyed town in Zambezia province that had been occupied by Renamo for several years. There I met the new Frelimo administrator, who told me how he had taken the initiative to communicate with the Renamo troops that had laid down their weapons. Reconciliation had already started, he said; there was no need to wait for official instructions. He sent someone with me to a Renamo military camp close to the town. I saw an old monastery in ruins, and boys with heavy weapons, no older than 15, lounging around the grounds but immediately alert when they saw us ap-

proaching. We asked to have a word with the commander. A man came to us and held out his hand. I had to respond, but I hesitated. It was as if I saw the blood shed in the brutal war on his hands. He looked at me, waiting for me to shake his hand. Suddenly I thought: if the Mozambicans can live with this, if they are willing to accept and forgive, if they want reconciliation, who am I to do otherwise? I took his hand. It was at the start of a serious and rapidly growing involvement by my organisation, Awepa, in the peace process, the reconciliation efforts and the construction of a functioning multi-party democracy.

Punishment or amnesty?

The official peace agreement, the AGP, granted general amnesty, and nobody had objected, not the Mozambican population nor the international community. The amnesty law applied to everybody involved in the war, Renamo guerrillas as well as the government army. Trials were never discussed as a serious option. Filipa Baltazar da Costa, former deputy head of OMM and a Frelimo MP, says now, “If we start punishing, where would it end? The line between being guilty or being a victim was often blurred. Mozambicans understood that; most families still had members that had been kidnapped by Renamo, dividing families into Frelimo and Renamo members. Punishing the Renamo war crimes would also mean opening up the issue of criminal acts committed by the government army. Who always knew what was done by whom?” Her colleague Gertrudes Vitorino adds, “We had to forgive, not forget. How



Woman in Angonia in Tete province: the pictures of Chissano and Dhlakama with the text on her cloth wrap: 'Fruit of Reconciliation', 1993 (Alfredo Mueche, AIM)

can you forget what you saw? People who saw their daughter being pounded in the way women pound their maize. There are so many witnesses, youth kidnapped, raped. But we had the example of South Africa: punishment is not the way.”

“How do you feel now, that those crimes were never punished?” I asked in an interview in 2008 with Helena and Isabel, living in Maputo. Their response was unambiguous. “We have never questioned that. It was clear from the beginning of the negotiations that if we started to talk about punishment, peace would never be achieved. We had to accept that we would keep our mouths shut and forget.”

“But can you forget?”

“No, we will never forget.”

“And forgive? Can you live with people when you know they have been part of it?”

“Sometimes it is still difficult, particularly when you see people with big cars, speaking in Parliament as if they care for the population, when you know that they have been complicit in brutal war crimes. But yes, in general we are able to forgive. We Mozambicans are very tolerant, maybe too tolerant; it is in our people’s nature. We are able to tolerate, even if it is not reasonable.”

It was not the first time that amnesty was granted, although the previous occasions had been related to admissions of wrongdoing. In the first years after independence, President Samora Machel spoke with people who

had collaborated with the Portuguese administration during the colonial war. If they were honest about crimes committed against the Mozambican population, they were accepted and received amnesty. In 1986-1987, a government radio campaign encouraged people to run away from Renamo; if they did, and if they submitted to government authority, they were given amnesty and support. 2000 men changed sides at that time. Many of them were victims as well, and the population was asked to receive and accept them. “That sort of thing taught us to understand and accept the enemy, even after serious crimes. Religion was also important in teaching us about peace and tolerance,” says Isabel. “After the peace agreement, we tried to live with the fact that from one day to the next, the bandits were no longer bandits anymore. It was far more important to keep the peace than to ask questions.” When the Peace Agreement was signed, silence about the atrocities was the norm. But when I ask Filipa Baltazar why people did not speak out during the civic education programmes, she says, “Oh, they did, not in public, but amongst themselves.” (See Chapter 7.)

Traditional healing or Truth Commission?

“If we would not have had a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, we would have gone up in smoke,” Bishop Desmond Tutu said in an interview on Dutch TV in January 2008 in reference to the South African reconciliation process. “How can you forgive someone who says: I deny everything?”

Mozambique survived; it did not go up in smoke. The main concern during the

transitional period was to integrate and accept the former enemy. In addition, the churches preached forgiveness and integration. It is a discussion that I had several times with Boaventura Zita of CCM during our joint civic education programmes of that time. His response was, "A truth commission is not our way to deal with this, although it worked in South Africa. We have our traditional ways of healing."

It confirms what I heard in a visit with an Awepa parliamentarian delegation in April 1993 to a village to the north of Maputo. It was a region that had been severely affected by the war, where attacks and killings had driven the population away from their villages to safer camps in the town of Manhica. Men came back to rebuild, but women and children still remained in the camp until they could be sure that safety had been restored for good. I asked about the lost children, the ones that had fought in Renamo. Could they come back as well? "Yes, of course; they are our children." But could these people accept what they had done? "We have our ceremonies for that. We don't speak of the violence that has been committed. That would bring the spirit of violence back. Our *curandeiros*, our traditional healers, hold a ceremony to cleanse them of the evil, of the violence, of the crimes. And after that they will be accepted." And another man said, "We are not always the ones who are in a position to impose punishment. In the end, justice will be done. That is our strong belief; that gives us peace."

Mozambican researcher Alcinda Honwana held a lecture at a Dutch university in 2008 explaining the importance of traditional healing, especially for former child soldiers, who are victims and perpetrators at the same time. She told the story of a ten-year-old boy, Marula, who was kidnapped but tried to escape together with his father. Their escape attempt failed.

"As punishment, and for his own life to be spared, Marula was ordered to kill his father. And so he did. Following this first killing, Marula grew into a fierce Renamo combatant and was active for more than seven years. He does not remember how many people he tortured, how many he killed, how many villages he burnt and how many food convoys and shops he looted. After the war, he returned to his village. But his paternal uncle, the only close relative who survived the war, refused to welcome him home. These events established Marula's transition from child to soldier, civilian to combatant; from victim to perpetrator, innocent to guilty, a killer rejected by his own family. It shows the moral and emotional dilemmas created by a war that tore apart communities and split entire families."¹

Honwana explained how Mozambicans deal with traditional healing. "Cleansing and purification rituals were performed to deal with the emotional and social problems of war-affected populations. The rituals were

1 Honwana, A. *War, Reconciliation and Citizenship in Mozambique*. 2008, The Hague, ISS Public Lecture Series no. 1, page 9

based on cultural notions of social pollution by the spirits of death.” She explains that the spirits of the victims wander around, and, if no purification takes place, it can affect not only the individual who committed the offences, but the whole family or community. “In the post-war chaos, when governments and international organisations are unable to provide effective mechanisms, these community rituals are often the only means available to help communities to move forward. The rituals offered the former child soldiers what they needed: forgiveness and reacceptance into the community. In this way, the community also reconciled itself with its troubled past.” Marula was indeed later accepted by his family.

“And what about us, the victims?”

Traditional healing through local ‘*curandeiros*’ made many people’s life bearable, mainly in the rural areas. But the silence about what happened was very real and continues to this day. No crime was ever admitted openly, and no direct relation was laid between the offender and the victims. Nothing was officially documented, and testimonies of victims have not been requested. Helena says now, “In the beginning, it was not necessary to speak out; people knew who had done what. But now history is being rewritten more and more, and the new generation does not even seem to know what happened. It hurts that the people who attacked us say now that they fought for justice. I sometimes think: and what about us? Did what we went through not matter?” And Fernanda, a friend from a northern province, says, “I lost my father. He was

a good man who was killed just like that, without any reason, but they never apologised; they never said sorry.”

Talking with Boaventura Zita of CCM in 2008, I returned to the discussions we had fifteen years before. I asked him, “Why did Mozambique not create a truth commission like in South Africa?” He explained, “To have a truth commission, you need a strong judicial system. Also, South Africa had a different reality; the war was not as brutal as in Mozambique. In addition, there was a lot of contradictory information or misinformation here; at some point in time, you no longer knew any more what was true and what was not. Will it help? To know now what a present MP has done and what not? It is easy to judge. Behind the war is the empty stomach: hunger and starvation. Searching for total justice is difficult. Massacres were committed for economic reasons. Where is the justice? Let’s not forget that the process has political, economic and social victims. Who has treated the invisible wounds of the Mozambicans? Many have been turned into instruments but thanks to treatments, no visible traumas are left. We were brothers, but we were used. External conditions promoted that. We in the churches have spoken strongly about forgiveness. The civic education programme that we carried out together with Awepa gave everybody the opportunity to talk; that was the best thing that could have happened. (See Chapter 7.) The centre of the country, Manica and Sofala provinces, were more difficult. The wounds from the war were different there. But after several

meetings and seminars, the difference was gone.”

I raised the same question with Reverend Lucas Amosse, former Secretary-General of CCM, who had been involved in peace and reconciliation programmes for many years, and was instrumental in setting up the civic education programme with other church leaders. “It would have been very complicated to research what happened. It was already complicated enough, and peace had priority above everything else. South Africa is an organised society, different from us when we came out of the war.” Thinking back, he then adds, “Almost all of us were victims. But I do see now that we did not do enough to recognise the suffering. We did not want to prolong the pain. I think this was a mistake, but I don’t know what we can do now. People who suffered need room to express their suffering. The ones who committed war crimes were not punished, and we did not acknowledge the suffering of the people who were abused. Trying to open it up now will have many consequences. There are risks involved; false stories will be told. Going back to a truth commission now is almost impossible.”

Obede Baloi explains: “In the Mozambican case, former warriors were key to establishing peace, there would have been no peace without them. The leaders made a compromise; they had no interest in pursuing the truth. And the people needed their leader to be part of a new beginning, so they did not ask questions. Violent actors hardly remained in places where they acted during

the war and were not recognised as having committed crimes. With an invisible enemy it is easier to accept the other.”

Could prosecuting war criminals indeed block peace processes?

Perpetrators from the wars in former Yugoslavia and in Sierra Leone, and from the genocide in Rwanda, have been brought to court. These legal proceedings probably come as a relief to many victims after years of impunity. The trials are also meant as prevention, as a signal: you cannot just kill, thinking that you will go unpunished. However, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is increasingly confronted with doubts from diplomats and judiciary who question whether the charges are not hindering the peace process rather than contributing to the solution, e.g. in the current conflicts in Sudan and Uganda. Bert Koenders, Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, said in an interview in 2007 that the obvious choice is not always to opt for justice first, and then for peace.² He speaks about a dilemma. Who will be willing to sign a peace agreement if he knows that he will be headed straight to the court in The Hague? “You have to listen to the population,” he said, “that is where the victims are.” The role of the ICC is also disputed in Africa. But the founders of the ICC argued that peace cannot be sustainable without justice. A Uganda analyst disagrees, saying that it is a matter of priorities, since neither justice

2 Koelé, T. Reportage in Afrika met minister Bert Koenders, *De Volkskrant*, The Netherlands, May 12, 2007



A delegation of parliamentarians, members of Awepa, and representatives from refugee organisations on a fact-finding mission in villages in Gaza province where people are coming back, April 1993
(Pieter Boersma)

nor a democratic state would be possible without peace: “Enough space should be given to make the deal.” However, setting that priority also means that the victims will not have justice. It does indeed present a huge dilemma. People from Southern Sudan say, “Our priority should be reconciliation.”³

Trials are always selective. Who defines who is most guilty: the ones who actually kill, or the ones who initiated the violence, but remained behind the scenes? In the Mozambican case: what about apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia at that time?

3 Lindeyer, K. ‘Vrede en gerechtigheid in Afrika’ *NRC Handelsblad*, The Netherlands, 14 July 2008

And the support in the context of the Cold War? There seems to be a kind of unspoken agreement not to touch the international responsibility.

Conclusion

Amnesty, traditional healing and forgiveness worked in Mozambique. It did indeed bring peace; it made it possible for former enemies to live side by side and build up a new life together. It was different from the colonial war for independence, or from other wars where one side achieved an undisputed victory, such as the Second World War in Europe. Those wars ended with a clear statement of right and wrong, allowing room for acknowledgement of the

suffering – at least on the winning side; only after 60 years is there some room for nuances and shades of grey. The way the war ends is significant for the decisions about punishment. When there is no clear winner or loser, pinpointing the line between right and wrong is a difficult and sensitive matter.

Real reconciliation means honesty on both sides. But that was not possible for the people in post-war Mozambique, at least not openly. In the end, the only way to deal with the past was just to live with it. Still, long-term consequences are unclear, and dilemmas remain.

Chapter 6

The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

The psychological importance of the UN troops, especially in the first period, should not be underestimated, several people told me. The UN wanted to make sure that Mozambique's peace process would be a success, especially after the recent failures in Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Angola. Mozambique had a serious chance of becoming a success story, as it fulfilled most of the conditions needed to make it work: both sides in the conflict and the population as a whole all wanted peace, and long negotiations between the government and Renamo had resulted in a serious and detailed agreement with compromises made consciously by both sides, laid down in the General Peace Agreement (AGP). At that point, it looked as if there was hardly a way back.

“The situation is miraculously fine”

Italian diplomat Aldo Ajello was appointed by the UN to coordinate the ONUMOZ peacekeeping mission to Mozambique, consisting of a political staff, a humanitarian aid programme coordinated by aid programme coordinated by UNOHAC, and about 6.500 UN troops and 1000 civil police. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was responsible for arranging the return of more than 2 million refugees, together with NARML, the Mozambican government institution in charge. But three million inter-

nally displaced people also needed support. Many international organisations were involved in their return and integration, for example the Norwegian Refugee Council. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) organised the transport of refugees, internally displaced persons and demobilised soldiers. Many refugees returned spontaneously, long before the official programmes started. Ajello found a very sympathetic ear in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN at that time, who pushed donor countries to contribute manpower and money and to agree to new timetables.

The UN had not been closely involved in the peace talks and was caught off-guard by the demands that the Peace Agreement placed on them. Ajello had initially been appointed to the position on a temporary basis. Consequently, in late 1992 and early 1993, it was an unprepared international community that had to move quickly. In December 1992, ONUMOZ offices were established in Maputo. Ajello complained in a meeting in early 1993 about the slow budget approval process, causing delays in the arrival of troops. Only \$11 million had been approved in advance, but another \$300 million needed for UN involvement had not yet been committed. Peacekeeping forces from Italy, Botswana, India, Zimbabwe and Uruguay were ready to come, he said.¹ Quick arrival of the troops was important in order for peace to hold. As

1 Hansma, T. *Minutes of Awepa meetings in Maputo*, 31 February 1993



Mozambicans repatriated from Swaziland, arriving by train in Boane, 30 km west of Maputo, 1993
(Alfredo Mueche, AIM)

Ajello stated at that time, “Renamo does not want to move its troops until the UN is in place.” “Delaying demobilisation is dangerous,” said Renamo leader Raul Domingos in January 1993, referring to the insufficient UN presence. The first UN troops did not arrive until April 1993.

In that meeting in early 1993, Ajello described the situation as “miraculously fine”, despite a UN presence that was still far too small. “People are not dying, thanks to a good food response. The peace is holding; rain is falling. But there is a lack of international media coverage, since the situation is calm.”

Ajello’s mission is generally seen as successful. He played an important role, not only as the head of the peacekeeping force, but as a politician who played chess with all the pieces on his diplomatic chessboard, often under time pressure, involving the Mozambican government and parties, the international community and his UN staff in seeking solutions. Ajello’s strength was that he was new to UN peace-keeping missions, and perhaps more open to unusual solutions as a result, responding seriously to signals from Mozambican society.

The Mozambican politicians welcomed the support coming in from the international community. They wanted desperately to make peace work and tried to create the necessary conditions, but acknowledged their lack of experience and limited capacity. Moreover, trust had to be built on all levels – in politics, in society and in the future

joint army. Consequently, the UN and donor organisations were welcomed and needed. However, almost every country, international organisation and ambassador had an opinion on how Mozambique should develop. Ajello had the important and difficult task of trying to coordinate these differing views and to promote joint reflection. Arranging donor involvement to ensure that funds were provided at the right time and place was also important. However, it sometimes looked as if the country had been taken over.

Renamo made threats regularly, toying with the idea of resuming the armed conflict. Their threats of war were dangerous; they could still make it happen. However, these residual rumblings of unrest were also, and perhaps primarily, a way for Renamo to exert pressure on the proceedings – and it achieved the desired results. From a position of relative weakness, since the existing government was already established and recognised by the international community, Renamo’s only recourse to retain power in further negotiations was to threaten to boycott the process. “We regularly faced intimidation and threats,” former UNOHAC representative in Sofala and Inhambane George Siemensma now says, “but I don’t think it was from any real desire or even possibility to go back to war. I think that Renamo leaders knew that those times were over. The only moment that I felt a real danger that everything could go wrong was when Dhlakama announced a boycott one day before the elections. Not a return to war, maybe, but the feeling that everything had been in vain.” (See Chapter 8.)



UNOHAC trying to cross the water next to a destroyed bridge over the Luaua river in Sofala province, 1993 (George Siemensma)

Ajello had stressed the importance of responding to Renamo's material demands, providing money that hardly could be expected to be accounted for. Providing financial resources would increase interest among the Renamo leadership to build a life in the city, creating an appealing alternative to a return to the harsh, primitive living conditions in the bush. Danish Ambassador Peter Truelsen supported that idea, saying in early 1993, "It is in everybody's interest to get them out of the bush. Others have a base, houses, income, but Renamo do not. Getting them into the city, providing the means of survival, helping to establish a political party is important."²

Money and luxurious houses in Maputo were indeed important for Renamo to build their new position. The donor community

were not the only ones to respond. Entrepreneur 'Tiny' Rowland of the international company Lonrho had made financial deals with Renamo in the past, in exchange for an agreement from Renamo not to attack the Lonrho installations in the Tete province of Mozambique. When that approach no longer worked, and Lonrho was no longer excluded from violent attacks, Rowland turned to supporting peace. "There is no democracy without money," Raul Domingos seems to have said to Rowland in June 1992. A deal was made to provide between six and eight million US dollars, the exact amount dependant on continued Renamo adherence to the peace accords. Rowland also helped with Renamo's demands for houses, putting the four-star Cardoso Hotel in Maputo at Renamo's disposal for a period of one year and providing a fleet of vehicles.³

The AGP was both sophisticated and complex. It included agreed procedures and precise timetables, and stipulated that the transition period should be concluded with elections at the end of 1993. However, that period proved far too short. With the example of Angola clear in the minds of the Mozambicans and the international community, an example in which the rebel movement Unita restarted the war after the 1992 elections, it was clear that much better preparations would be needed. Even after elections were postponed by a year, it

2 Hansma, T. *Minutes of Awepa meetings in Maputo*, 31 February 1993

3 Alex Vines, *The Business of Peace: 'Tiny' Rowland, financial incentives and the Mozambican settlement*, 1998, Accord, Conciliation Resources, UK

was a race against the clock. Just one month before the elections, Renamo had still not relinquished control of all the areas it occupied, which meant limited access, hardly any information and no freedom of movement for the people in those areas.

Postponing the elections, however, also meant a longer UN presence, at the cost of US\$20 million a month. In January 1993, UNDP Representative Erik de Mul said in a meeting, "If UNOMOZ has to stay till sometime in 1994, the costs of the UN operation will increase substantially. It is almost unthinkable that the Security Council will extend the operation beyond 1993." Despite the considerable expense, the UN Security Council approved the extension; Ajello supported the postponement, which proved to be crucial. Quick elections imposed from outside, ignoring the context, have caused peace processes in several countries to fail, even though the elections themselves went well. The international

community has often underestimated the importance of making time to involve the population, to build realistic perspectives for a better life, to achieve reconciliation between the former enemies, and arrange serious preparation of the politicians before they take up their new tasks. If pre-election preparation is rushed and incomplete, it provides a weak base for the post-election period. De Mul also expressed his concerns about the democratisation process following elections. It was clear that elections could not be the end of the story.

Another problem was the language. The national language spoken in Mozambique is Portuguese. UN personnel and troops, embassy personnel, international organisations that came in to provide technical support for repatriation, rehabilitation and elections were hardly able to read the basic documents, let alone comprehend the nuances, especially in the beginning. At the request of the government, Awepa provided translations into English and bilingual publications of key documents. Extra copies were made for the UN.

UN troops

The first troops arrived in April 1993. The Italians came to replace the Zimbabwean troops in the Beira corridor. They established a visible presence at first, with regular armed patrols, but after some time this was no longer necessary; there were hardly any serious incidents. However, the presence of the UN military as a neutral force had a positive effect, especially around the demobilisation assembly centres.



Demining in Sofala province by a South African company, 1993 (George Siemensma)

The UN peacekeeping force had a limited mandate; if war or violence had broken out, an adequate reaction would probably have been difficult. Fortunately, that was not put to the test in any serious way. The war was indeed over after the 4th of October; the UN soldiers were mainly in Mozambique as a symbol of peace and security. On the other hand, it was a large army and had little to do. By the end of the transition period, the population mainly viewed them as soldiers who spent most of their time lying on the beach. Some contingents played an especially constructive and positive role, supporting efforts to build roads and children's playgrounds and gardens. As Siemensma relates, "They helped to make roads accessible and locate land mines. They opened their hospitals to the population and provided logistic support."

In contrast, the Italians in Manica province caused serious problems. Ernst Schade, coordinator of Norwegian organisation Redd Barna (Save the Children Norway), who was based in Manica, tells me in 2008 how he became involved. "The Italian contingent was not very well prepared for this mission. They had no prior information about Mozambique; it could have been any country as far as they were concerned. Their behaviour in Manica demonstrated a lack of respect for the population, driving cars recklessly, causing accidents, refusing to pay for the damage."

At that time, Redd Barna was working to help unaccompanied minors who had lost their parents in the war, trying to help

children find their way back to their families. "The first sign that something was wrong was when staff members saw a lot of young girls with very short skirts." The situation became much more serious when Redd Barna discovered widespread and well-organised sexual abuse of children by the troops. Schade describes witnessing the abuse first-hand. "Two staff members came to my house at 11 p.m. and asked me to come and have a look in a nightclub. There were 40-50 Italians there. They had constructed a stage and I saw four very young naked girls, and four naked Italian men. They had numbers on their body and one of the men shouted, 'Number 1 goes on number 6.' They filmed everything." Through a friend, a Mozambican photographer who was asked by the Italians to copy the films, Schade was able to obtain a copy of the material. "It was pure child pornography." Redd Barna wrote up an official report for the UN in December 1993, but it took some months and a wave of international publicity before a serious investigation was launched. However, the investigative mission drew clear conclusions and the Italians were sent home in April 1994.⁴

The Italians were replaced by a contingent from Botswana. The contrast was dramatic. The Botswanan troops gained popularity by undertaking community-oriented projects. Schade describes the difference in approach. "The Botswana chief commander

4 Schade, E. *Experiences with regard to the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Mozambique*, 1995, Redd Barna, Norway-Mozambique

came to me, a tall and impressive man. He gave me his personal telephone numbers, saying: if there ever is a problem with our soldiers, please call me.”

UNOHAC

The general mandate for the coordination of humanitarian aid was assigned to UNOHAC, and included reintegration of ex-soldiers and coordination of demining. Unlike the other UN staff, UNOHAC provincial coordinators were recruited from expatriates who lived in Mozambique, who knew the local situation and spoke the language. Their teams were the only ones that had unrestricted access to Renamo areas. “Our strength was twofold,” says Siemensma, who worked in Sofala province, one of the more difficult areas. “Our mandate was established in the Peace Agreement, and that put us in a good position to negotiate and to convince Renamo to stick to the rules at difficult moments. In particular, we had access to difficult areas where there were people in hiding, still under Renamo control. But it also gave us the possibility of coordinating the emergency organisations effectively, which avoided a situation in which each organisation just started wherever they liked, or let other interests prevail. We let them unfold their plans and adjust to each other.” Most NGOs did not like UNOHAC involvement in the beginning; newcomers simply wanted to rush into Renamo areas, preferring the ‘popular’ areas like Gorongosa, for which it was easier to raise money. “But they did in fact need us to gain access to the regions where the situation was still tense.”

The intervention in Sofala was not limited to aid. UNOHAC mediated in four cases of mutiny related to ex-soldiers who were waiting in the assembly areas for demobilisation. “In July 1994, we received an urgent message that the disabled soldiers in Muanza had taken a substantial number of hostages,” says Siemensma. “On our way to the spot, we met the UN troops, who had put up a barricade across the road. They warned us that the situation was dangerous, but we decided to continue with the UN flag on top. In Muanza, we saw about 200 people camping at the side of the road, being held by the soldiers. They were very aggressive, although they were only armed with sticks and crutches. They protested about the slow demobilisation process.” The former soldiers now also wanted to hold the UNOHAC team hostage, but negotiation resolved the situation. “Back in Beira, we did what we had promised. With the help of the Red Cross, they received food for the hostages and for themselves. Involvement on a higher level made it possible to include Manuel Pereira, the Renamo representative for Sofala, who talked with them about the demobilisation problems. They then let the 200 people go. It still took several weeks before the soldiers were out of the assembly centre.”

In another case of a blockade in Dondo, the ex-soldiers had arms and fired them into the air. No hostages were taken that time. It was Pereira who had called for a demonstration, so they would not listen to UNOHAC pleas to stop it. “A forceful discussion with Pereira was necessary, referring to

the AGP agreements, especially about weapons, before the blockade was lifted,” says Siemensma.

Demobilisation and a new unified army

Timely demobilisation and integration of former soldiers were indeed crucial. If that process was not completed before the elections, war could restart at any moment. The Peace Agreement defined that the two Mozambican armies should be integrated in one unified army of 30,000 soldiers, 15,000 from each side, to be recruited on a voluntary basis. But most soldiers just wanted to go home. Ajello also expressed his concern, saying that “an initial survey indicates that only about 15% are interested in being in the joint army. And donors are not interested in paying for the new army, or for any army.” Military training and support were later provided by Britain, France and Portugal and Zimbabwe; Italy contributed financially.

Ton Pardoel was head of the UN Technical Unit for demobilisation. In an interview with a Dutch newspaper in May 2009,⁵ he said, “Everything had to be invented; even the government did not know how many soldiers it had in the country. It was a public secret that a third had been killed or deserted, but there was no documentation anywhere.” 49 assembly camps were created, where soldiers would be prepared for demobilisation. They received an identity pass with a photograph. “For many of them, it was the first time that they had seen themselves. [The process] had

to be transparent, so that both parties could have confidence and hand in their weapons without losing face.”

The number of Renamo soldiers was equally unclear, and was exaggerated in the beginning. Doubts existed as to whether all troops had come forward. Renamo held back a substantial number, especially in the area around the former Renamo headquarters of Maringue. Moreover, not all the child soldiers had been demobilised or released immediately, as had been agreed. In June 1994, Renamo admitted that it still had more than 2000 child soldiers. A UNICEF survey had confirmed their presence in tightly guarded bases within Renamo’s strongest military zones. A special demobilization team was organized for the benefit of those under 15 years of age.⁶ But even in 1995, after the elections, an additional 50 children were released from Maringue through Red Cross intervention.

A Dutch diplomat who was involved at that time says now, “We did not know exactly how many had to be demobilised. The early figures from Renamo were very high, but later proved to be much lower. We were prepared to contribute, but became concerned about the slow process.”

The first troops went to the assembly areas in December 1993, a year after the AGP, and demobilisation started in March 1994. At the end of the UN mandate in December 1994,

5 Steen, H. van de ‘Je hebt antennes nodig, geen plan.’ *Brabants Dagblad*, 30 May 2009

6 Synge, R. *Mozambique, UN Peacekeeping in action 1992-1994*. 1997, US Institute of Peace Press, p. 97



Aldo Ajello (centre) talks with an Awepa delegation. Left: Jan Nico Scholten, president of Awepa; right: Sir David Steel, member of the Awepa Board, 1993 (Pieter Boersma)

92,881 soldiers had been demobilised; 11,579 had joined the new army by then, far fewer than expected. The slow demobilisation process and delays had caused many problems. By July 1994, the number of mutinies had increased, it appeared as though discipline on both sides had disappeared almost entirely. It was clear: soldiers did not want to join the new army. They only wanted to be demobilised, receive their salary, get food, blankets and shoes and leave.⁷


A Mozambican success story: two years income made integration of ex-soldiers happen

What should Mozambique do with more than 92,000 ex-soldiers who had no place in the new army, or who did not want to join


it? Ex-soldiers often become the new marginalised youth, lacking experience in anything but war, unwelcome in their former village, or still having access to guns. Their presence would continue to jeopardise stability if they were not able to find a new way to live. In Angola, during the period of peace in 1992, frustration about the slow demobilisation process created space for criminal attacks on the re-opened roads.

In January 1994, Ajello expressed his concern that demobilisation was not moving along fast enough. He then took an unusual initiative. He proposed guaranteeing monthly support for two years in cash, to be paid for six months by the government, and eighteen months by the donor community. The demobilising soldiers were first given an introductory course about their rights and duties and about peaceful civilian

7 Fauvet, P. and M. Mosse. *Carlos Cardoso e a Revolução Moçambicana*, 2003, Maputo, Ndjira, p. 327



Soldiers at the UN-run assembly point in Massinga waiting for their demobilisation, Inhambane province, 1994 (Ferhat Momade, AIM)





A demobilised soldier receives money and clothing, 1994 (Ferhat Momade, AIM)

behaviour. They also had access to vocational training. They had to choose the place where they wanted to go, received a package of civilian clothing and were provided transport to their chosen destination. The monthly sum was related to the last salary in the government army, and paid through the local bank. It was between \$7 and \$24 a month, and higher ranks up to \$46, with a lump sum of US\$52 for all at the end.⁸

“It was a revolutionary way of thinking; we could hardly sell this idea to our government in The Hague,” says the Dutch diplomat. “But once the EU had accepted it, the Dutch were prepared to join the initiative.” The programme was approved in March;

the first soldiers drew their money from the bank in their district in July 1994.

“It gave us a good position to return,” says one of the ex-soldiers. “We became respected members of the community, had something to offer to the family, could invest in our lives.” Most of the ex-soldiers went back to rural areas, built a house, invested in their impoverished family, found a wife, had a baby and worked a piece of land. The outcomes of the evaluations are positive.⁹ By 1996, 87% of these demobilised soldiers had been reintegrated into society and accepted by the community; most of them had secured a food supply or a small guaranteed income. Their families were better off, with more children going to school. The

8 Barnes, S. *The Socio-Economic Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique*. 1997, Maputo, UNDP/RSS

9 Lundin, I. et al. *Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise*. Case study, 2000, London, Macmillan Press

men who stayed in the capital had a lower success rate, but it was still within reasonable parameters.

The total reintegration budget was US\$94.4 million. From that budget, \$35.5 million was allocated to the project to provide the two years of cash income. Of that amount, \$33.7 million went directly to the demobilised soldiers. The overhead was extremely low: 2.5% for UNDP, which coordinated the programme, and 2.5% for the bank. Sam Barnes concludes in her evaluation for UNDP that “cash and material benefits for all demobilised soldiers should be the base of all reintegration programmes. There is neither organisational capacity, nor an economic base in post-conflict societies to implement large-scale job creation programmes.”¹⁰ In the end, more than 92,000 soldiers benefited, about 71,000 from the government forces and 21,000 from Renamo.

Despite its success, the example has hardly ever been followed in other countries. Most went back to the traditional project approach. There are taboos and prejudices about providing direct cash. One objection is that poor people lack the proper skills to improve their lives themselves and need specialised help from others to spend the money in an adequate way. Another view holds that it would be better to give it to the women, because they take responsibility for the family, while men do not. The Mozam-

bican approach challenged this. What happened was the opposite: when a regular and unconditional supply of money was provided, men worked with their families and planned how to improve their lives – and many succeeded.

The new army: “we were under military orders not to discuss politics”

During the negotiations, the Frelimo government had difficulties agreeing to an army of 30,000; they had wanted at least twice that number. UN coordinator Ton Pardoel confirms the lack of enthusiasm that soldiers felt for joining the new army. “The question of whether we could get enough soldiers for the new voluntary army was crucial. Most were completely fed up with the war; they wanted to go home. They wanted peace.” At the time of the elections, the new army was not yet complete. While an army of 30,000 soldiers had been planned, by late August 1994 it totalled 7,806 soldiers, consisting of 4,263 former Government troops and 3,543 former Renamo fighters. By the end of the ONUMOZ mandate in December 1994, the total had reached 11,579.

Adriano Malache was working in the Ministry of Defence in 1995. I interviewed him in October 2008. “It was still difficult. Troop numbers had been reduced substantially, and there was a lack of confidence. Joint courses had to minimise the tension. There were major differences between the ones who came from the former government forces, and had often attended military school, some even going to the academy,

¹⁰ Barnes, S. *The Socio-Economic Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique*. 1997, Maputo, UNDP/RSS

while the Renamo guerrillas came out of the bush. They had to be integrated, learning the principles of regular drills. Seminars were organised with both sides about the role played by armed forces in a situation of peace in a democratic society, with due respect for the law and for human rights. It was discussed together. Aguiar Mazula, the Minister of Defence, took this initiative. It was a slow process; theory does not change actual behaviour overnight. But bit by bit it was understood.”

Public statements did not always reflect reality. “Publicly, we said that there was no division, but everybody knew how difficult it was. But the leadership of the armed forces helped everyone to accept each other, saying, ‘We have all killed; we are not going to accuse one another.’ We were under military orders not to discuss politics. The lack of space to express political sentiments actually facilitated integration. It took place in a spirit of reconciliation, not transposing the old problems to the new situation. We had to be democratic.” Malache continues: “Now we sometimes feel that there are so many things to be questioned: who was to blame, what did we do wrong? Many things still hurt, give you a feeling of revolt. But at that time all the efforts were directed at maintaining peace. For the youth, it is already history.” Malache is now the director of the Mozambican office of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), an organisation that supports democratic development of political parties in seventeen countries.

The peak of international aid

Refugees and displaced people returned home and families tried to find each other, people started to build again, and minimal living conditions had to be created. “We saw a lot of new international NGOs coming in just to profit from the opportunities,” says Alex, a former employee in the water sector in Manica. “There was money available and many applied for it, even if they lacked the capacity to deliver quality. UNCHR had distributed the districts amongst the aid organisations. Even if they were specialised in only one issue, they suddenly had to do everything: agriculture, building schools, digging wells, etc.”

The return of refugees through UNHCR had suffered many delays. UNHCR had been unprepared, and was only beginning to get itself organised in August 1993, after it had secured a budget of \$204 million. It took so long that returning refugees even missed the planting season. 250,000 people had already returned on their own by then, mainly from Malawi.¹¹ Alex continues, “Peace brought relief and optimism; everybody felt that. You could travel without fear. But the transition period was also very confusing, involving many irritations, especially towards international NGOs that came temporarily. You had to wait until the peak was over to return to normality. Serious NGOs that were in the country before the Peace Agreement mostly stayed and tried

11 Synge, R. *Mozambique, UN Peace-keeping in action 1992-1994*. 1997, US Institute of Peace Press. Washington D.C.

to guarantee continuity.” And Siemensma says: “We built up a very good database that was later handed over to the competent government authorities, together with all the material, computers, etc. But it was more difficult for the government than it had been for us to get a grip on the coordination of the international NGOs.”

Looking back

In an interview in 1999 in a Dutch newspaper¹², Aldo Ajello reflects on the process and the role of the UN. “In Mozambique, we came as friends. That is not the case in many other countries; the UN has often a bad name. I violated all the UN rules. I knew that it would be the end of the story if we were associated with the New York bureaucracy.” He continues, “After an agreement is signed, the guerrilla movement is extremely vulnerable. The fighters have to come out of the bush. They are afraid, see peace as a trap and start to violate the agreement.” Renamo attacked four villages in the first days. Ajello went directly to Dhlakama, saying: “We spend one million dollars a day on this process, a fortune. We cannot continue like this. What is your problem? Maybe we have the means to solve it. If not, you remain bandits that nobody wants to deal with.” The UN spent 17 million dollars on financial support to Renamo during transition. “That was absolutely necessary to change Renamo into a political party.” Lessons can be learned from Mozambique, says Ajello. He lists five points:

1. Everybody has to be convinced that there is no military solution;
2. After the negotiations, there should be no losers;
3. The peace agreement should be very detailed. If it is not, there will be huge problems when it is implemented;
4. The peace-keeping force has to be there for the population. If not, it becomes an occupation force;
5. The most support should go to the rebels, and not to the government.

Conclusions

Two years of negotiation and two years of transition have been criticised as excessively slow and expensive. Yet the unorthodox approach and the extra time that was taken to sort things out were actually useful, and probably provided the most important basis for the success of the peace process. The international organisations provided necessary support – morally, financially and technically – but not all organisations recognised the importance of having the Mozambicans in the driver’s seat, being the owners of their own country. The international presence was sometimes too overwhelming.

12 Bossema, W. ‘Na vredesonderhandelingen mogen er geen verliezers zijn.’ *De Volkskrant*, 16-04-1999



Civic education seminar in Inhambane, March 1994 (Awepa Maputo)

Chapter 7

Civic education in the transition period

“I was studying outside the country when I heard that the Peace Agreement had been signed,” says Obede Baloi, Mozambican sociologist and my colleague from 1993-1998. “It was a new era. I came back to be part of it; I was passionately inspired by it. In the beginning of 1993, I travelled to Gaza for the first time and saw the destruction from the war, burned cars on the way. But I also saw the people coming back on foot. They came on their own initiative. They did not wait for ONUMOZ; they started to build houses. They believed that it was possible. This impressed me”. He continues: “At that time, Awepa held its first series of civic education seminars with civil society organisations. One of the trainers for the CCM seminar did not show up, so CCM suggested that Awepa should talk with me. I had two days to prepare for the subject on democracy. I did it and got involved. It seemed an opportunity to make a useful contribution.”

Baloi talks about his growing enthusiasm, “People were already involved in the transition. I was impressed by the discussions about freedom and democracy. People aired their opinions; there was no self-censorship. They were already using the space of freedom. It was wonderful. That was the start of my five intensive years in Awepa programmes, taking part in the

different phases of civic education¹, and in election observation. After elections we were involved in providing training and support to Parliament and in capacity building for local elections.”

Mozambican organisations and Awepa

In November 1992, one month after the AGP was signed, Awepa supported the international conference of women’s organisation OMM, in which the participating delegates together with leading women from other Portuguese-speaking countries exchanged ideas about how Mozambican women could be involved in peace-building efforts. The OMM conference became the first step in the nation-wide involvement of women in the Mozambican process. After this event, Minister of Justice Aly Dauto in January 1993 asked Jan Nico Scholten, president of Awepa, to pursue involvement in civic education.

“Awepa was the first international organisation in the country that was prepared and able to address the issues of peace and democracy with civil society, and for a long time it was the only one,” says Angelo Matusse in 2008.” Matusse was Awepa Representative for Mozambique from 2000-2008, and was interested from the start.

A joint programme was then set up with the Protestant churches, organised in CCM, and with the women’s organisation, OMM.

1 Baloi, O, ‘... e muitos participaram!; um estudo sobre a educação cívica por ocasião das primeiras eleições gerais e multipartidárias em Moçambique’, 1995, Awepa Maputo-Amsterdam

CCM had been actively promoting peace and reconciliation for several years. The programmes included series of national, regional and provincial training seminars in which the provincial leadership, members and activists were trained to involve and inform the local population. The issues were about the content of the peace agreement, with explanation of new rights like free circulation, the reconciliation process, acceptance and cooperation with the former enemy, and the new multi-party system. The programme expanded later, including the youth organisation OJM and the organisation of trade unions OTM, as well as some small organisations. With ONJ, the independent trade union of journalists, the special role of journalists in the process was addressed. In the final phase before the elections, a small group of Renamo activists was trained.

The trainers were Mozambican specialists, staff from the participating organisations and Awepa staff and specialists. Awepa was a trusted partner for Mozambique. Through its international members, which included MPs, politicians and human rights experts, it was able to provide the necessary expertise. The activists from the Mozambican organisations presented the message, using local languages in regions where Portuguese was too difficult to understand. The organisational capacity and motivation, down to the smallest villages, was impressive.

Filipa Baltazar was Deputy Secretary-General of the OMM at that time, and responsible

for the education programs. In 1995, she concluded in an interview: “We put our experiences together and the result was a great programme.”² Her colleague Gertrudes Vitorino added: “In the beginning, we did not know how to start. We developed everything in cooperation with Awepa. We had no idea that the programme would grow to such an enormous size, nor what we would be able to realise in the end.”³

The civic education programme: where should we start?

The people of Mozambique were traumatised; many had lost their families and their homes, while others had been abused, or had to seek refuge in neighbouring countries or in camps. Now that peace had finally been achieved, they tried to resume their lives. The majority were illiterate and public awareness of the new constitution of 1990 and the General Peace Agreement, the AGP, was almost non-existent, especially in the rural areas. The new democratic system in Mozambique was based on Western legislation, founded on principles that are different from traditional African practices, which are based more on consensus than competition. Apart from that, it was also different from the recent political systems, both the colonial times when there was no democracy at all, and the one-party democracy after independence. The concept of

2 Baloï, O, ‘... e muitos participaram!; um estudo sobre a educação cívica por ocasião das primeiras eleições gerais e multipartidárias em Moçambique’, 1995, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 19

3 Idem

making a choice between parties was unknown, and general elections by secret ballot had never been held before.

The new situation needed to be discussed; it was necessary to talk about peace, tolerance, freedom of circulation, respect for different opinions and respect for human rights. It was necessary to explain the new political system, democracy, political parties, voting. How could the population be involved? How to prevent democracy from becoming an empty shell, excluding the people? What could be done to prevent war traumas and hatred from overshadowing hope and cooperation?

Developing the programmes

Shortly after the Peace Agreement, Awepa started in a small office in the back yard of the Norwegian Refugee Council, just me and Telma Mahiquene, a young Mozambican woman, who just had finished commercial administration school. She was a combination of assistant, bookkeeper and receptionist, and I was everything else, with nothing but my laptop and motorcycle. After the first big OMM conference, we were immediately caught up in the rush of requests. We hardly had time to reflect; we simply had to get started. It was a period of learning by doing for everyone involved, carefully identifying the most urgent needs. This meant involving creative and motivated people in the programme, and arranging all the support we needed from the official institutions, the Ministry of Justice and later the electoral bodies CNE and STAE.

Civic education was not yet as much of a trend in international organisations as it is now, and we often had to reinvent the wheel. The Mozambican organisations built the programme around their active membership in the districts and villages. Everything was discussed together, analysing the phases in the Mozambican process and inventing new methodologies.

Awepa's international office and staff were supportive, and our donors were flexible, so the programme was able to start without bureaucratic delays. Specialists and parliamentarians from Europe and Southern Africa came in, joining us as colleagues on voluntary basis, never asking for consultancy salaries or luxuries. Many of them knew Mozambique and spoke the Portuguese language, and were motivated to contribute. They say now that they learned as much from the Mozambican process as the Mozambicans did from them.

Other players

At the start, no other organisations were available to provide civic education, and the work of the electoral bodies had not yet started, but a broader involvement developed later, especially prior to the elections. The Catholic church had already started a programme of 'reconciliation and forgiveness' in August 1992. In December 1993, they started a civic education programme in the run-up to the elections, supported by Caritas Mozambique. 36 trained activists went into the provinces to accompany 736 activists in the countryside. When the electoral bodies were installed, the American

organisation NDI worked directly with them, providing support for the materials and manuals that had to be developed. In 1994, provincial civic education coordinators were appointed by NDI/STAE, principally to focus on voter education. Taking a pragmatic approach, most coordinators combined their election-oriented efforts with what was happening already in other civic education programmes. International NGO Friedrich Ebert organised several debates and produced educational materials. Party observer training was financed by the US; the funding that was provided was intended to train 35,000 monitors from different parties⁴ and the programme was implemented through three international organisations: CARE, IRI and IOM.

As the official technical institute for the organisation of the elections, STAE trained 1600 civic education activists. The information they provided was mainly technical: the dates and locations for registration and voting, the importance of having a voter registration card, and how to vote. The training came too late to help with voter registration, but Baloi describes a major push in the last three weeks before elections. “STAE organised a giant campaign, combining radio and TV, but also mobile units, making direct contact with the population through election simulations by the civic education

teams.”⁵ Many Mozambican organisations picked up the subject; round table discussions were broadcast on the radio, and the ‘*Companhia Nacional de Canto e Dança*’ (the National Song and Dance Company) and other theatre and dance groups held performances about the elections, often in cooperation with civic education activists.

Working with the mass organisations: OMM, OJM and OTM

Coming out of a one-party system, the only organisations that had nation-wide membership and experience in local activities were the so-called ‘mass organisations’ – OMM (women), OJM (youth) and OTM (trade unions) – created by Frelimo after independence as a way to involve the population in development. The churches had a nation-wide presence as well, although with a different history and position. New organisations had only started emerging since 1990, but most were still small and local. Many of them joined the programmes of the big organisations. The ‘mass organisations’ had declared themselves independent from the Frelimo party after the constitution had opened up options for diversity in 1990. They wanted to adopt a role in promoting diversity in society, creating room for different opinions in women’s groups and youth, and involve themselves in impartial civic education work. The impartiality of the message they conveyed was a

4 *The U.N. and Mozambique 1992-1995*; intro by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, p. 60

5 Baloi, O., ‘... e muitos participaram!; um estudo sobre a educação cívica por ocasião das primeiras eleições gerais e multipartidárias em Moçambique’, 1995, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 14

condition of programme support from Awepa, but that did not require much discussion; it was clearly the way they had chosen to play their role in peace building, reconciliation and the new democratic society.

OMM, and the involvement of the women

I met the two women in 2008 again, who had set up all the OMM programmes from 1993-1997, Filipa Baltazar da Costa, and Gertrudes Vitorino. After ten years, we had so much to tell, so many experiences to exchange that it was often difficult to get us back on track and discuss the issues that the interview was intended to address. “When the Constitution paved the way for a multi-party system in 1990, many women in OMM were against it. But we, the leadership, had travelled outside the country several times and seen different political systems, first in Zambia and later in Malawi. It was difficult for many people to accept that Chissano wanted to introduce a multi-party system, since the majority of the people taking part in the nation-wide discussions had been against it. But Chissano was searching for peace.”

OMM had been effective within the one-party system, maintaining direct lines of communication with the party, the Frelimo government and Parliament. “As OMM, we had influence; we could change some legislation and practices related to women, precisely because we were accepted by the Government as the leading women’s organisation. Mozambique always made room for women’s leadership. But it is a different matter in our homes.” Local structures brought the issue of women’s

rights into the districts. OMM was known for its effective campaigns on topics related to hygiene and health, as well as its early attention for domestic violence. *Círculos de interesses*, or interest groups, created in the townships and in the villages, organised local women, giving them the opportunity to improve their lives. Since 1990, a different kind of room had been developed for new local programmes. Because OMM was losing its financial support from the Frelimo party, it now received some donor funding. However, most of the work was done by the large women’s networks out of a sense of solidarity – operating with a very low budget. For OMM, the end of war meant a new motivation to build peace, but also to seek a place for women in the new emerging democracy.

The *Mulher e Democracia* Conference of November 1992 was intended as a time of reflection by the OMM provincial delegates. Participation from Angola and other countries offered outside inspiration. But by then Angola had already gone back to war, a sign for Mozambique that the preservation of peace was not a foregone conclusion. Filipa still feels that as a hard failure. “I was invited as an observer for the Angolan elections, the elections themselves went fairly well.” But preparations for peace in Angola had been less than thorough, The armies had not been dismantled and were immediately able to take up their old positions, with Unita even stronger now it had gained access to the cities.

The OMM conference became the first step in the nation-wide involvement of the women in Mozambique in the peace and democratisation process “We made people aware of the changes,” says Filipa. “People now had to deal with many parties; they had to know the rules. They had to fight for a just position of women in society. The important thing was to forgive, not to punish.”

“We pushed the women to be demanding in the democracy”

Augusta Lôbo de Odadilea, long-term activist with OMM in Nampula and Maputo, says in 2008: “We explained that democracy starts at home. The provincial delegates from Zambezia and Nampula were an inspiration to me. They knew what it was about; they had the spirit to do the work; they were not in a leading position just for the sake of being the boss or for the money. If it is just about the money, that can destroy everything. But they wanted to leave something behind for the well-being of the people. We went into the townships, involving the population; it was in a spirit of tolerance, solidarity, harmony.”

Even during the war, the OMM women in Nampula had tried to reach the women in the rural areas, often taking risks. “We had brigades in every district. We tried to work with the isolated women. We were on the way to a town 80 kilometers from Nampula in a convoy travelling with military protection when we heard that the enemy was close. We found a place to stay overnight, but hardly slept out of fear. We later saw how a village was attacked and burned. The

population received us with a theatrical performance that showed what had happened: the stealing, the kidnapping, the killing. We left very sad. We accompanied the governor to a camp that had received the victims. One pregnant woman had her body covered only in tree bark. They had been liberated by the army. I cried and cried; I kept being haunted by those images.”

Those images motivated Augusta to continue to work for peace after the agreement. “We did not talk about what had happened; only then was it possible to accept it. Nobody was punished, nobody was put in jail; there was a general pardon. It was not easy to lend a helping hand, to live with a person who had killed your family. But we carried the message with us and kept explaining until it was understood: let’s build up Mozambique together. We went on foot, without having a bed or proper food. In Namacura, we slept in a guesthouse that had been partly burned down.” Although it was difficult, they even sometimes went into the Renamo zones to try to reach the women there. “They were isolated from any information. Later, we tried to cooperate with the Women’s League of Renamo which was just emerging.”

The OMM provincial coordinator of Nampula had already told me in 1993 how they tried to break through the distrust. They were refused permission by Renamo to go into a Renamo-controlled area; they were told that it was not worth it and that nobody would be interested. When they contacted Renamo women, they were allowed to enter

the zone together. The women inside had not even heard that peace had come to the country.

It happened that a household had one person from Frelimo and another from Renamo. Augusta explains, ‘We compared it with two football teams; different parties had to learn to coexist.’ OMM activists always deliberately left space to discuss the position of women in society. During a seminar, the women were told that they also could be candidates in the elections, but one woman responded, “How is that possible? I don’t have time. I have to work in the field, search for wood, cook, feed my husband and children and sell the products in the market, while my husband is in a meeting with the agricultural association. Life is already very hard for a woman.”⁶

Augusta remembers the difficult task they faced: “The legislation was difficult to understand. The multi-party system had to be explained, the concept of the direct vote, making a choice. And the discussions about the role of women were heated: what am I as a woman? The woman is taught to believe that her only role is to serve the man, that the man rules over her. But OMM tried to give them a sense of self-esteem.” Augusta considers her own life in the context of women’s rights: “As a woman, I ask myself what my role is; it is not just having

children and work.” Going back to the topic of civic education, she relates, “We worked in the districts in local languages, using theatre, songs and puppet shows. We called upon women to get involved, telling them to be demanding in the democracy. Participation in the elections has been as high as it has thanks to the massive involvement of women.” (See Chapter 8.)

OJM: the youth get involved

OJM took the initiative in December 1992 to organise a national seminar, with Norwegian support. At their request, they were also included in the first Awepa/CCM national seminar some months later. But the three-day regional seminars that OJM held with Awepa were only launched in December of 1993, first in Inhambane, and later in Nampula. Although the seminars normally had 60 attendees, there were almost a hundred participants. But that did not matter, said Maria Chuma, Deputy Secretary of OJM, who shared responsibility for the programme with her colleague Carlos Tembe, “We can handle it.” She was expecting a baby within three weeks, but even with her big belly, she maintained strong control of the seminar, which was run with great discipline.

Building up the programmes with CCM and OMM had taken all our energy in the first months of the transition period, so it was difficult to include another big programme. But Chuma had not given up knocking on our door. “We wanted to contribute,” Maria Chuma says in May 2008. “We wanted to have good elections; we did

6 Baloi, O, ‘... e muitos participaram!; um estudo sobre a educação cívica por ocasião das primeiras eleições gerais e multipartidárias em Moçambique’, 1995, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 30

not want to call our brothers ‘bandits’ anymore. It was a historic moment.” The programme in Inhambane included official information about the peace process and the agreement, but the most interesting part of the seminar was about democracy. Renamo youth and some small parties were invited. One of them later said, “This was the first time that I had to think about what democracy means in practice. And about the idea that democracy starts within the party. A lot still has to be done.” The principles of the new electoral system were explained. “The secret ballot was difficult,” says Chuma, “especially for married couples. The man normally wants to make the choice for his wife. But civic education was very helpful; the changes needed to be discussed and understood.”



Civic education seminar in Nampula, March 1994. Left: Obede Baloi; centre: Lucia van den Bergh; right: a participant (Awepa Maputo)

After the regional seminars, working groups were formed to go into the districts. “The activists went from village to village. But many zones were not yet accessible; we could not work in the Renamo zones. And some zones still had mines.” OJM staff member Carlos Tembe was responsible for the logistics. “Feeding and housing 100 people was a nightmare in those days, but I was proud that we managed. The seminar was where the message started multiplying. In the districts, the message was transmitted in local languages. It was about making people understand; there was no financial interest involved.”

Although OJM was the national youth organisation in the Mozambican one-party state, they were very eager to find a non-partisan way to do their work. “It was independent work, for all the youth; the learning process was independent.” However, in the districts, not everybody was always able to hide their preferences.

The whole process was a miracle, Chuma explains. “For example, the seriousness of the joint commissions that had to implement the AGP. It was a lengthy process. But it was also work based on moral conviction, inspired by the attitude of the leaders, Chissano and Dhlakama. The international exchange of that time was important. It created pride on the Mozambican side. We could show that the Mozambican people were serious. But many people were traumatised; two years was not enough time to solve the problems.” About the possibility of a Truth Commission, she says: “That was

not necessary. For us, it was clear: stop the war, rebuild the country, take steps forward. No rancour. We would have had many more problems if people had felt bitter.”

Some of the youth trained by OJM were later recruited by STAE in the provinces and districts to work as trainers or civic education activists. In Niassa province, 6 out of 10 youths who were trained in the Nampula seminar were recruited by STAE, and 11 out of 15 in Zambezia. Some later ran for Parliament or for local elections. One of them became a mayor, saying to me later, “We learned everything about democracy and about how the system works from the civic education programmes,”

OTM: the Trade Union Organisation

The trade unions, united in OTM, got off to a late start, mainly because including more organisations in the programme was too much for our small organisation. However, their request to be included was so strongly expressed that we finally gave in and started a programme with one national and three regional training seminars in July 1994. Little time was left before the elections, but OTM organised its activities quickly throughout the country, using the full scope of its access to the workers in the companies, through its network of local branches. “We are going in the factories; we will reach different groups in society,” they said. Most companies’ management were supportive, providing time and space for the workers to take part. In September 1994, I attended a meeting with 600 workers in a big factory close to Maputo, the *Empresa*

Cometal Mometal. People were sitting in the main hall in their working clothes, eager to hear what was going on. Even with this high number of participants, OTM activists went beyond simply providing information, also managing to include discussions and simulations. Working in groups, they prepared a theatre show and quickly learned a song the participants wrote themselves.

In May 2008, I spoke with two of the main OTM organisers, Candido Mathe and João Moiane. They told me, “After the peace agreement, we had to restore contact with the countryside. The war had destroyed the infrastructure in the rural areas. It had also been a difficult time for the factories; they could hardly work, they had no raw materials.” Mathe says, “We had to make the workers aware in order to create a peaceful situation. Every worker was asked to take the message home, and to influence their family and neighbours. We had sometimes difficulties: you are from Frelimo, some people said, so how can you do impartial civic education? But in all our civic education work, we spread the message neutrally. We never took sides.”

Working with CCM and its Protestant member churches

Independence from government and party structures had always been the point of departure for CCM. The organisation ran a powerful programme through its member churches. It worked in the same way as the other civic education programmes, through training on regional and provincial level, moving forward from there. The



Brazão Mazula, chairman of the National Election Commission CNE (left) and Lucas Amosse, Secretary General of CCM (right) at a CCM seminar in preparation for the elections, 1994 (Awepa Maputo)

message included a strong focus on forgiveness, and was spread in churches and in community groups. Because of the pluralism represented in its membership, the programme included many interesting discussions. Reverend Amosse said to me in May 2008, “Our partners understood our position; the position of the church was respected. We encouraged the people to contribute to guarantees for democracy, to try and reduce fear, saying, ‘you have the power to decide’. I think many people voted for Renamo to prevent them from going back to war.” He continues, “The churches were neutral, impartial; they avoided being on one side or the other. From our perspective, this independent position was good. We could promote justice without making conces-

sions to anyone.” Many of the trained CCM members were appointed as provincial coordinators in the STAE/NDI program in the last months before registration and elections.

Civic education with Renamo

In the course of 1994, Renamo requested a civic education programme. However, the nature of the message had to be impartial, so the inclusion of political parties in the actual process had not been anticipated. Despite that consideration, it seemed important to do something. We asked for advice from Minister of Justice Aly Dauto, who had encouraged Awepa at the start. “Do it,” he said, “it is important. Find a way to include them.”

So we organised a seminar with 17 activists from Renamo in June 1994. It was difficult at first; Awepa had historic links with the Frelimo government, and I remember how strong their suspicion was, but also their curiosity. They made provocative statements, but they relaxed when they saw that we did not attack Renamo. Anselmo Victor, political secretary of Renamo in 1994 and now Renamo MP, looks back now to that first seminar. Participants from this fairly elementary training seminar were sent into the Renamo areas to disseminate the knowledge they had gained about the new multi-party system and the elections. “After that, the responsibility for the civic education work was passed on to the Renamo Women and Youth Leagues; the political bodies could not do that part. The leagues have integrated this responsibility as a permanent

programme in their activities. The leagues are still active. Their statutes have been changed, and the president of the league is now elected by its members.” From 1996 on, Awepa included the Renamo Leagues in the programmes. (see Chapter 11).

The civic education trainers

Over the years, the organisations and the Awepa staff developed a strong working relationship with many of the trainers, Mozambicans as well as foreigners from the international network. “In 1993, I was not convinced that elections would solve the Mozambican problems,” says Ana Mendonça, a Portuguese sociologist who was one of the trainers, “I was not sure that the parliamentary system was the best for Mozambique, or that the country was prepared for it with the deep division at that time. I believe in a balance of power, a countering power that corrects, somebody standing beside you who tells you that what you are doing is not right. However, in Africa, introducing the multi-party election system often means ‘winner takes all’. This has to do with the notion of a single tribal chief. But there was no alternative, so I thought: if it has to happen now, it should be prepared as well as possible.”

Ana was responsible for the part on human rights and democracy, mainly with the women. As she put it, “*democracia não cai do céu*”: democracy does not fall from heaven, you have to work for it. “Democracy in your own life and in politics are related to each other. That was always the way I started to introduce what democracy

is. For the women, that concept was sometimes confronting. Even the ones who had no husband had sons, and experienced the inequality at home.”

When I talk about the process as a miracle, Ana says, “No, miracle is not the right word. That makes it look as if it just happened to them. But it was not like that. I still believe that Samora Machel played a fundamental role in creating a society like this, one country from Rovuma to Maputo, a unity that is rarely seen in other African countries, and a capacity to discuss and seek consensus.”

In our interview in 2008 Candido Mathe from OTM made more or less the same observation. “Machel was a great worker for peace. The first thing he taught us was: we are all Mozambicans.” His colleague Moiane adds, “Machel has always paid a great deal of attention to the concept of ‘one nation’. We were not used to being divided along lines of tribal differences or political leaders.” But he also says: “The struggle is different now. It is a struggle for a better life, a fight against abject poverty; we have to get involved in work that creates wealth.”

The party gap

There was a gap between training for political parties and training in civil society. Civic education activists said at that time that they met people from the parties during their civic education meetings with the population. “Our knowledge was far better than theirs, and the confusion they often caused by making untrue statements was difficult to cope with.” Frelimo had its

internal organisation sufficiently in place, but even some of their members later said that it would have been useful to receive training about the new political system. It was even more difficult for the less organised parties.

The training given to *delegados da lista*, party election monitors, proved to be far from sufficient. When elections were held, many of the monitors were untrained. Anselmo Victor says in 2008: “Mozambique is a large country. Renamo tried to include thousands of party monitors to observe the elections, but we were preoccupied when we realised that they did not dominate the material sufficiently. The training programme did not reach everybody. Even nowadays there is a lack of training for party monitors. But in general, it was an excellent process. Going to the ballot box for the first time is a significant event for the population. When you negotiate, you know that you lose some things and win others. But in the end, Mozambican society won.”

Information, media and the independent trade union of journalists

Media were always invited to take part in the civic education programmes. The radio journalists stayed for most of the three days, especially in the provinces, broadcasting large parts of the discussions. TV was only available in Maputo, a camera team was always present for several hours, holding interviews with the organisers and with participants. Most journalists were very interested; it was a learning opportunity for them as well. They realised that they were ill

prepared to monitor the elections, and asked for a special training programme for journalists. ONJ, the independent trade union of journalists, took the lead.

Joseph Hanlon, journalist and writer, coordinated the training in three regional seminars in January and April 1994. Hanlon had analysed the process in Awepa’s Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin⁷ since the beginning of the transitional period. But later, the journalists complained that their editors-in-chief were not interested in their stories. In response, an extra seminar was organised in June 1994, directed at the leadership. The programme provided concrete information, but also discussed the role and responsibility of journalists in covering the elections and seeking the truth behind accusations. In his report about the electoral process, Hanlon writes, “Mozambique’s inexperienced and poorly resourced journalists had serious difficulties coping with wild allegations and disinformation from both sides. When parties made ludicrous charges and refused to back them up with facts, journalists did not have the means to conduct independent investigations and felt forced to run the charges because they feared criticism for bias if they did not.”⁸

7 Hanlon, J. (ed.), *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, January 1993 to present, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam

8 Hanlon, J. *Report on Awepa’s observation of the Mozambique electoral process, 1995*, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 30

The Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (MPPB)

The bulletin was initially intended to inform the international community and the parliamentarians in Europe. The broad foreign involvement required proper information and analyses. From January 1993 to the end of 1994, 13 issues of the MPPB were published. It became clear, however, that there was an even stronger need for the information inside Mozambique, so from December 1995 on (nr. 16), it was also published in Portuguese. The MPPBs were distributed amongst embassies, institutions, parties, ministries and civil organisations involved in the process, and was cited regularly. It added critical information of the kind that Mozambican journalists were not always able to investigate or publish. The

Bulletin still follows the issues on democracy and elections. In its current form, it is entitled the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin; it is now a joint publication by Awepa and CIP, a Mozambican investigative institute.

“The openness of that period and the willingness to talk were important,” Obede Baloi says. “There is more self-censorship in government institutions now. There is a different atmosphere in the parties, implying: what we say is correct.” The open and nation-wide discussions were amongst the most important benefits of the peace process, contributing immensely to the acceptance of the situation. It was like a fresh breeze after a period of darkness.



Frelimo rally for the 1994 elections (Pieter Boersma)

Chapter 8

The elections

The electoral law was approved in December 1993, after a long and difficult process. “We started to develop the legislation after the 1990 constitutional changes that opened up the way for the multi party system,” says Ismael Valigy, who was then working at the Ministry of Justice. “The process developed well. After the Peace Agreement [in October 1992], we had to incorporate the new aspects of the protocols, and to make some adjustments to the Constitution to make it compatible. We did a comparative study of electoral legislation of countries that had extensive experience, mainly the Portuguese-speaking countries, and we participated in observer teams in other countries, to learn from their experiences.”

However, the process now required a broader involvement. Valigy explains, “Just after the donor conference in December 1992, we wanted to organise a conference to discuss the law with all political parties and stakeholders. Renamo was not involved yet; the other political forces at that time, e.g. Monamo, PCN, Fumo were involved. But there were a lot of difficulties. There was not much willingness to participate. They were seriously divided – not because of the content; the division was of political character. The conference did not take place, so we then tried a different strategy: individual consultations.” A new effort was undertaken after some months, with the aim of

including Renamo as well. “It was important to involve Renamo as early as possible,” Valigy says. “President Chissano was supposed to give the opening speech and he also wanted to participate. But Renamo and the parties indicated that they would walk out of the hall en masse as a statement that they did not accept the head of state.” It did not work; for the second time the conference did not take place. “So we continued in a different way, drafting the law on the base of the peace agreement. But the process was very long and extremely difficult. The only



Supporter of Renamo president Dhlakama, waiting for the arrival of Vicente Ululu, Maputo, 1992 (Ferhat Momade, AIM)

positive element was that we could refer to the detailed protocol that includes the electoral process.” The two failed conferences were an indication of the deep distrust which still had to be resolved.

The small political parties

The new, small political parties emerging at this point became increasingly involved in the political developments, being invited to take part in meetings, discussions and transitional institutions. The creation of political parties had been allowed since the 1990 Constitution, two years before the signing of the General Peace Agreement, and many had been created rapidly. Donors financed registered parties, encouraging them to get organised and to prepare a programme and campaign for the 1994 elections. However, while Frelimo and Renamo were familiar throughout in the country, hardly anybody had heard of the others. The small parties lacked experience and did not have a

support base in society, and most of them had few ideas about what programme they wanted to present. Many were primarily worried about financial means, about the money and cars that were made available through the donors. But they faced many challenges; they had to reflect on what it means to be a political party in the new system, and how to operate in an environment like Mozambique where communication was difficult and resources were scarce. Some politicians had been active under the one-party system, or even in colonial times, and were now prepared to compete for the presidency. Competing with Chissano and Dhlakama for the presidency could serve as good publicity, but it was not a realistic goal. On the other hand, winning enough votes for seats in Parliament for the small parties was not easy either. Lack of experience, lack of cooperation and basic mistrust often stood in their way. It was characteristic of that specific moment in history, with



Vicente Ululu, general secretary of Renamo is greeted by supporters on his arrival in Maputo, 1992 (Ferhat Momade, AIM)



Representatives of small political parties with Domingos Arouca (left) and Carlos Jeque (right), both later candidates for the presidential elections, 1993 (Joel Chiziane, AIM)

the two big parties just coming out of a civil war, that the name given to the new small parties during the transitional process was *partidos não armados* (unarmed parties).

CNE and STAE

The electoral bodies now had to be created. The National Election Commission (CNE) was responsible for the process as a whole and for the main decisions, and STAE (the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration) was responsible for execution of the elections. But by then, complicated discussions had started. “The parties wanted STAE staff to be appointed on a party basis. We saw it as a technical government body, part of the public administration, and therefore non-partisan,” says Valigy. A compromise was found: the general director was appointed by the government and assisted by two deputy directors, one appointed by Renamo, and one appointed by the other parties. Valigy smiles, “They were called unarmed parties, which seems like a very strange name now.”

The discussion about the composition of CNE was equally long, culminating in a compromise: 10 members were appointed from the government, 7 from Renamo and 3 from the other parties, headed by an independent president (chair). Valigy was one of the Frelimo members. “It was difficult to choose the president. Three candidates were nominated. We had a maximum of two days to decide, but there was still no solution on the second day.” Brazão Mazula, the candidate for the small parties, was finally accepted by all. Two vice presidents

were appointed: Leonardo Simbine from the government, Jose de Castro from Renamo. All decisions had to be taken in full consensus.

Brazão Mazula was generally considered as an independent intellectual who did not have current ties to Frelimo or Renamo. When I spoke with him in May 2008, he said, “When I came back from studying in Brazil, I realised that I had to start my life all over again.” The multi-party system was difficult, especially in the current situation of reconciling the former enemies. Mazula describes the situation. “For the first time, the CNE members were brought together with their former enemies in the same meeting hall, and I had to construct the platform. It was also the first time that new political parties were involved. It was anthropological work, meeting as human beings.”



President Chissano presents his candidacy for the presidential elections to Brazão Mazula, chairman of the National Election Commission CNE, 1994 (Ferhat Momad, AIM)

He continues, “The electoral law facilitated the work of the CNE. It was very detailed because of the lack of trust between the parties. Every detail had been discussed and compromises had been reached. It was a ‘goodwill law’, a consensus law.” Mazula felt a heavy responsibility; if they failed, it could jeopardise the entire peace process. Civic education was being done amongst the population, but Mazula felt that the CNE members needed it just as much. “In fact, the population reconciled earlier than the politicians, and we had an equally fundamental lack of knowledge. We met once a week and started to find out exactly what our role was; we first studied and analysed the law.”

Ismael Valigy was especially worried about the civic education programme in the country. “Civic education should be one programme, with one message, and with the same material and manuals; that was what

we decided.” But the official materials took time to develop. “CNE had to approve everything; if one small thing was not accepted, everything stopped.” They accepted the early start by the civil society organisations, although not wholeheartedly. Valigy says now, “It is clear that the ones who wanted to participate in civic education could do so. There was great enthusiasm, especially amongst the youth. I think that the role of the churches was one of the most important factors, even before STAE was created at the provincial level.”

Discussions with donors about the materials were another headache for Valigy. “We wanted solid ballot boxes that could be used again in the next elections, but the UN only wanted to pay for cardboard boxes. You could not even lock them properly, and they were not water-resistant in the rain. We knew that we would have many open-air voting assemblies. And they wanted the ballot papers to be printed in black and white. The majority of the population was illiterate, but they could recognise the colours of the party flags.”

Full consensus: useful or not?

Every decision had to be taken with a full consensus. One opposing vote could delay decisions for weeks. The CNE was therefore often considered as slow, not reacting adequately to the problems and the decisions that had to be taken. The implementing body, STAE, often encountered obstacles as a result of these delays. STAE also had its own problems. Its staff members were inexperienced, had to work in a vast coun-



Preparation of a group of international Awepa observers. Right: Tamme Hansma, staff Awepa Amsterdam, 1994 (Pieter Boersma)


try that had been devastated by war, dealing with many potential voters without identification cards, hidden in remote rural areas that were almost inaccessible. Moreover, STAE was politicised. It became soon clear that the date that had been planned for 1993 was unattainable.

A week after CNE was installed, the ambassadors stood on their doorstep. They wanted Mazula to set a date for the elections. “I said, ‘I cannot. I have to adapt to the reality.’ They answered, ‘But we are only talking about the technical aspects.’ But this is not a purely technical process; it is a socio-political process, I told them. We only could set dates once we had established some confidence, and that would only be established along the way. In addition, although CNE is an independent body, the parties had to be consulted regularly, which also delayed decision-making.”

Mazula remembers many tense moments. His idea was to have a computerised system, as he had seen in Brazil. However, computers were a new phenomenon in Mozambique; expertise was minimal and Renamo was afraid that they would not be able to control what happened. They stressed that the Angolan elections had been vulnerable to fraud because of the use of computers. Months of delay passed, from January to May 1994, without a decision being taken. “I decided to talk to the leaders, Chissano and Dhlakama. In May, I met with Dhlakama without informing CNE. I told him that we were facing serious delays because of the lack of decision about

informatics. I explained how it could work, how you could build in security. We talked for hours, and then he thanked me, saying ‘I was not aware of this problem, nobody had talked to me about it.’ Chissano also said that he had not been informed. But the consequence of the meetings was that Dhlakama ordered Jose de Castro not to make difficulties about computers anymore.”

As a result, the CNE meeting on the next day started with trouble. Frelimo vice president Leonardo Simbine did not accept that Mazula had taken this initiative, and saw it as a lack of confidence in the CNE. “If we go to talk to the president of Renamo, we have to do that on the base of consensus,” Simbine said in the meeting. Mazula continues, “It was Frelimo member Valigy who saved us. He said: Mr Vice President, Dr Mazula solved a problem which gives us the possibility to proceed. He has informed us about



Long queues at the first election day, Maputo, 27 October 1994 (Pieter Boersma)



The Awepa coordination team for the election observation discusses its final press release. From left to right: Jan Nico Scholten, president of Awepa, Guido van Hecken, Joseph Hanlon, Luc Dhoore, Sir David Steel, 1994 (Pieter Boersma)

everything he did, about the objective and the result. There is no secrecy, nothing has been hidden. Why condemn this?"

Building trust was an underlying theme throughout the whole process. As Mazula says, "From the start of the negotiations till the spontaneous hug between Chissano and Dhlakama when the agreement was signed, it was a long and difficult way, and it continued during the transition. This process was lacking in Angola; preparations there were far too weak. I am thankful to the leaders now; both Chissano and Dhlakama have resolved problems several times."

Was the large involvement of the international community positive or negative, I asked Mazula. "There were many meetings. Once a month we met with the ambassadors and the World Bank," he sidesteps

the issue. But then he adds, "Aldo Ajello announced the date of the elections in a press conference without CNE knowing it. I called him for a meeting, and said that it was CNE's decision. What authority did he have to do this? Ajello said, 'We are here to verify the electoral process.' But I asked him to go back to the press, and he humbly agreed."

Elections almost boycotted: a narrow escape

The most dangerous moment came the day before elections, when Dhlakama suddenly announced a boycott of the elections, stating that there were irregularities. Three small parties joined the boycott. Everybody held their breath. Mazula says, "We heard the news, so I asked for a meeting at 8:00 p.m. and we discussed till midnight without reaching a solution. But then I said, 'We are not leaving here without a decision'. So we went on, and it was 5:00 in the morning and we still had not reached a consensus. Renamo members wanted to be loyal to their president. Then I said, 'At 7:00 a.m., when the polling stations are opening, I want to have an official statement on the radio with our position.' So I asked for the position of every member for the last time. This time I did not use alphabetic order or start with the vice presidents. Instead, I started at the left side of the table, with Renamo member Anselmo Victor, and next to him Frelimo member Valigy. Victor hesitated but then started to talk carefully: 'As a loyal member of Renamo, I want to support our president Dhlakama. But I am here a member of CNE in the first place, and that

confers certain responsibilities. Any party can declare a boycott, but that has to be done at least 15 days before the presidential elections. That means that legally there is no basis for a boycott. So our position has to be that the elections can continue as planned.' This raised more discussion amongst Renamo members; Jose de Castro was the strongest voice in favour of the boycott. But after all the others had agreed, de Castro finally agreed as well. At 7:00 a.m. when the radio broadcast opened, the first announcement was that CNE had declared in full consensus that the elections could go ahead. I saw this as one of the most important battles that we won in the end. Even in Renamo strongholds like Nampula, there were long queues first thing in the morning." Dhlakama only lifted the boycott the second day. But then people had already gone to vote in huge numbers.


"Not all of the process was concluded by the time elections were held," says Mazula. "Renamo still had a substantial number of hidden arms, but I think that there were also generals on the Frelimo side who would have been prepared to take up arms again, depending on the outcome of the elections. After the elections, Dhlakama said to me, 'We lost the presidential elections, but we won in Parliament. We won 112 seats out of 250; we had never expected this number. We only involved ourselves in the course of this process'."

Observation


More than 3,000 international observers came to Mozambique, 2,100 through the UN,

of whom about 100 came six months before the elections. Most of the others stayed just for the days of the elections. Awepa was invited to bring in a group of 160 observers, parliamentarians from Europe and Africa and high-level representatives from churches and civil society organisations. Similarly, Awepa had participated in the observation of the first democratic elections in South Africa and Malawi (1994), and in Angola (1992). Organising observation on such a scale during the peak of our other work was impossible, so a separate team came in to prepare and organise it, under direct responsibility of Awepa vice president Luc Dhoore and director Bartie Lürhman.

There were 2,700 polling sites with 7,300 polling stations spread over the country. It did not make sense to only go to the obvious places; Awepa wanted to bring them into the remote areas. But finding places to sleep, finding transport and food was not easy. International NGOs in the provinces were very supportive, providing cars, experienced drivers and guesthouses. Awepa sent provincial coordinators of the teams to all provinces six weeks prior to the elections. Joao Cravinho was one of those coordinators. I met him again in 2009 in Portugal, in his office as Secretary of State of Cooperation. Back then, at the time of the elections, he did research and supported our programme, working as a civic education trainer, coordinating the Awepa group of observers in Tete, and helping to handle the first seminar with the newly elected Parliament.



Polling station, 27 October 1994 (Pieter Boersma)



Electoral observation in the provinces

Joao Cravinho coordinated an observation team from Awepa in the province of Tete. The observers held their breath the day before the elections. Cravinho remembers, "When Dhlakama announced a boycott, I called them all back. It was very unsure what consequences this could have; fear rose again. They all slept in the provincial capital that night. But in the morning CNE announced that elections would continue, and everything was calm. People came to vote in huge numbers. We did not notice any hesitation because of the announced boycott. They wanted to vote."

During six weeks of pre-election observation, he had travelled throughout the whole province of Tete, preparing the places where observation could take place. "Tete had a stronger involvement by Renamo than I was used to in the South. From the beginning, I was impressed by the easy way people and even political parties were able to live together. At political rallies, you saw the normal agitation but there were hardly any difficulties. I could easily speak to the party leaders that came to Tete. Dhlakama was an exception; I was not able to talk to him. The head of the list on the Frelimo side was a hard-liner." Cravinho contemplates the unique situation in Mozambique: "I have thought about the psychological aspect: the two sides beat each other almost to death. In other countries, that destroys the relationship for ever. In Mozambique, they have beaten each other almost to death, but then concluded that the war could not continue."

Knowledge about the elections was quite good in Tete, concludes Cravinho. "Frelimo and Renamo had enough information; they knew what it was about. The small parties were weak and did not know much about the process, except for their political leader from Maputo. In general, the Frelimo people were better qualified and had more experience. Renamo complained to us that the international community gave more support to Frelimo. I spoke with the PCN leader for a long time about the conditions and the freedom, and I also spoke a lot with journalists. But there was little information about other parts of the country. Our relations with the UN were diverse. They felt that they had priority above everything else. When the UN came, I had to leave my hotel although it was already paid for. I got my money back and was put on the street. I had to find some place in a house somewhere. It was difficult to deal with them at first, but they were more supportive later. The group of MPs that I accompanied was from different countries: Malawi, Tanzania, Holland, Germany, about six. They had to travel far into very remote areas in groups of two. Some of them had to take live chickens with them, to be prepared on the spot."

"Did your time in Tete change your perspective?" I ask him. "Yes," he answers. "I did not know Renamo. During the war, you heard the shooting in Maputo and could not go to nearby places like Catembe or Marraquene at night, only during the day. It was the first time that I had contact with Renamo, in a process that went beyond depicting them as devils. I was also reading

the book *A causa das armas*, an anthropologic study about the Mozambican war [by Christian Jeffray], which also gave a more diverse picture. But in general, there was still a lot of fear and uncertainty. Before the results were announced, the situation was tense. At that time, we were not yet sure that the war not would start again, as it had done in Angola.”

Mirjam Boswijk, working in agriculture in Zambezia, coordinated a team in that province. She said, “Tete has much better roads and the distances are not like in Zambezia. We did not go back when Renamo announced the boycott, because we never could have reached that spot again in time.” Although Awepa had tried to be clear about the conditions in Mozambique, the Zambezian teams were not happy with the hardships. The team to Mopeia complained, although the local staff had done everything they could to make the guesthouse comfortable. But there was no electricity, no running water, traditional latrines and simple beds. “And Mopeia is hot; the heat is like a wall you can lean against,” says Mirjam. The Gurue team had to drive 350 km over bad roads to get into their region. “But the elections went extremely well. Queues everywhere from the first moment on. At one place, the president of the electoral staff apologised: ‘Not everybody could come to vote, because one person died recently.’ ”

The elections were planned for two days on the 27th and 28th of October, but delays and difficulties on the first day influenced the decision to prolong them by one extra day.



Supporter of President Chissano of Frelimo, Ilha de Moçambique, Nampula province, 1994 (Ferhat Momade, AIM)

The prolongation was announced at the last moment. In most of the places, it was not necessary anymore; people had voted. Mirjam saw the difficulties that this extra day caused for the electoral staff, who were obliged to stay at the polling station day and night during the election period: no food, batteries of the lamps running out. Staff members from World Vision brought food into the more remote districts. However, the Awepa observation teams from Zambezia decided to leave, and thus missed the count.

The elections: “When two elephants fight, the grass suffers. But the grass spoke out”

Long queues had already formed by six in the morning of 27th of October, the first day of the three-day elections. That is a picture that remains very vivid. More than six million people had registered, about 80% of all voting age adults, and 5.4 million people voted. Those figures are extremely good considering the difficult Mozambican circumstances. It was clear that people were eager to vote. The votes were divided quite equally. The results were surprising: 44.3% for Frelimo, which gave them 129 seats, 37.7% for Renamo (112 seats), and 5.5% for the UD coalition (9 seats). The remaining votes were for the small parties. Chissano won the presidential elections with 53%. Dhlakama was second with 34%. A nine-seat win for the starting UD coalition was an unexpectedly high result. Some say that it had only been possible because people were confused about where candidates were placed on the lists. True or not, it was a positive sign for democracy that at least one extra party held seats in Parliament.

Conclusion

Nothing was simple during the preparations or the elections. Mistrust, mistakes, difficulties, delays, it all happened. The extra year that was allotted for the transition period provided time to sort things out, and that was crucial. The decision-making based on full consensus in the CNE electoral commission delayed the process, as did the drafting of the detailed law. However, it created a solid base for implementation of the electoral system. And the overwhelming truth is that the elections went extremely well, under the most difficult of circumstances. Elections were conducted well and voter turnout and participation were huge. The dedication and honesty of electoral staff deserve admiration, and the results reflected the will of the people: “the grass had spoken and the elephants should listen.”¹

1 Hanlon, J. *Report of AWEPA's observation of the Mozambique electoral process 1992-1994*, 1995, Amsterdam, Awepa

Chapter 9

Is history being rewritten?

At the time of the Peace Agreement, people thought that they knew what had happened, that it was not necessary to say it. The only thing that mattered was trying to forget. But stories started to circulate that could no longer be verified. On one hand, these stories emerged out of a need to justify the war, to convince the tellers and their listeners that it had been for a good cause: the democratic state. On the other hand, the stories were intended to change perspectives on responsibility, making both factions look equally guilty. Earlier factual stories about who had done what suddenly no longer seemed reliable. Truth became relative, depending on what was reported and what others in the neighbourhood believed, and only partly relying on personal experiences. As far as the victims were concerned, the made-up stories and justifications hurt, but many young people no longer know which stories are true.

A good cause

A friend was waiting in a shop in Zambezia, not long after the war, and a political leader from Renamo was standing in the shop beside her. New goods had come in and she looked at a nice colourful *capulana*, a cloth wrap. "Isn't it beautiful?" the politician said. "Thanks to us, you can buy that now." She looked at him and said, "Apparently, you first had to kill my father for that," and walked away.

"Now Renamo says it was to bring democracy," says Helena, one of the women I interviewed in Maputo. "Should we believe that? A falsification of history is happening." Most of the Members of Parliament avoid the past, because the situation would otherwise be untenable, but bitterness is sometimes still the response: in one of the sessions, Renamo stressed that the government was not doing enough to build schools. One of the Frelimo MPs burst out, "But who was it that burned them all?"

The Cold War perception of Renamo fighting a just war against communism had long been the base of the US support to Renamo. But in the late eighties stories about the brutality could not be denied any more. Kidnapping a US nurse, the Homoine massacre on 18 July 1987 when 424 people were killed, and other atrocities seemed to tip the balance. The US State Department abandoned the perception of Renamo being 'anti communist freedom fighters' after a solid study under their assignment, carried out by Robert Gersony in 1988.¹ He interviewed refugees and catalogued atrocities. "The level of violence reported to be conducted by Renamo against the civilian population is extraordinary high", he concluded, "It is conservatory estimated that 100.000 civilians may have been murdered

1 Gersony, R. *Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict –Related Experience in Mozambique*; Report submitted to Dr. Chester Crocker, Ass. Sec. Of African Affairs; April 1988, Department of State, US



Victims of the massacre in Homoine on 18 July 1987, where 424 people were killed, 1987 (AIM)

by Renamo.”² This study changed most of the US attitude, reinforced through the end of the Cold War.

“The population was behind us”

Contradictory as it may seem, the attitude of believing in the good cause contributed to the peace process, and to Renamo’s general desire to create a credible political party and to participate in a democratic society after the war. In the first seminars that Awepa held with Renamo Youth and Women’s Leagues, justifying what happened amongst themselves was important; they needed to confirm that their years of hardship in the bush had not been in vain, confirming that it was Renamo that brought democracy about. “The population was behind Renamo; they trusted their leaders.” says Raul Domingos in 2008. These sentiments were expressed in several Renamo interviews that I conducted. The recognition of widespread support is important. “Frelimo made mistakes, was authoritarian, was communist, so the population chose Renamo.” Although the people’s criticism of the Frelimo government may be true and justified, the testimony of thousands of kidnapped and mistreated people tell a different story about their choice to support Renamo. Fear and seeking refuge was a daily reality for the Mozambicans during the war. Once the people were held by Renamo, they had no choice at all.

The idea of support from the population was also defended during the transition period. UNOHAC provincial representative George Siemensma visited Inhaminga in 1993, a town that was then still under Renamo administration. “The Renamo governor told us proudly that the population had overturned many kilometres of railway track in order to prevent Frelimo from using the trains for transporting their heavy arms in the direction of Tete to, as he said, oppress the people there.” Siemensma later asked a man how it had been possible to turn the heavy rails. “He told me that they had been forced, in large groups and with machine guns in their backs. Another man showed me the football pitch where people who had been too tired and given up had been executed, while the others were forced to watch.”


Stories and rumours

An oral society lives with rumours. The sheer number of rumours makes it difficult



Mass grave of 350 people, killed in the Homoine massacre. Others were buried in individual graves, July 2007 (Mirjam Boswijk)

2 Hanlon, J. *Mozambique; Who calls the shots?*, 1991, James Curry, London, p. 47



Memorial service in Homoine, 20 years after the massacre, July 2007 (Mirjam Boswijk)

to know what is true. Stories are repeated easily without being verified. Some reliable stories also came out bit by bit, for example the acknowledgement that certain areas had in fact been more or less sympathetic to Renamo, especially in the central provinces. In the border area, Renamo fighters came from Malawi to visit their wives and family at night without anybody asking questions. In Zambezia province, Renamo distributed Bibles at first. The issue of sympathy for one side or the other was not completely black and white.

Accusations are now also arising about the behaviour of government troops, malnourished youth who had to fight an endless war not of their own choosing. People in refugee camps in the Zambezian districts died of starvation; they could not leave for fear their departure would make them suspect. Mirjam Boswijk, who lived in Zambezia at

the time, says, "Some of the people from Frelimo were so arrogant. It did not matter how much the people suffered."

Those stories can be told now, but talking about the Renamo atrocities is still a highly sensitive matter. "You need courage now to talk about that," says CCM pastor Mutungamira from Beira. "But people are not mad; they know about good and bad." Even he started to doubt the accounts about the Homoine massacre, now that there are many contradictory stories circulating about what happened there. The massacre of Homoine in July 1987 is in dispute. In a single day of attacks, 424 people were killed and many were kidnapped. Is it true that it was not Renamo, as rumours say now, or is that story made up?

Homoine: "hear the witnesses"

Mirjam Boswijk lived in Homoine in 1987. I ask her about the attack in an interview in 2009. "Renamo was approaching the town; we knew that we were almost surrounded. Attacks in the neighbourhood had increased and people from the villages slept in town, returning to their fields in the morning. The government army dug trenches, trying to protect the city of Homoine. The evening before the attack, someone came to our house out of fear for our safety. He wanted to tell us to leave, but saw that we did not have a car available, so he let us sleep. Using our motorcycles through areas under Renamo control would have been too dangerous." The attack started at 05:30 in the morning. It was a nightmare. Mirjam escaped, running barefoot for 13 kilometers through the bush

with gunfire from all sides crisscrossing above her head, but she finally reached the town of Maxixe. That evening, cars carrying the wounded arrived. A friend accompanied them. He had hidden under the stairs outside a hotel. “What he saw was horrible,” she says. “The killing took place on the streets and in the townships, where they broke into people’s houses. Our friend saw the dead bodies in the streets when he finally dared to come out of his hiding place.”

Mirjam went back the day after. “There were dead people laying in rows in a gallery of the hospital, where they collected the bodies, all covered with blankets. People would walk along the rows, searching for missing relatives. I could not understand the logic behind the killing. Why kill an old innocent woman, and split her head in two with an axe?” She cannot get that picture out of her head.

The Homoine attack drew international attention; it became iconic, recognised as extremely horrific. Some months later, between 400 and 500 people were killed in two major attacks carried out by Renamo on the road from Maputo to Gaza, in which people burned to death in buses and cars. Those attacks did not draw the same degree of attention, although there were many testimonies, including from escaped young boys who told about the preparation in the Renamo camps and about the attack itself. Nobody, including Renamo, ever questioned who carried out these attacks. But different stories about Homoine keep cropping up persistently: who actually did it?

Raul Domingos, Renamo political leader at that time, defends the position that it was not Renamo. He tells me his story in May 2008; most of what he tells me was also in the Mozambican newspaper *Magazine* (30 June 2008). “We intensified the war in the South in 1987, after the Zimbabweans had started to support Frelimo in the Beira corridor. They said that we did not have the capacity to cross the Rio Save for operations in the South.” Renamo, in contrast, had in fact crossed the rivers. “Frelimo wanted to destroy Renamo’s credibility, creating the impression that we were no more than a group of criminals without a political agenda, and that we were sowing terror, carrying out massacres of the population.” The *Grupos de Contra-Insurgencia* or counter-insurgency groups from Zimbabwe incorporated Mozambicans who spoke the local languages “so people would confuse them with Renamo soldiers.”

I show Mirjam the interview with Raul Domingos, and ask her opinion about the possibility of a Frelimo role. “Of course that thought occurred to me after the rumours started,” Mirjam admits. “But I never really doubted; it was too clear. What convinced me even more were the stories of friends. A colleague was held inside the house together with her father. She managed to escape through the back door, but her father, brother and other men were kidnapped. Some months later, three of them came back, emaciated to the point of skin and bone, and told their story. They were forced to walk for many hours. Anyone who could not walk any more was killed ‘like

chickens', in the man's words. In the Renamo camp, they were called to meetings and had to listen to taped speeches by Renamo president Dhlakama. Later, young men and boys were selected to be trained to take part in attacks. As a *misto*, a man of mixed race, her young brother was not selected. He was lucky, because *mistos não prestam*, people of mixed race, are not considered useful for anything." The three were able to escape after being held by Renamo for three months.

"I went back to Homoine 20 years after it happened. There was a ceremony with survivors and family. A pastor from CCM led us to the mass grave where 350 people are buried, victims of the massacre. Others were lying in individual graves, 424 in all. Many of the people who were kidnapped died as well. There were flowers, candles, reading and prayers." She thinks back to all the people she met at the memorial service: people who had been able to run away or hide.

"Everybody has a story, and they started to talk about it, to tell their stories. Some friends refused to come because of the doubts that exist. That hurts. Even if you doubt, you can come and pay respect to the victims, not accusing one side or the other. You could hear the real stories from the people who were there, hear the witnesses."

Many victims feel offended that their story is hardly taken seriously anymore. They are put in the position of having to defend themselves. What Frelimo and Renamo did was apparently the same thing: 'in a war,

both sides kill; both are equally guilty' is a generally accepted message now. But that seems to remove the responsibility from the ones who caused the suffering in the first place. Who still defends the truth? Who defends the victims?

Does the truth still matter?

Many African countries, including Mozambique, have had a history full of violence. Colonial war and oppression by Portugal were amongst the worst. Despite the scars left by past wrongs, people had to forget what happened, and reconcile with former oppressive colonial nations. This raises an important question: Will this recent war, which involved much more violence between Mozambicans themselves, simply be forgotten in the next generation? Or will people still want to search for the truth and document it? Are they going to be willing to deal with it honestly?

Reconciliation without a truth commission was essential to bring the war to an end quickly. But it also meant that people had no place to tell their stories of suffering, and to recount the brutalities and atrocities. There is no official record, so there is a serious danger that history is being rewritten.

Chapter 10

Parliament starts up

The elections garnered high praise from all sides, within the country and beyond. Joaquim Chissano was elected President, Frelimo had a majority in Parliament with 129 seats, Renamo gained an unexpected 112 seats, and the UD coalition won 9. Now the real work could commence.

Derailed in the very first meeting

Of the 250 new Members of Parliament, about 35 had experience in the former one-party parliament, and nobody had ever held a seat in a multi-party parliament; many had no prior experience in politics at all. Events went wrong at the very start. In December 1994, the Speaker (president) of the Parliament had to be elected in a preparatory general meeting. Frelimo's candidate was Eduardo Mulembwe, former Attorney General, while Renamo's candidate was Raul Domingos, the main Rome negotiator. In the past, those elections went by a simple show of hands and the new parliamentary procedures had not yet been adopted. Chissano, who chaired the meeting, adhered to the rules still in place. "We wanted a secret ballot," says Renamo MP Manuel Pereira. "So when this was refused we left the hall." Renamo had hoped to win some votes from Frelimo members. Mulembwe was elected by the Frelimo majority, but the first clash occurred even before Parliament had held its first session.

"Formally, Chissano made the right decision, but he could have been more flexible in order to adapt to the new situation," says a former colleague. When no solution had been found by January 1995 everybody became nervous; it was not even certain that Renamo would take part in the first parliamentary session in March. Neither party took the first step to call for a joint meeting to attempt reconciliation.

In late January, Awepa president Jan Nico Scholten asked for a meeting with the three party leaders to discuss support, refusing to meet with each leader separately. They all came; it was an opportunity for them to meet without losing face. "It was that meeting that broke through the impasse," says Raul Domingos. "The multi-party parliament had to start its work using rules from the one-party system. So we walked out, and only resumed participation after intervention from Awepa and the Inter-parliamentary Union." Speaker Eduardo Mulembwe confirms, "There was so much distrust between the three parties. We felt insecure, asking ourselves what would happen. The ones that had experience with parliamentary life considered themselves the leaders. Many others, who came from the bush, had only completed four or five years of primary school. The situation did not permit a peaceful start. People were ignorant, lacked references, and the parliamentary regulations were not adequate anymore."

Three initial actions were agreed in that January meeting with Awepa. The first was to hold a three-day training session after the



Members of the Permanent Commission of Parliament in deliberation. From left to right: Eduardo Mulembwe, Speaker of Parliament, Abdul Carrimo (Frelimo), Antonio Palange (UD coalition), Raul Domingos (Renamo), Vicente Ululu (Renamo), Armando Guebuza (Frelimo), 1995 (Ussene Mamudo, AIM)

opening of the first session in March, but before the parliamentary work would start. The second was to arrange for a working visit by four prominent Mozambican MPs, plus the Speaker and the Secretary-General to the parliaments in the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. The third and final agreement was about a working visit by the Deputy Head of the Dutch Parliamentary Secretariat, to sit down with the Mozambican Secretary-General and analyse how the Mozambican Parliament might be able to adapt to the new needs. All three parties accepted these three planned actions; preparations could start. Renamo returned to participating in the preparations for the first parliamentary session, planned for March.

European visit clears the air

Sitting in the train from The Hague to Brussels, the delegates from Mozambique relaxed.¹ Before that, the atmosphere had been quite formal. They had frowned when they heard that we would travel by train to Brussels; why not go by plane? The train might be easier and quicker, but was that respectful enough? But sitting together, trying out various seats in the empty first-class compartment, jokes were made, and the ice was suddenly broken.

1 The delegation consisted of President Eduardo Mulembwe, Virginia Matabele (from the Frelimo Permanent Commission), Raul Domingos (head of the Renamo parliamentary party), and Antonio Palange, MP from UD, and Secretary General David Sibambo

By that time, they had already been received by the Dutch Parliament, attended a session, raised many questions and doubts in informal meetings with Dutch MPs, wanted to know how much a MP in Holland earned, and how they paid for their transport. Secretary-General David Sibambo had additional appointments on his agenda that the others did not attend, including more contacts with the Parliamentary Secretariats.

“We saw on that trip how a parliament functions, how things were done in other countries,” says Raul Domingos in 2008. “For us, it was important to hear about the immunity of a parliamentarian. After that, we were also better able to draft our own regulations. It had not been a personal war; there was no problem between one person and the next.” David Sibambo adds, “It was interesting to witness the process between the deputies. The leaders of the parliamentary parties already understood each other well. When we came back, we worked better, especially on the new regulations.”

March 1995: the test case

Everybody was nervous. Would the first session fall apart, like the meeting in December had? Would the former enemies be able to take the others seriously? Would they understand their role as parliamentarians, inexperienced as they were?

Within Awepa, we were also nervous about the training. We included Mozambicans with knowledge about the constitution and legislation, as well as eight European MPs and specialists. But how could we deal with

existing distrust; how could it be possible to promote a democratic attitude in a situation like that? How could we work with people who had no experience at all in the parliamentary system, making clear that procedures can be the base of democratic decision-making? The Maputo office had to coordinate the training. We had been using simulations successfully in the civic education programme, developing it in cooperation with the Mozambican organisations. Because Mozambicans come from an oral society, they have a much easier time understanding the practical usefulness than most Europeans – not to mention the fun of it. We accordingly proposed a similar approach for this training seminar as well. My Mozambican colleagues understood the concept, but the Amsterdam head office had doubts; it looked ridiculous to include MPs who had been ministers in the former government in a play. Still, they gave us the benefit of the doubt.

The Speaker of Parliament opened the session by announcing the three-day training seminar. The real work would only start after that had been completed. The simulation was divided in blocks over the three days, alternating theoretical information, further explanations and discussions. It started with a proposal of a draft law from the ‘minister’ in the simulation. The roles were distributed carefully, avoiding tension before we even got started. My colleague had puzzled some days over how to mix party members and regions. The three parties were not defined at a recognisable size and were assigned invented names. The



Parliament building in Maputo (Pieter Boersma)

law discussed in the simulation was about growing tobacco, a non-issue at that time. The phases of the play included the discussion in the party bench to take a position, the work in the committees, procedures like motions, the consultation of the electorate, and the plenary session. Contacts with the press were included, and they also had to deal with a pressure group.

The play quickly took on its own dynamics. I saw an MP, playing a journalist, running through the corridors asking, “Where is the minister; I want an interview with him.” Committee meetings involving heavy discussions took place; I saw an MP suddenly looking questioningly to someone with whom he had worked, “Are you actually Frelimo or Renamo?”

When the time came at the end of the three days for the final evaluation to take place, the parliamentarians were supposed to move back to their normal seats. But the MPs refused, saying “We want to stay in the

seats that we had over the last three days.” Speaker Mulembwe had not fully participated in the training; when he came in to take his own seat, the MPs called him back: “No, no, the public balcony is back there behind.” Mulembwe laughed and took a seat as part of the audience.

Learn the job and reconcile

Raul Domingos talks about those early days. “In that first seminar with Awepa, we learned the rules of the game. I have never again seen such a clear explanation of how Parliament works in practice. It was interesting for everybody. Frelimo had only had experience in the one-party system; the multi-party system was only created in 1990 in the new Constitution and confirmed in the AGP. Now we had a clearer perspective on what that meant in practice.”

Roberto Chitsondzo, Frelimo MP, remembers, “A that time, we did not know each other. We had to draw closer to each other; that was what we tried to do constantly. We learned how Parliament functions. We did not have any experience.”

“The simulation was very important,” most of the interviewed MPs say now. It makes Raul Domingos smile: “Former enemies were laughing together. The Frelimo colleagues thought that they had enough experience, but it was not the experience you need in a multi-party system. So we started to learn together, and the opposition showed that they were good pupils. We learned how to dominate and make use of the parliamentary instruments. But it was

even more important to learn to accept each other.”

Some years later, Alcido Guenha, at that time parliamentary spokesperson for Frelimo, said to my colleague, “I only gradually realised the great importance of starting this way.” It is exceptional that Parliament created space for it. It was done at exactly the right moment; half a year later might have been too late.

Another important factor was the choice of the two former negotiators, Armando Guebuza and Raul Domingos, as the actual parliamentary party leaders. As Domingos states, “We had gone through all the political discussions, the demobilisation and new army, the return of the refugees. During the negotiations, we always had to seek consensus; every step required debate and agreement. We needed the same kind of consensus in the new Parliament. When there was a serious problem, the session was stopped and the problem was brought to the leaders. Because of our joint experience, we had developed a large capacity to search for consensus, so we took our responsibility. After that, the MPs went back to the plenary session and were able to take a decision.”

“I was impressed,” says Chitsondzo. “Those two were real leaders.” But he is also clear about the importance of Mulembwe’s role: “He said to us, ‘The war has ended, you are now important actors. There is no way back. You have to feel responsible for that.’ But there were terrible moments. Renamo



Parliament after renovation, 2007 (Pieter Boersma)

had the strategy of leaving the meeting hall. We were able to continue anyway because we held the majority, but it was sad, terrible. Things got better later; the strategy changed to making a scene. Disruptive behaviour is not the way we work; we call it the *escolinha de barrulho* (the noisy infants' class)."

The first session succeeded and paved the way for continuation. However, more training was requested, e.g. with the parliamentary committees. Pär Grandsted, Awepa board member and member of the former defence committee in Sweden at that time, said after several days of working with the defence committee, "It was an eye-opener

for the MPs that they actually have the power to break through the secrecy of the army, to ask openness in the event that political decisions need to be made."

More travel was requested as well, including visits to parliaments in Zambia and South Africa, and in European countries. Less experienced MPs and committee members were now included. The programmes were carefully prepared in cooperation with the other parliaments; it was not intended to become tourism. And indeed, during the first years, that did not happen. In seminars in Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces, dealing with MPs and their electorate, the

Speaker of the Namibian Parliament was one of the lecturers. He talked to the Mozambicans about the modest conditions in his own parliament and the voluntary work that had to be done. He stressed, "Traveling gives you the opportunity to learn; use it well, make sure that you benefit."

In 1998, a group of women from political parties and from women's organisations went to Brazil. The trip was hosted by the Brazilian organisation Cfemia. Former women MPs in Brazil had founded this organisation, realising the lack of support for women to understand the discussions in parliament, and their opportunities to influence the decisions. Angelina Enoque, Renamo MP, talks about her experiences. "The trip to Brazil was wonderful. We also saw how the municipalities worked, and we were presented to a community group in Sao Paulo. It helped us a lot. In the end, we grew more than the Brazilian women. Brazil has 530 seats but only 46 women in parliament." At that time, Mozambique had 24.8% women in parliament: 62 women out of 250 MPs. The Mozambican women had indicated that they preferred to go separately, rather than being mixed up with women from civil society. However, in the end it was possible to convince them that the strong point of Cfemia was precisely that convergence, bringing women together independently from their background. My colleague Obede Baloi accompanied them on the trip. He now says, "No, it was not difficult; the group was spontaneous, had no reserves. While they were travelling, they were no longer party delegates; the agenda

is non-partisan. They exchange, work and lunch together."

In the course of 1996, more international organisations came in to support Parliament, SUNY (State University of New York) being the most important. "The legislative production with the support of SUNY was significant, continuing from 1996 until 2001," says former Secretary-General David Sibambo in 2008. However, UNDP involvement in those first years was a failure. A trust fund was set up in 1995, but donors quarrelled about the draft project proposal. "All the donors wanted influence. Many meetings were held. They forgot what Parliament wanted." Sibambo thinks that by the time an agreement was finally signed in 1998, it had lost much of its effectiveness. "Some things were realised; others were not. The coordinator came from outside, without knowing what he actually had to do."

Angelina Enoque says, "I learned a lot through the programmes. Awepa asked us questions: What are you doing in this role? How do you represent the people? They taught us how the institutions function and how you could deal with your colleagues, including the ones from the other party. In the first legislative period, the learning process was very well guided. We learned about legislation, learned to draft proposals. We saw the difference between this way of working and the one-party system. We were the enemies, the 'armed bandits', but that disappeared bit by bit. We accept diversity of ideas, we argue in the plenary session,

but afterwards we drink coffee together; that is maturity.”

“Awepa’s participation in that phase was historic,” Raul Domingos says now. “It was about establishing a multi-party system where the battlefield and its weapons were transformed into a political forum.” He continues: “It was a critical period. Many people did not believe in the success of the multi-party system; they expected shocks. But there were not very many in the first legislature. The first legislature showed that it was possible. It encouraged all the Mozambicans. The second was often more violent, e.g. hammering with shoes on the table.” (See Chapter 12.)

“Parliament played an important role in the pacification of the country,” the current Secretary-General of the parliamentary secretariat, Baptista Machaieie, says now. “It helped us to coexist peacefully. It was an important decision to establish equal positions in the commissions: when the president was from Frelimo, the secretary was from Renamo and vice versa.”

The Secretariat

A dusty office on the ground floor of the parliament building, two typewriters and a hand-operated stencil machine for typing and reproducing the minutes of the sessions: that was what the Secretariat of the Mozambican Parliament had to work with in 1994, at the time of the elections. They knew that their conditions were not adequate to meet the new demands of the multi-party parliament. However, there had

been little support for improvements before the elections. When the urgency became clear, donors were willing to provide support. Some provided urgent necessities – a copy machine, paper for the first session – but most were waiting for the trust fund programme to do more. Awepa does not normally provide materials, but it made sense to quickly buy three computers and to organise a computer course for ten staff members, as well as an audio recorder to simplify the reporting process. This contribution was just a drop in a bucket compared to what was needed. “It was the first time that most of the staff had seen a computer,” says former Secretary-General David Sibambo.

The staff consisted of serious and dedicated people, but they had to deal with many problems. Paulo Mupengue, then Head of Finances, explains, “In the old system, we were considered professionals who had to serve the Parliament. Suddenly we were considered Frelimo and therefore partisan. There was a great deal of mistrust, even though we tried to do the same for everybody.” David Sibambo adds, “The Secretariat could not remain the same as before; we all came from Frelimo, we had only worked with Frelimo. The arrival of Renamo and UD led to shocking experiences. We had to solve that problem in the first mandate. We had to be politically neutral, without personal sympathies. 1994 was the most difficult phase. We had only a small staff and 4 billion Mt on our budget. (1994 about 550.000,- US\$) A year later, that amount rose to 42 billion (1995 about 3.700.000,- US\$)

Mupenge explains, “In the old system, the MPs did not get a salary. It was voluntary work, done out of a feeling of responsibility, but the new financial demands of the MPs caused a lot of stress.” Sibambo agrees, “Management was suddenly very complex. The MPs needed hotels, subsidies, had to justify what they spent; there was a lot of paperwork. It was not a very transparent system; that is much better now. There was permanent lack of cadre. People took evening courses to obtain the level they needed to have.” New staff came in; the parliamentary parties had the option of appointing their own personnel. “I called them in together and said, “These are the conditions here; you have to work with it. And we are neutral. We will not accept any underhanded tricks here.”

In February 1995, Jan Nico Overbeeke Deputy Secretary-General of the Dutch Parliament, came to Mozambique to analyse the needs of the Mozambican parliamentary secretariat, in consultation with Sibambo and the staff. Mupengue was one of the few who spoke English, so he accompanied the visitor. “It was about how to create the required basic conditions required. We analysed where the differences were.” Gradually, the basic conditions were put into place.

Awepa’s contribution to the Secretariat was modest, but I remember a seminar in which the Portuguese Head of Communication explained how to deal with the flow of information, and she gave examples of the advanced system in the Portuguese parliament. The Zambian Secretary-General

then commented, “That is how we would do it ideally. Now we are going to look into possibilities and priorities in a poor country.” The Portuguese parliamentary secretariat was helpful regardless. For example, they invited six trainees in 1997, offering them the opportunity to improve their professionalism in reporting sessions.

Fifteen years later, the Mozambican parliamentary secretariat has its own office, built by the Chinese, offering proper conditions and enough space to accommodate the parliamentary parties and hold meetings, and housing a good library. I was welcomed proudly. “We have an information bulletin, broadcasting time on radio and TV, and a network of journalists that follow the work. TV now also reaches the provinces and districts. That helps,” says the current Secretary-General. And Mupengue, now personal assistant to the Secretary-General, states with pride: “We are now as good as the neighbouring countries.”

Elections are not the end of the story



Seminar with OJM for the preparation of local governance, Inhambane, 1997 (Awepa Maputo)

Chapter 11

Democracy and peoples' organisations

Elections are not the end of the story. But knowledge and understanding about democratic rights following the elections was minimal. The people had been prepared for reconciliation and participation in the elections, but what were the prospects afterwards? What concrete actions could they take to bring their concerns forward and to gain influence? For many people, parliamentary proceedings did not seem to have any bearing of their daily lives. The lines of influence through the former nationwide Frelimo organisations and local party structures had disappeared. Although decisions were often top-down in those days, it also gave clarity about whom to address. In the new political reality, people had to organise themselves in a completely different way.

In 1996, former civic education partners asked Awepa for a follow-up of the programmes, adapted to the new situation. Awepa wrote a manual to explain how Parliament works and what opportunities there are to influence decisions¹, but that was far too difficult for most people to comprehend. It was then decided to hold a new series of seminars, trying to help the Mozambicans to get a grip on the new democratic possibilities.

1 *Guia sobre a Assembleia da Republica*, editor Obede Baloi, 1997, Awepa Amsterdam-Maputo

Changes in organised civil society

Civic education during transition had been successful, not only because of the curiosity of the population, but even more because of nation-wide organisational structures of the churches and of what were known as the 'democratic mass organisations' for women (OMM) and youth (OJM), and by the organised trade unions (OTM). (See Chapter 7.) The women and youth mass organisations had been created immediately after independence and held a monopoly position, until the changes in the 1990 constitution that allowed diversity. The mass organisations then declared themselves independent. They could count on active membership in the entire country.

By 1996, the new emerging NGOs had pursued their own independent identities. Where they could easily be included in the big civic education programmes in the first phase, this solution was no longer acceptable. However, organising a programme with these smaller organisations on a large scale was complicated; most did not have a network, their capacity was often limited, and many were in the process of implementing programmes that were tied to contracts with donors. Staff often saw the training mainly as their own learning process or felt isolated in the execution, so the outreach was disappointing. Awepa then looked for experienced structures for people to help coordinate and accompany the activities of the small organisations after their training. CCM and others took up the task in the provinces. Operating on the basis of simple proposals, some money was provided

for their work at grassroots level. Cultural groups were amongst the most active.

From 1997, legislation was prepared for local elections. (See Chapter 13.) When the civic education programmes started to include information about the future local municipalities, the subject of democracy suddenly became more tangible. The training seminars became lively again; simulations about how local government works were included. Nicknames were given to the municipalities and local budgets were worked out on the basis of priorities of the community. Some fun was included; working groups during the seminars provoked other participants by giving the mayor a luxury car, while others made a budget that only allowed space for a bicycle, saying that that was good enough, and that a local water pump was more urgent.

The work with OMM, OJM and OTM was as efficient as before; they continued to be well organised. OMM was preparing its congress, in which it wanted to formalise its complete independence from the Frelimo party. Nevertheless, what had been natural in the first phase changed entirely in the next: with the differentiation of civil society, it increasingly became a matter for dispute. Significant attention on those organisations was now viewed as too one-sided. At the same time, Renamo's Women and Youth Leagues gained strength and wanted to put their own stamp upon the civil movement.

Civil society as part of a political party: the Renamo Leagues

The more that the work with OMM and OJM was viewed as one-sided, the more critical Renamo became of the support that Awepa provided to those organisations and not to their Youth and Women's Leagues. Coming back from an OMM seminar in the North, I met Vicente Ululu in the plane, and he asked me urgently not to neglect the Renamo Leagues anymore. At the end of 1996, Awepa president Jan Nico Scholten had a meeting with Dhlakama, in which he promised to launch a programme with the Renamo Leagues as quickly as possible. This marked our acceptance of the changing nature of the civic education programme. For Renamo, the programmes were an important part of learning about the system, but the seminars also served as a forum, an opportunity to meet other members, to discuss and exchange experiences, and to see how they could include themselves in the new society.

Angelina Enoque, MP and head of the Renamo Women's League at that time, was one of the inspiring figures for the women: "I want to support the voice of those who don't have a voice, helping women to speak out," she says in 2008. She was unhappy with the emphasis that Awepa put on OMM. "OMM had the opportunity to grow, but we felt marginalised. We had such a lack of experience. We wanted to take a step forwards. But then we managed to get support from the Awepa programmes. This was important for the women; we entered a new phase. The Women's League gained

official status. In Parliament, we now have a cabinet for women MPs; outside the government, women work to achieve more equality. Women are the target of discrimination in many ways.”

In the first seminar with the Youth League the discourse was ideological, establishing the official position. It was organised in Chokwè, and was intended for the southern region of Mozambique. Most of the youth were over 30, and many party leaders took part. The programme was a mixture of the ‘normal’ non-partisan issues and current prevailing opinions. Renamo MPs such as David Alone, and journalists of their choice such as Salomão Moyane, were included as trainers. At supper, the trainers sat with the leadership. That was the moment when the past became tangible. References were made to war and to walking long distances after attacking a village. It felt a bit uncomfortable.

The Chimoio and Nampula seminars (in the centre and north of Mozambique) were different from Chokwè. Although the number of attendees was set at 70, about 90-100 came. While the Renamo intellectuals had been present in Chokwè, now the participants were young, coming from the bush and hardly literate. They were not used to being asked their opinions. The first evening in Chimoio was a disaster. We were hosted in the Red Cross Centre, a nice place with good four-person bedrooms, a meeting hall and a place for meals and social gathering. But the boys were not used to such luxury, to TVs and comfortable seats.

They also did not trust people from ‘the other side’, the established institutions, and we felt that they had a lack of confidence towards us. The first evening they quarrelled about the TV and broke it. The Red Cross coordinator wanted to throw us out, saying, “This work is not serious; how can you do a seminar with those kids?” Because we had good relations with him, we were able to convince him to let us stay. We talked with the Renamo leadership and they were helpful; they convinced the youth to behave.

The programme started in an atmosphere of mistrust, but then the miracle happened. They became interested, started to think about the questions in the working groups. We had developed practical approaches and exercises to explain the new situation and discuss how a democracy works. So what was their role? Did they believe that they could have a role? Did they think that there was democracy in Mozambique? The last



Seminar with Renamo Youth in Nampula for preparation of local governance. Left: Obede Baloi, centre: Lucia van den Bergh, right: Renamo activist, 1997

question led to lively discussions with different outcomes in each group. In the end, most of them concluded, "Yes, there is democracy, but it was Renamo who brought it." We were happy with this outcome. How could they ever endure that they had fought for nothing, think that it had been in vain? After the first difficult hours, the enthusiasm remained. They felt that they were being taken seriously.

The seminar in Nampula, where my colleague Baloi had to deal with 100 participants, also got off to a difficult start, but in the end they were also eager to learn and wanted to be taken seriously; recognition and inclusion were important. Later series of seminars with Renamo did not encounter the same problems any more. The training programme became established.

OMM returns to the Frelimo party: "We were overruled"

OMM had taken the challenges after the changes seriously and promoted a genuine women's movement throughout the country. It had reactivated its dynamic structures right down to the smallest villages after the war. *Círculos de interesses* (women's interest groups in townships and villages) were active and now often received some donor support. The organisation was growing increasingly strong and independent. After discussions in the provinces, new statutes to make their position official were supposed to be adopted in the national OMM congress of September 1996, but that did not happen. While Renamo wanted to assert its role in civil society, Frelimo wanted

to reassert its influence as well, trying to regain control that had been lost.

"It was a coup," says Filipa Baltasar da Costa when we meet in 2008. She had drafted the proposal. Her colleague Gertrudes Victorino, OMM spokesperson at the time, relates, "Just before the approval, I left the hall to inform the press about our independence. I was explaining it to them when we heard applause, expecting that the decision was taken. Then we suddenly heard that OMM had rejoined the party. The Frelimo party had used the charisma of Graça Machel [the widow of the former president]. She said to the hall that the OMM belonged to the party, and then everybody applauded and the decision was taken."

Extra delegates had been brought in from the North, female *antigas combatentes*, former fighters from the colonial war, who were unhappy with the modernisation. They took the lead in the applause. OMM activist Otilia is bitter: "The *antigas combatentes* took over OMM; it does not achieve anything anymore." The open-minded Provincial Secretaries of Nampula and Manica were not re-elected. In Tete, the national leadership's attempt to push the provincial secretary aside was stopped by the members. Filipa tells me, "We immediately lost most of our donor support for good programmes that were already being implemented. Almost the next day, UNIFEM came to take back the car that they had given us before."

“I did not agree to go back to the party,” says Ana Madalena Charovar, then provincial OMM Secretary, and now Frelimo MP. “We had gained so much; we had good programmes, we had working groups in every district. We have lost a lot; nowadays OMM is paralysed, takes no action. Going back was a strategy proposed by the party.” The provincial secretaries of Nampula and Manica were amongst the most active in trying to break through the party lines. They included Renamo women in every seminar, and the Nampula Secretary visited women in Renamo areas in 1993 and 1994, trying to build up relationships between the women. Ana Madalena continues, “My personal analysis is that the party saw a women’s movement growing that could associate itself with any party. They felt threatened; they wanted to remain in control. The cadre that we trained is now in associations and NGOs.”

After OMM, OJM followed suit and re-joined Frelimo. We in Awepa did continue the implementation of the current programme, also including the preparation phase for local elections, but we at that time did not start a new programme with them, nor with OTM, although the trade unions always had a more independent position.

Candido Mate and João Moiane of OTM look back with regret: “We were heavily involved in the 1994-1997 period, but after that OTM was no longer included in the civic education programmes. We felt marginalised. Workers lost interest, so there

were more abstentions. Civic education has to be permanent.”

The influence of the population: the example of the land law

Many of the people who had gained experience in OMM and OJM did not want to return to Frelimo control, and started their own NGO; donors were eager to support them. The result was the development of active and independent groups in civil society, some of which were critical but close to the Frelimo philosophy, while others were more on the opposing side. This new form of involvement by civil society had a successful impact on several crucial occasions. The broad discussion of the review of the land law, approved in 1997, is a good example. The Government appointed a land committee, which functioned as a platform for specialists to give their input. However, civil society did not think that was enough. Organisations published manuals in which the law was analysed, especially examining its impact on poor farmers and on women. ORAM, an agriculture support organisation, was established by ex-CCM activists. They set up a programme to explain and discuss the law and its possible pitfalls in the countryside. Concrete improvements were the result.

The conditions were optimal in this case: the Government and the Parliament had an open mind. They did not see the input as a threat, but as an asset they were prepared to use. The president of the Agricultural Commission, Helder Muteia, organised a public hearing in Parliament. It became an example

of a functioning democracy, but even more importantly, it resulted in a good land law, written to protect small farmers and the rural population. Although practical implementation of the law is not always as good, the law still serves as an example for other countries. The initiatives by ORAM and other organisations were extremely important in showing that influence was possible, and that legislation is relevant to the lives of the people, for whom access to land is crucial. However, this example was partly so successful due to high investments from organisations and some supportive donors. Moreover, involvement on such large scale is only possible on a few issues. Women's groups have been successful in other cases: both the family law and the recently approved law on domestic violence were civil society initiatives, although the last is still subject to heavy debate in the independent press. Men feel that they are being accused and that their interests are being neglected.

Who sets the priorities?

Diversity in organised civil society has grown over the years. Some civil society organisations opt to cooperate with the government at the national or local level, while others monitor government policy or choose a role as a critical watchdog. The independ-

ent press is diverse and influential. The Human Rights League has been following the situation since the early 1990s and has published many critical reports and articles about human rights violations. Civil society has actually achieved an independent position towards the government, and their influence is substantial. On the other hand, considerable control over Mozambican priorities and approaches was lost through increased donor dependency. Issues often have to be adapted to the philosophies and trends of headquarters in Europe or the US. The number of donor-funded organisations has grown, but it is not always clear who they represent

A young generation is coming up, willing and able to discuss the important issues in society, talking about poverty, about necessary changes in the Mozambican economic and social system. Pastor Mutungamira from Beira recognises the problems, but is also optimistic. "Mozambique changed forever; people here will never accept situations like in Zimbabwe under Mugabe. Other countries failed to include the grassroots. We did include them, and we are proud of that. It is our big lesson. They cannot take that away from us any more. We grew up; we are adults now."

Chapter 12

Credibility of the Democratic Institutions; does the system work?

The Western multi-party system is imposed “in total disregard for the accumulated experiences based on the history, culture, values and traditions of African societies,” says former president Chissano in a lecture in the Netherlands in April 2008. He gives examples of countries thrown into deep division and conflicts through the rapid imposition of the multi-party system while recovering their dignity and their land after colonialism, eager to follow their own path. He thinks that Mozambique managed its own process of transition quite successfully, but states that “democratisation takes time, and is frequently subject to pitfalls.” The adopted system is complicated and very costly, especially for a poor country.

Parliamentarians struggling with their role

Ernesto Lipapa is Frelimo MP from Cabo Delgado province in the north of Mozambique.

“In 1994, we did not have experience. But we learned that political work means participating, not abandoning. Still, there was a lack of continuity in the learning process. The tumultuous acts inside Parliament affected our credibility towards the population.” He refers to the second mandate, when Renamo’s demonstrative departure from the hall was replaced by the practice of banging shoes on the table. “But we are doing better now.”

“There is growth, also on the Renamo side,” Frelimo MP Alfredo Gamito concurs. “But Parliament could improve if we improve how the committees function. The population does not know them, yet committees have an important say. But they are secondary to the party strategies and the leading Permanent Commission. The leaders of the parliamentary parties are more of a determinant, more important.”

Speaker of Parliament Eduardo Mulembwe confirms that the work of the committees is not very visible. “We are used to having the main discussion in the plenary session. We have two days of committees and two days of plenary every week but it means that the same discussions often take place twice. But the number of laws that are approved by consensus has grown. The MPs are starting to take up their role; there is not so much ignorance anymore.” Renamo MP Albino Muchanga says, “Reaching consensus is difficult, but we sometimes manage, for example about the statute on civil servants. But Parliament should function more separately from the parties; they should recognise our specific position. Our role is to approve the social and economic plan, and to monitor whether it has been executed.”

Getting a grip on the issues

The pressures of daily work are high, and there is a substantial backlog in approving new legislation; time to study and discuss the proposals is limited. Complicated issues like EPAs (free trade agreements with the EU) or the conditions that accompany the loans from the World Bank and the IMF

require background information, research and support. However, inclusion of specialists or researchers in the preparations is rare. In December 1998, Awepa organised a conference in Maputo with the Southern African parliaments about debt. It was at the time of Jubilee 2000, an international movement demanding debt cancellation for third-world countries. There was a growing awareness in poor countries about the negative effects of World Bank and IMF loans, and the conditions that accompany them. One of our specialists prepared the conference with a small group of MPs. Most did not have a strong command of the English language, while all the documents from the World Bank and IMF are in English. This meant that providing a translation into Portuguese was important. “Did we really accept that we cannot give free healthcare to the poor anymore? How can we explain that to our people? I never agreed!” one of them said with growing concern.

Far from the people’s concerns?

During Chissano’s presidential period, Armando Guebuza was leader of the Frelimo parliamentary party. He opted for a strong independent voice for the Parliament. Parliamentary influence, including voices from society e.g. on the land law, was especially possible during the first mandate. But while Guebuza is president now, Parliament does not seem to have the same independent force or space. “Nobody wants to put their bread in danger,” says Verónica Chemane, working in a civil society organisation in Maputo. “It is difficult for Frelimo MPs to oppose the government. The opposite is

true for Renamo; they have never approved an annual plan or budget yet. It is often not about the right decision, but about what the party discipline asks.” But does Parliament make sufficient use of its opportunities, trying to be a representative body of the people, addressing their problems? Talking to several MPs now, they see the problem.

MP Alfredo Gamito says, “Every MP has to visit his province twice a year, to meet his electorate. There is huge pressure to spend 30 days in the districts. But the distance between Parliament and the people is growing.” Frelimo MP Ernesto Lipapa explains, “When I come into the town of Mueda [in Cabo Delgado province], people expect that I can do something for them. They want a representative in every district; they want us to look into the price of maize, to set the minimum wage. It is confusing for them when we don’t have an answer to their questions. They also don’t know which party the people are from, and they often don’t care.”

The dominant party: does the winner take all? Is the one-party system creeping back in?

While parliamentarians are trying to establish their roles, the difference between the opposition and the governing party is growing. Renamo support shrank in the parliamentary elections from 37.7% in 1994 to 29.7% in the 2004 elections. The inclusion of small parties in a coalition with Renamo (Renamo União Eleitoral) did not help. The UD coalition that gained 9 seats during the first mandate disappeared and no other party gained access to Parliament. The

dominance of the Frelimo party in governance and in society increased. Some of the people I interviewed say that government and party now seem almost the same, and that room for diversity is diminishing. Is that the case?

The Nampula representative of the Human Rights League (LDH) Tarcísio Abibo suspects that he had difficulties getting into university because of his job and his critical views. “The ‘red card’ [Frelimo membership card] is now the basis for everything. Only people who support Frelimo can study; the new intellectuals all share the same ideology. I will never get a job in government institutions. Even my children will have fewer possibilities because of my activities.” Complaints have generally increased about privileges for Frelimo members and about restrictions for those who do not have the ‘red card’, or who criticise the Frelimo government.

“Frelimo prepares its candidates very well, especially about the interests of the party. It is a pre-programmed story,” says Alcinda, working in Nampula. “And if you aren’t following the mainstream, everything is more difficult: getting jobs, a land title, opening a shop. But what is it that makes people afraid to talk?” Obede Baloi says, “People think that all measures are taken based on instructions from the leadership. But that is not the complete picture. Restrictive measures are often taken at lower levels by people who just want to ingratiate themselves with the boss.”

Renamo MP Eduardo Namburete was fired from his position as a lecturer at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. He took legal action and won. Angelo Matusse, former Awepa representative says, “It was not the government that sent him away from university; it was Brazao Mazula, the rector at that time. There is a perception of exclusion by the Frelimo government that is not always based on reality.”

Did the opposition use its opportunities?

“It is difficult to always be in opposition,” says Renamo MP Angelina Enoque. “We have good ideas but they hardly ever pass. Last week, after a horrible wave of violence in South Africa against Mozambicans and other foreigners, we wanted to react as Parliament, as the sovereign institution. It is a matter of national interest. But then the Frelimo bench did it alone. It is not a comfortable position we are in.”

The opposition had a free ride after the war. Everybody encouraged them and donors were ready to finance the new parties, stimulating a democratic party structure and a political programme that is open to discussion, as the only way to gain the continuous support of the population. But Renamo never distanced itself from the authoritarian structure of wartime. It lost many good people; cadre like Raul Domingos, Jafar Gulamo Jafar, Daviz Simango and Maria Moreno, all in key positions, were expelled or pushed aside.

“The opposition only hurls insults,” says Marcos Juma, leader of Panamo and MP for the UD coalition during the first mandate.

“We should point out the mistakes, but being more positive, being constructive.” Juma has ideas about education, about the exploration of minerals, about agriculture: “We should change the agricultural system, lay down the hoes, re-open the rural shops, give jobs to that part of the population. Those things should be discussed in the parties.” Angelo Matusse says, “After the Peace Agreement, the party in power promoted the opposition. In 1992, it was necessary in order to maintain peace. The opposition became accustomed to being promoted. But now they have to spread their wings and fly on their own.” He continues: “I think Frelimo is pushing too much towards its own side now. Opposition already exists within the party, stating that freedom of expression is necessary. People are appearing within Frelimo who talk openly.”

Longing for unity

In contrast to the concern about Frelimo’s increasing dominance, there is certainly some nostalgia for the past, for when no time was lost on competition and discussions were about real issues. People remember the preparations for the Frelimo congresses and the constitutional changes, the discussions in factories, institutions and in the townships, the outcome being carried forward to a higher level by their representatives. Nobody wants to go back; people now want the freedom to choose, to express other opinions. But seeking consensus is firmly rooted in the traditional thinking about leadership, so they talk about the necessity to discuss the national problems, about finding solutions together.

“The present system can be very divisive. The parties don’t talk about serious things, they only talk about how they can win,” says Ernesto, a man from Nampula. “Parties come to ask for your vote, make promises and then disappear.” No vision, no serious discussion, no local base.

Small political parties: “We did not see the opportunities”

Everybody in Mozambique knows the word: the ‘envelope’. It is not about bribery, but about the official sum provided to support small parties, initially paid by the donors, and later included in the official government support. It is the money that each registered political party receives to organise their activities and to compete with other parties. Leaders of small parties now say that this is one of the reasons that parties do not work together. They each want to have the right to receive.

“The start was wrong,” says Andre Balate, president of the political party ‘Parena’. “In 1993, they should not have promoted the creation of parties like that. Many were created just for the money. It is necessary to stop for a while and see what each party delivers. Parties should prove themselves first and receive money only after the work is done. This approach creates laziness and nothing is achieved. Political parties have to work for the population, not for themselves,” says Balate. “But at that time, it was the only possibility to avoid that only the two big parties would participate.

Marcos Juma of Panamo agrees that many parties were created because of the money, and that it keeps them divided. "Division means that you always lose. They say: 'I am going to create my own party, so I can receive money'." But he does not think that it was wrong at the start. "It was the best that could be done. But we did not see the opportunity of the support that we got." Juma tried to form a broad coalition for the local elections of November 2008. "We wanted to form a block for constructive opposition. 19 parties were with us. But then they asked me: 'but who will receive the envelope?' Only two stayed together, Pimo and Panamo."

Juma's political choices go back to the past. "I was never really with Frelimo, but I never agreed with the war. We suffered, after independence those from outside, from the apartheid regime were laughing about us, who were killing our brothers" During an attack by Renamo in the Northern city of Nacala he escaped. On his way to the provincial capital Nampula, he saw that Renamo had set fire to a tractor, with people tied up on it. He wonders: "Is war the way to achieve democracy? They keep talking about bringing democracy, but I don't agree. If that is truly their goal, then they now have to sustain democracy. But Renamo was never democratic; that is why they pushed their good people out. Mozambique had its own form of democracy. It was not Renamo that achieved peace; the people brought peace because they were tired of suffering. We are here thanks to the people."

Juma continues, "Outside support for political parties is hardly coming in anymore now." CPDM [a centre for political parties that was created through outside support] still exists, but at the same time it does not. There is a lot of quarrelling going on inside. Donors now feel that we, the small parties, are not interested in growing."

"In the end, it is about personal survival"

Adriano Malache is the coordinator of the Mozambique office of NIMD, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. NIMD has supported small parties since 2000, and created the party centre (CPDM). He observes, "The organisational structure of the small parties is weak. They should have a support base, ask for membership fees. What is their social base? Where do they have visibility? What is their message? They have to ask themselves who will concur and collaborate with that message. However, the majority does not have a vision like that; the party is the source of personal survival for the leadership." He continues, "The conclusion of the international community after the elections was that the money was used poorly. Capacity building was provided, but with what results? None of those people currently hold seats in Parliament." NIMD has been providing training for almost ten years now. "They all come to workshops, except the two big parties; their culture now is to say no." Malache views the dialogue between the parties as the most important aspect: "Discussing the national interests is essential for multiparty democracy."

The large investments made by the donor community with the aim of creating a third force before the first multiparty elections did not result in serious political diversity. Most small parties remained artificial creations. Even the ones that have some visibility now, either because they have been included in a parliamentary coalition with Renamo in the 2004-09 mandate, or through a presence at local level, have not built up a credible and democratic party inside the country. Training and support has not changed that. There is still limited comprehension of what proper and effective opposition means. But there are certainly opportunities. A new party was created recently, the MDM (see Chapter 13), gaining force rapidly in 2009, the year of the national and provincial elections.

But Malache is not very optimistic for the short term. He describes the current divisions. "We work with an NGO called AMODE. They go into the districts to work with the political parties and community leaders, trying to

solve local problems. But we see that the parties keep the conflict alive, instead of creating space to discuss it together. The multiparty system still faces many weaknesses in part because of poverty. There is a lot of tension in the provinces of Zambezia, Sofala, and Manica; everybody now wants to enter into party structures. Access to power also gives access to financial resources. The competition is becoming more aggressive. In the end, it is about personal survival."

"What is the solution?" I ask him. He answers, "There is none, not in this generation. It is a process. In institutional terms, Mozambique is functioning. But talking about the practical aspects, the benefits for the population, therein lies the problem. There is room to express yourself and political parties can be created, but to what point does the population benefit?" Matusse states, "It is not enough to look into the question of democracy. If there are no social guarantees, if democracy is only for the ones who eat, it does not work."

Chapter 13

Local governance

Beira looked different in 2008 when I came back after ten years. When I visited it before, the city was dirty, the streets were full of potholes, and the neighbourhood around the market was an uneasy place, with aggressive pickpockets. But now everything looks clean and organised, new public toilets do not have the same smell, and the informal markets are organised by product. I walk through a street full of second-hand shoes.

“It really improved,” says the taxi driver on the way from the airport, as we drive over the repaired roads. “We are so happy with our Mayor, he looked into our priorities.” When we pass an open field he says, “Do you remember how everybody did their necessities here in the open air?” Yes, I do; I still remember the women, just spreading their legs under their *capulana*, their traditional cloth wraps. “Three months it took to solve the problem,” he says. “After the place was cleaned up, you had to pay a high fine. People complained at first, but now everybody is happy.” He is not the only person who feels proud. Any party sympathies aside, Daviz Simango, the Renamo Mayor of Beira, did a good job.

Decentralisation process

The first law on municipalities was approved in September 1994, just before the first multi-party elections. But the new parliament declared the law unconstitutional,

and thought that the discussion should be reopened, but now including the opposition. In 1995, Alfredo Gamito became Minister of State Administration, and thus responsible for the new legislation. He explains in 2008, “In 1990, the government wanted to change the 128 districts into municipalities. But later we saw that we could not start on that scale, so we opted for a gradual approach.” The model also changed. Not the districts, but the towns would be municipalities; later, the more than 600 *povoações* or small villages would have their own elected representatives. “We had many discussions with Dennis Jett, the US Ambassador, and he put us under huge pressure,” says Gamito. Jett was not the only one who was trying to push through quick elections. In 1997 a letter from 10 donors, written in a blackmailing tone, urged that local elections should be held no later than the end of that year. This went too far for other donors; the Nordic countries in particular disassociated themselves from that position. The new law on decentralisation was approved by consensus in April 1997 and the first local elections were held in June 1998, after several delays. 33 municipalities were selected to start with, of



Maputo City Hall, 2007 (Pieter Boersma)

which 23 were cities, including all the provincial capitals, and 10 *vilas* (towns). Ten years later, the local elections of November 2008 added 10 more *vilas*. National parties could compete locally, as well as local *grupos de cidadãos* or citizen groups. The latter had the same rights as the local party branches.

Gaining experience and thinking locally

There was a huge lack of knowledge. For Awepa, informing civil society was a logical follow-up to earlier civic education programmes. However, the lack of knowledge among parties and their candidates was even more serious. From 1997, Awepa trained civil society organisations again, but also trained political parties and their candidates, as well as local observers. I left Awepa shortly after the local elections, but my successor set up a programme for the newly elected local governments and assemblies.

“Political parties are not used to thinking locally,” said one of the trainers. “National head offices take the lead in selecting local candidates, in campaigning and in preparing a programme.” Small parties did not have a local base, and the local citizens groups did not have easy access to information; the bureaucracy to register as a competing party was complicated.

The seminars tried to promote local thinking as the first priority. They raised the questions of what candidates and parties actually wanted to do on a local level, and what relationship they had with the local population. To guarantee quality, the Ministry of State Administration (MAE) provided

specialists for the training, and experienced deputies from municipalities in other countries were brought in as well. Manuals were written and the law was explained in a detailed analysis.¹ The Frelimo party was well organised at the local level, but had to deal with centralised instructions and decisions, and the party branches were not used to local independence. It was even more difficult for Renamo and the small parties, and donors did not want to give Mozambique much time to adapt.

Boycott no longer works

After several delays, in March 1998, the CNE announced the elections for June 1998. By then, Renamo had unexpectedly announced a boycott, which most small parties joined. But an approach that had worked during the negotiations and the transition period, when full consensus was required and a boycott could delay every decision, had now lost its power. After several efforts to satisfy Renamo, the elections went ahead on the 30th of June without their participation. Doubts existed if their move was motivated by realistic complaints, or if the parties were simply not ready and did not want to lose face.

By then, Awepa had conducted 8 out of 11 provincial seminars with potential Renamo candidates and their party structures. We wanted to stop, but they begged us to continue. Many participants were frustrated that the decision to boycott the elections

1 Hanlon, J., *Guia básico sobre as autarquias locais*, 1997, MAE & Awepa, Maputo

was made without consulting the local branches.

Angoche

At the end of October 2008, I spoke to Alberto Massane, Renamo Mayor of Angoche at that time. He admits that he did not like the boycott: "It was a pity; if we had entered in 1998, we could have done much more locally. We had so much support." That was probably true. I was in Angoche during these first local elections, as an observer. Voter turnout at the national level was only 14%. Frelimo was going to win anyhow, so why vote? The boycott brought back tensions; people did not want to be seen at a polling station, because that meant that you were in favour of Frelimo. "I won't go; we don't want new conflicts," I heard people saying, "Let them fight out their differences amongst themselves and not make our lives difficult again." In spite of the boycott, Renamo was authorised to hold mass rallies during the campaign period. Dhlakama organised one when I was in Angoche, and thousands of people attended it.

Many in Angoche had turned to Renamo after the cashew scandal. In 1995, the World Bank imposed its policy on Mozambique, forcing it to export raw cashew nuts, instead of encouraging them to be processed in the Mozambican factories. This measure had dramatic consequences: the cashew industry, just recovering after the war, and by then mostly in the hands of private Mozambican companies, collapsed. 14 factories closed in the area around Angoche. Donors had made their aid dependent on compli-

ance with IMF and World Bank conditions, so the government had no choice. And Phyllis Pomerantz, responsible World Bank official in New York, did not even want to hear about the social and political consequences in post-war Mozambique.² The once-lively town with its many economic activities fell apart. People lost their jobs and many frustrated workers blamed the government and turned to Renamo.

Mayor Massane had no ties to Renamo during the war. "What hurts most is that I worked 30 years in the cashew industry, through the whole war as well. The workers were simply sacked. The government only gave compensation to the jobless after a lot of pressure, but it was far from enough." The companies did not accept much responsibility for the workers. I ask if he knows about the World Bank policy. He replies, "Yes, I know about it, the condition that the whole raw cashew production should be exported. Because of the crisis in India and Guinea, the Mozambican market was liberalised. The exporters got all the privileges; it meant a quick profit for the trade companies, but they did not pay the workers. The World Bank wanted manual processing instead of the mechanical processing that we did, but that is neither appropriate nor adequate. People were paid per kilo, under legal minimum wage, like slaves."

2 Hanlon, J. and T. Smart, *Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique*, 2008, James Curry, London

Massane was convinced that he would be re-elected in November. "I believe in the victory, despite fraud and games." He is from Angoche, and blames the government for excluding the Angoche natives in public services. He receives little support from the district government, he says, and Frelimo municipalities are privileged. "The Awepa capacity building is welcome," says Massane, "but we now have little support from the international community. The twin city ties with the Portuguese town of Figueira da Foz are not functional." Massane dreams about better roads, water, a new cemetery, and economic investments in tourism: "We have a virgin beach 40 kilometers long." He mentions that he had yet not taken the initiative to exploit this opportunity during this mandate, but does not give a reason. And his next mandate did not come; he was not re-elected. There was no evidence of fraud, say well-organised national observers.

Progress, but why no women in local government?

The same dreams come back everywhere: a clean city, water, roads. Carlos Tembe, former OJM staff member, now heads the Department for Municipalities in the Frelimo party. When I meet him in May 2008, he gives some indications of the progress: "Chimoio was a clean city, but it deteriorated; it is dirty now. In contrast, Tete did very well, the way the Mayor works is good. He does not stay in the office; he talks with the population." The local taxes often provoke difficult debates. The municipalities receive financial support from the national government, but local salaries have to be paid out

of local income. "Quelimane collects tax from commercial taxi bicycles. In Ilha de Mozambique, the city council had promised not to collect taxes, but later they did so after all, so the population is in revolt."

Rita Muianga, Frelimo mayor of Xai Xai, was a member of the Assembly from 1998, but replaced the former Mayor when he died. In 2003, a women's group came to her, saying "we want you to be our next Mayor." She was indeed elected, but remained one of the few women in local councils. Even after the 2008 elections, only 3 out of 41 mayors are women. The other two towns that have women mayors are Mandlacazi and Marrupa. Quotas guarantee women a place on the national candidate lists, but this rule was never established for the municipalities. Yet Mozambican history has brought many strong women to the forefront, and it is frustrating to see how they are pushed aside locally. "We involve women as much as possible," says Rita Muianga. "Associations receive support, especially the ones that defend the vulnerable groups. The cost of living has increased, and people have to work in agriculture without the proper means. We try to support *casas agrarias*, thus supporting small farmers, many of them women."

Juntos pela Cidade: a citizen list in Maputo

Not many small parties or citizen groups were able to establish a good position at the local level over the years. Only two of the five citizen groups from 1998 came back in 2003. But Juntos Pela Cidade had made a

good start, winning 15 seats at the first elections. Critical investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso, killed in 2000, was one of the initiators.

I see them in the streets of Maputo during the 2008 campaign, young people walking in small groups. They distribute postcard-sized pamphlets, and it is difficult to spot them between big lorries full of flags and people from Frelimo, and smaller Renamo cars. “JPC played a very good role in the first period; they put their finger on the things that were not going well,” says Helena, a well-informed Maputo citizen. “But now they hardly participate any more. Philippe Gagneaux, the party leader, gave up.” JPC was especially successful because they showed what a progressive and independent opposition could look like. They also showed other small parties that boycotting was not the right approach.

I speak to Philippe Gagneaux in November 2008: “I withdrew in part because of pressure from my family.” But the big question for him is why their support diminished. “We had dreams after the elections. It was a movement of intellectuals but 35 groups were supporting us in the first campaign. I did everything: wrote statements, handled 200 phone calls every day.” During a working visit to Brazil with Awepa, he saw how Brazilians work with participative budgets, giving the population influence on the priorities: “It entered into my perceptions of democracy.” Gagneaux is critical about Maputo Mayor Eneas Comiche, for example about his way of dealing with the traffic and

public transport. “Why not have a municipal public transport system?” Talking about the present phase, he says: “JPC is becoming less intellectual; the candidates are now from the townships. But they don’t have the level needed to govern.” In 2003, JPC went back to 5 seats, sinking further in 2008 to 2. In the end, JPC failed to live up to expectations; it failed to consolidate its base and work with it.

Popular Maputo and Beira mayors not re-nominated

The popular mayors of the two main cities, Maputo and Beira, were not selected as candidates for the 2008 elections. In Maputo, Frelimo Mayor Eneas Comiche had built up credibility. Cleaning up the city had been important for the population of Maputo. Comiche was known as honest and transparent, and people felt that he addressed the real problems of the town. Why can he not finish his job? We were happy with him. Why do parties never listen to what the population wants? is what I hear in Maputo. Gagneaux says about him: “Comiche did not give privileges to party members. That is why he was pushed aside.” Comiche accepted the choice of the party. In November 2008, Frelimo candidate David Simango (no relation to Daviz Simango from Beira) was elected with 85.8% of the vote.³

3 *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, Issue 37, Awepa/CIP, 15 December 2008

Beira's independent Mayor; a new alternative coming up?

In Beira, when Renamo did not re-nominate Mayor Daviz Simango, massive crowds of people flooded the streets, asking him to stay. He did, running as an independent candidate, and won with an overwhelming majority. 61.6% of the votes went to him, while the Renamo candidate got 2.7%.

Two weeks before the local elections, I spoke to Daviz Simango. The person who organised my meeting knew me; he had been active in Renamo seminars, so he was helpful, but avoided actually meeting me. The moment was difficult; the personnel struggled with the question of their loyalties.

Daviz Simango's father was Uria Simango, who was allegedly executed in a re-education camp in the early 1980s together with his wife. He is still the Mozambican symbol for how dissidents were treated at that time. This and other aspects of Frelimo policy are the reasons why Daviz Simango chose Renamo, right from the beginning. So why run as an independent candidate now? "I am Renamo, I will always be Renamo," he says, "but my candidature was imposed by the people. The population is behind me. Only if the party recognise its mistake, if the Chief indicates..." He gestures wordlessly.

Simango's choice to run as an independent candidate had immediate consequences: the majority of the Municipal Assembly rejected the plan and budget for 2009. "All 19 of Frelimo and 6 out of 25 Renamo voted

against; it was an order from the party." He laughs, "And now they complain, this budget had the new salary scale. It was a lack of knowledge. The municipality now uses the old 2008 version." I ask how he can work without majority support in the Assembly. "If the Assembly rejects the plan three times, then the Assembly is sent away."

In Simango's view, Renamo's war was necessary. "The churches were closed. If you had two huts, they nationalised one. We tried to create political parties peacefully. In the end, the only alternative was taking up arms." But was the cruelty of the war necessary? He avoids giving a straight answer. "The struggle for independence was for all Mozambicans. Frelimo created the idea that there were foreign interests. But no, the revolt was national."

At the time of the interview, Simango still kept the possibility open of returning to Renamo, but this later became impossible. Renamo now sees him as a traitor. In May 2009, there was an attempt on his life, although the background is still unclear. Simango announced the formation of a national party, the MDM. Several senior Renamo politicians who accepted the invitation to attend the ceremony were expelled, amongst them Maria Morena, leader of the Renamo parliamentary party. The establishment of MDM seems to have had consequences for Beira already. The potholes are coming back – the Mayor is busy with other aspirations now.

High turnout in November 2008: what are the perspectives?

Voter turnout in the elections was surprisingly high: 46%, compared to 28% in 2003. The election was generally well run.⁴ But Renamo lost its five mayors, and has no majority in any of the assemblies. The GBD, a small party that supported Simango for the elections, won seven seats. For the first time, Beira now has an assembly with no majority for one of the big parties. This gives GBD a great deal of power; they can help one or the other to achieve a majority. The tradition of good local observation that had grown over the past years worked. Parallel counts were carried out in an organised way by a national Electoral Observatory that coordinated preparations in the whole country.

Campaigns and programmes are now local, and the population increasingly judges local government on what they actually do. However, the diversity that was seen in the elections of 2003 is in jeopardy. Four small parties and three citizen's lists won assembly seats, but in general the small players lost ground everywhere except in Beira. Complaints about the control of the ruling party are growing, in the national government as well as in the municipalities, and there is said to be some discrimination of Renamo municipalities. Renamo has again lost support, but its analyses of the reasons why should go beyond blaming others.

Simango's MDM party opens new perspectives, at the national level as well as locally. It could offer a third way, the alternative that many people hoped for, and it might break through the bipartisan polarisation. But it is again a new and difficult process, requiring a democratic attitude and space from both major parties. It requires an ability to share, or even to lose. And it requires MDM to do what most opposition failed to do: build up a base and create a serious and realistic programme.

MDM now also has the possibility to develop another view about the cruelties of the war. Simango definitely has reasons to be bitter about the Frelimo government in the first years after independence, but as a party leader and potential presidential candidate, an honest approach about the terrorist acts during the war could contribute to his credibility towards the population. Just as his parents deserve recognition, so do the innocent people who suffered from the Renamo violence during the war; they deserve someone who has the courage to say that what happened to them was wrong, no matter who did it. In that respect as well, MDM could offer a third way.

4 *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, Issue 37, Awepa/CIP, 15 December 2008

Did expectations come out?



Every space is used to grow food – urban gardening Maputo, 2007 (Pieter Boersma)

Chapter 14

Poverty and stability; 'you cannot eat democracy'

“The thinking in most Western countries is that democracy will deliver development”, former president Chissano said in a lecture in the Netherlands in April 2008. “Therefore, democracy is often presented as a pre-condition for development assistance. That is a wrong assumption.” In Chissano’s view, it is the other way around. You cannot build democracy on an empty stomach.”¹

Producing for those who cannot buy

Walking in the Beira market, I see piles of boxes with tomatoes. There is a new government policy to stimulate rural people to produce more. People should fight poverty by working harder. But poor people already work hard, often under minimal conditions with hardly any means. Women work the fields with a primitive hoe in the hot sun, carrying their babies on their back. We know the lovely pictures at sunrise, but it is not romantic; it is pure poverty. They produce for their family and for the local market, in the hope that they will earn some small profit to get them through the period before the next harvest. But do they actually earn anything? The tomatoes are already rotting; the production seems to have been in vain. At the same time, hungry people walk through the streets who would be hap-

py to have something in their stomach. It is not a production problem, it seems, nor a problem of local demand; the problem is buying power. People who have no money will not eat, and people who produce become poorer because their investments do not earn enough profit to even pay the initial costs. So will those women work hard and invest their money next time? It is a downward spiral.

Money should be brought into the poor society to create the much-needed buying power, through decent salaries and at least a minimum level of social security. Bringing cash into the poor society is a way to stimulate the local economy and avoid marginalisation of the underclass.

Is Mozambican stability in jeopardy?

“Poverty is the main danger for post-electoral conflicts,” says Renamo MP Angelina Enoque in May 2008. “The population changed its attitude, as you can see from the explosion of violence last February. From January to May of this year [2008], the costs of living went up every month. The country has to define its priorities better. And one priority is to produce food.”

The February 2008 uprising in Maputo townships was about the price of public transport.

A taxi driver, working for an owner, explains that he works about half the day just to earn the costs of the *chapa* (privately-owned minibus) that brings him into town. Just then, the radio broadcasts the current session in Parliament. “Do you hear what they’re saying? The only time when they all agree is when it is about their own salary and cars.

1 Chissano, J.A. ‘*Democracy in Africa*’, 2008, Evert Vermeer Annual Lecture, Amsterdam

They were all given new cars, and look how the population has to reach their work. Our transport is not important.” It is true; there are long queues for the *chapas*. Although the transport price increase was reversed, it still takes a large part of low salaries. The ones who earn a good wage live in town, but support personnel, house cleaners, and drivers with low incomes have to build their houses far from the centre. They do not benefit from improvements in town. They take the *chapas* over bad roads, changing two or three times, and paying the full price every time. “It would cost me 60 Mt a day [about 2 US\$],” says a friend, a serious worker who earns a modest salary, “so it is better for me to walk three hours a day; I don’t want to spend my whole salary on the *chapas*.” What’s more, reversing the transport price increase is not a long-term solution. The costs for the owners of the *chapas* are rising as well, so the prices will go up later; there is no way to avoid that. But the real problem of the low salaries – that tiny wages mean people cannot afford to use the *chapas* – is not addressed.

In April and May 2008, there was a wave of violence in South Africa against Mozambicans and other foreigners. The taxi driver says angrily, “We suffered a lot in the times of apartheid, because we supported the struggle. They forget about that. What did the Mozambicans do to deserve such behaviour? They always worked hard in the mines. Now many are coming back to Mozambique. They have lost everything; they have no job, they have nothing.” Asking for a reason why they turned against

Mozambicans is not relevant; there is none. But the anger of young South Africans who see no future for themselves is frightening. I expected words of revenge, but none were spoken. “That is not our way to handle conflicts,” agreed people in a public debate on TV. “We have to be clear about the unacceptability of the attacks, but there will be no revenge. That only can lead to a new spiral of violence.” And that is the last thing that Mozambicans want.

Governance for all

Although eager to avoid new violence, Mozambicans understand and share the frustration of the young South Africans. The feeling of exclusion is a dangerous breeding ground in Mozambique as well. Inclusion is not just a question of democracy, multiparty or otherwise; it is a question of equal opportunities and governance for all. Inequality is growing; the big houses and cars are for the happy few, while most people have a hard time keeping their heads above water. Hunger and inequality undermine the credibility of the present democratic system. In the actual free market system, only a small group takes the profit.

Addressing poverty is difficult in a poor country like Mozambique. But it is also a matter of political choices: the will to redistribute wealth, nationally and internationally. Can rich countries continue to take their profit from cheap labour and from exploitation of natural resources in the South, while the poor people pay the price? At least something should be given in return. Decent salaries and fair prices are

crucial, but they are only the beginning. Discussions are growing about social security or a guaranteed basic income. There are many experiments going on now, such as the *bolsa familia* in Brazil, a cash grant provided on a regular basis to poorer families, or social pensions and child benefits in South Africa. And there are Mozambican examples: 15 years ago, at the end of the war, two years' guaranteed cash income was provided for the demobilised soldiers. (See Chapter 6.) Now, small amounts of money are given every month to more than 100,000 very poor elderly people, mostly women. Cash transfers offer a different perspective on poverty. People with a small guaranteed income tend to take more initiatives, their children are sent to school, and transport to the clinic can be paid for. It also stimulates the local economy: through increased buying power, and means that small-scale farming can be profitable again. For donors, contributing to a modernised social system may in the end be cheaper than the current project approach. Moreover, it could avoid problems and conflicts that lead to economic losses and human suffering on a scale that is not even imaginable.

'It is time to see if this democracy serves the poor'

"The danger of social explosions sparked off by poverty is real, as we saw recently in Kenya and South Africa," says Veronica, a woman working in Maputo. "In the first years after the end of the war, we saw nation-wide motivation, which Mozambique used to recover. But now it is time to see if this democracy really serves the poor. I see a major difference between the official statements and the real-

ity for the population. Not only the poorest, but also the workers, the middle class, the people with jobs see how the costs of living are rising all the time, so the money that they earn is worth almost nothing in the end."

Candido Mate from the trade union organisation OTM says: "There are no jobs in the cities. We have to stimulate entrepreneurship, create capacity for small businesses, produce and sell things. We cannot all have a paid job; they simply are not available. We need our own initiatives. However, a policy of creating infrastructure and strengthening citizens is lacking. Government-initiated capacity building, or initiatives like building dikes for water management, are good examples of what could be done. The banks are not helpful in rural areas. I believe in people's capacity for taking initiatives if they have the opportunity." He then adds: "Life is a struggle, it takes time. But the gap between the population and the top has become wider. People say now, 'they only solve their own problems, we continue to live in misery, nobody supports our living costs'." His colleague continues: "People don't vote any more. They say: 'Vote? For what? For them to eat? What is left for us?'" And a friend in Maputo says, "Many people feel now that elections don't change anything."

Can a democratic system save people from poverty? Or can access to basic needs save democracy? Food and democracy are both necessary, but a full stomach is the first priority for most people. Democracy, yes, but it has to reduce inequality and bring development.

Chapter 15

Conclusions: Why did the peace process work?

Mozambicans talking to Mozambicans: the agreement was theirs

In a war that was largely imposed from outside, the churches encouraged Mozambicans to speak with each other, without the involvement of a foreign force: “let brothers speak to brothers.” When the negotiations finally started, they were in the hands of the Mozambican political leaders from both sides. The direct talks in Rome started in 1990 and the General Peace Agreement (AGP) was signed in October 1992. It was a negotiated agreement, with detailed steps to be worked out in the transition period; both parties had made compromises. Despite outside pressure, the agreement was theirs. The General Peace Agreement could be carried out because it was acceptable to both sides.

The right moment

Mozambique had adopted the multi-party system in its 1990 Constitution and had opened the country for the free market system. At the same time, South Africa, which had supported the war for over a decade, was changing and Nelson Mandela was released. The Berlin Wall had fallen. The interests of the Cold War and apartheid had disappeared. One by one, the reasons to continue fell away. Renamo saw its foreign support drying up, and droughts made surviving in the bush difficult. And Mozam-

bique was not rich in resources like Angola. Everybody wanted to stop the war, because nobody profited from it.

No amnesty, no Truth Commissions: “if we started to punish, where would we end”

Since the 1990s, the international courts have prosecuted war criminals. This practice is probably a relief for many victims after years of impunity. But nobody asked for trials in Mozambique. There was no punishment, not even systematic identification and documentation of war crimes. Superficially, it seemed as if it had been a bad dream and now everybody had woken up. No talking about what had happened, no visible rancour, just looking forward. But as people say, “the pain is not forgotten”, and “we don’t mention the evil aloud, because then it comes back. Traditional ceremonies in the communities were part of the healing process for the ones who committed the crimes and their communities, providing forgiveness and acceptance. However, no real attention has been paid to the victims.

Accept the enemy

The attitude of the established government, churches and organisations was clear: accept and forgive the enemy, take him up in your community, ban division and hatred. And that was not the first time; former President Samora Machel had questioned former administrators and collaborators of the Portuguese regime during the colonial war; if they were guilty of crimes against the Mozambican population, and admitted culpability, they received amnesty. In 1986 and 1987, amnesty was given to Renamo

fighters who handed themselves in to the government. The argument to convince the population was that “they are victims as well,” referring to the fact that many had been kidnapped or otherwise forcefully recruited. Acceptance of the enemy is dependent on two sides coming together. In their weak position when coming out of the bush, Renamo fighters also had to learn to live with a new reality. Reconciliation was the key word, and it was taken forward by the political leaders from both sides, by civil society, by churches and the press. A tentative start to deal with each other, to create daily coexistence even while the wounds had not been healed.

The civil organisations and churches involved the people

The massive involvement of the population was crucial. It was about reconciliation at all levels, but also about understanding what was happening, about discussing and participating in the changes. The Mozambicans knew how to discuss, how to look for solutions together; they were used to it. People were intensely curious about all the new elements, such as the multiparty system and the direct and secret vote. It was different from what they were used to, the African tradition of seeking consensus and the more recent one-party system. People at all levels wanted to contribute and to spread the message. A church leader says, “Other countries failed to include the grassroots. We did, it is our big lesson.”

Learning from Angola: taking time for the negotiations and the changes

Mozambicans as well as the international community did learn from the failed process in Angola in 1992, where the war restarted after the elections. They took the time to work out a serious and detailed agreement, and prolonged the transitional period by another year, not only to prepare for the elections, but to get most of the other elements into position: demobilisation and integration of ex-soldiers, return of refugees, building up a new joint army. Each of those elements faced the need for reconciliation, for finding ways to work together, for accepting the former enemy as an equal in the day-to-day work.

The international community was supportive, key actors listened to Mozambican solutions

The UN also learned from Angola and sent a flexible and dedicated UN Representative to Mozambique, who was indeed able to listen and find unusual solutions. The process received massive international support, something that is lacking in many post-conflict countries, and Mozambique was happy with it. It was the only way to carry out the Peace Agreement and build the social and political system on a new reality. Mozambique tried not to be overwhelmed by it, keeping the key decisions in their own hands. Trusted organisations could build their interventions and support on close cooperation, and were asked to start immediately on the basis of the existing Mozambican structures and experience. Awepa was one of those organisa-

tions. Donors provided flexible money that made it possible for urgent programmes to start immediately. ONUMOZ had a large peacekeeping presence, and also played a crucial political role at tense moments. For the first time in a peacekeeping operation, a humanitarian component was included (UNOHAC), reassuring RENAMO that the humanitarian interests in the areas under their control were equally guaranteed.

Stability during transition: government and constitution were recognised in the Peace Agreement

Mozambique kept its functioning government in place during the transition period. No experiments were imposed to introduce immediate changes, as happened in some other post-conflict situations. The leaders of both parties had carefully set out the road in a detailed Peace Agreement, to which both parts had committed themselves. That road has been followed quite seriously and closely.

Seeking consensus complicated and delayed the implementation, but it worked in the end

It was a fragile process. Consensus was a key word in almost every aspect of the agreement's execution. This often delayed the process; talking went on for days without any result. Renamo walked out of meeting halls as a way of pressure and boycotted the conference about the electoral law. The National Election Commission (CNE) had to take every decision by full consensus, with the agreement of all 20 representatives of the political parties. Tense moments were frequent and regular, and a return to war

was sometimes close. But peace was holding and the elections went well; under the circumstances, they were well organised and had a high voter turnout.

The first multiparty parliament: including the former enemies and learning the job together

Cold as ice: that was the atmosphere between the two parties at the start of the first parliamentary session following the 1994 elections. There was a complete lack of experience; international support and training were important. But the Mozambicans were eager to learn the job, also seeing the importance of building up the country after elections, and not giving up on reconciliation now. The competitive multiparty democracy could intensify hostilities, but that was not what the new MPs wanted. The two main negotiators, Guebuza and Domingos, were the new parliamentary party leaders. They were used to each other, fighting for their cause but reaching compromises in the end. They wanted this new experiment to succeed, and sought to find solutions at tense moments. But mistrust was high and the first meeting broke down into hostilities. An unusual and practical training seminar started before the first session. It was set up by Awepa in cooperation with the leadership of Parliament. Many believe now that this contributed to saving the Mozambican Parliament from falling apart. The fight became political, through procedures, and the situation slowly normalised.

The issues Mozambique faces now

Consolidating democracy and addressing poverty are the current challenges. Mozambique is still listed amongst the poorest countries in the world. Hunger and inequality can undermine the credibility of the present democratic system. The war will not return in its previous form, but the actual multi-party system might have divisive elements, and future stability could be jeopardised by the abject poverty of a large majority. In the current free market system, only a small group takes the profit. Modernising the social system with minimal guarantees, including for income, could ease the situation, increasing buying power, and thus also stimulating the local economy.

Conclusion

Accepting the enemy on all levels of society and in the political institutions was difficult. The introduction of European-style elections and parliamentary system, alien to existing Mozambican traditions and decision-making systems, was an almost unmanageable change. It required a completely different way of thinking – but more importantly, for a poor and destroyed country, it required almost impossible logistics and organisation. The effects of radical changes are often underestimated, especially by Western countries that put pressure on rapid elections and the quick introduction of a new model.

The Mozambican process did indeed succeed, both initially and in the longer term. It became possible because the agreement was consensual, and because internal and

external support were exceptional. The most important factor was the broad involvement of the population right from the start. Including the grassroots is an important lesson indeed. In Mozambique, churches and civil society organisations went into the smallest villages to discuss and explain the new reality. The Mozambicans made massive use of the period of relief, hope and motivation to make peace work.

Tolerance and forgiveness saved the peace process, but at a price: nobody ever admitted what was done; nobody ever apologised. Cruel attacks are now often hidden or denied. If there is guilt, the two are now often supposed to be equally guilty. Because of the absence of a Truth Commission in which personal histories could be expressed, and people could admit that they were part of it, it is now difficult to verify what actually happened. But, although history will be analysed bit by bit, it is important already now to keep things in perspective. Denying the cruel nature of the war, and the way it was started, is now an offence to the victims.

And many questions remain: about the present functioning of the democratic institutions, about being in opposition, about opportunities for small parties, about democracy on local level and the role of civil society organisations. Democratic institutions lose credibility if they cannot solve the most important problems. Poverty and marginalisation are the most urgent issues now. The gap between the elite and the poor is wide and has broadened even more in recent years. If new conflicts break out, it

will be because of poverty and lack of prospects.

Although there are lessons to learn here, conclusions to be drawn, the process cannot just be copied to other situations. On the contrary, one of the strong points is that it was owned by the Mozambicans; it was an inclusive process and it was linked to the Mozambican context. It brought the idea of the enemy back to a person who belonged

to the same country, a person who could be cooperated with. Key donors were flexible and respected the most important Mozambican decisions, although not always wholeheartedly.

Seventeen years after the Peace Agreement, Mozambique's struggle is not over. And most of the country's youth are not interested in the past; they want a future.

Annexes

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Historic dates

Mozambique

Population	Estimated at 22 million
Area	801,590 km ²
Capital	Maputo
Official language	Portuguese

Some historical data

Early 1900s	Final resistance is defeated and Portuguese colonial administration over the country is established. Mozambique becomes a 'Portuguese province', later under the dictatorship of António Salazar (1932-1968) and Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974).
1962	The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) is founded, with Eduardo Mondlane as its first president.
1964	Frelimo launches an armed struggle in northern Mozambique, creating liberated zones. The same is happening in other Portuguese colonies in Africa, Angola and Guine Bissau. Portugal responds with a colonial war, supported by NATO.
1969	Mondlane is assassinated by a parcel bomb.
1970	Samora Machel is elected the next Frelimo president.
1974	On 25 April, a bloodless coup of army officers in Portugal opens the door for democracy in Portugal and independence of the colonies.
1975	On 25 June, Mozambique declares independence. Samora Machel is the first president.
1976	White-ruled Rhodesia creates an opposition movement, the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR).
1980	Rhodesia becomes Zimbabwe. Support to MNR, renamed Renamo, is transferred to the military of South Africa, which was still under white rule.
1981-84	The war intensifies with a revitalised Renamo, supported by South Africa.
1984	Samora Machel signs the N'komati Accord with South Africa which states that logistical support to the South African liberation movement (African National Congress, ANC) by Mozambique will be stopped. In exchange, South Africa promises to stop its support to Renamo.

- 1985 Renamo headquarters in Gorongosa is captured by the government army. The 'Gorongosa papers' are found, providing evidence that South Africa still supports Renamo.
- 1986 Samora Machel is killed in a suspicious air crash. Joaquim Chissano becomes the next president.
- 1986 Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops come in to support the Mozambican government. Renamo increases its attacks in the south.
- 1987 A massacre takes place in Homoine in which 424 civilians are killed.
- 1990 A new constitution paves the way for the multi-party system.
- 1990 Peace talks officially start in Rome.
- 1992 On 4 October, the General Peace Agreement is signed between the Frelimo government and Renamo.
- 1994 On 27-29 October, the first general multi-party elections take place.
- 1998 The first local elections take place: local councils and local assemblies are elected in 33 cities and towns.

List of interviewees

Name	Position held in the period between 1992-1996	Position held in 2008/09 at the time of the interview
Abibo, Tarcísio		Representative of the Human Rights League in Nampula
Amosse, Rev. Lucas	Secr. General of the Christian Council Mozambique (CCM)	
Balate, André		President of the Centre for Promotion of Democracy (CPDM); President of Parena
Baloí, Obede Suarte	Programme Officer for Awepa Mozambique; sociologist, pastor	Lector at the Maputo University UEM, sociologist
Baltazar da Costa, Filipa	Dept Secr. General of OMM; coordinator of civic education programmes. Frelimo MP, Tete constituency	
Boswijk, Mirjam	Working in an agricultural development programme in Inhambane province. Witness of the Homoine massacre.	
Cadeado, Ana Jaime (Anita)		Delegate in Sofala for Panamo. Candidate in the municipal elections of 2008 for Panamo/Pimo
Carvalho, César de		Mayor of Tete municipality for Frelimo, Tete province
Charomar, Ana Madalena da Silva	Provincial Secretary for OMM in Manica	Frelimo MP, Manica constituency
Chitsondzo, Roberto Maxiamiano	Frelimo MP, Maputo-City constituency	Idem
Chuma, Maria	Deputy Secretary of OJM, responsible for the civic education programmes	
Correia, Rafael		Mayor of Montepuez for Frelimo, Cabo Delgado province

Name	Position held in the period between 1992-1996	Position held in 2008/09 at the time of the interview
Cravinho, João	Trainer in Awepa's programmes; long-term observer of 1994 elections	Secretary of State for Development, Portugal
Domingos, Raúl Manuel	Head of the political department of Renamo; Head of the Renamo delegation at the negotiations After 1994: Head of the Renamo Parliamentary Party, Renamo MP, member of the Permanent Commission	President of the PDD political party
Enoque, Maria Angelina Dique	Renamo MP, member of the Permanent Commission; Manica Constituency	Idem
Gagneaux, Philippe		President of 'Juntos Pela Cidade' in Maputo
Gamito, Alfredo Maria	Provincial Governor of Nampula Minister of State Administration (MAE)	Frelimo MP, Nampula constituency
Hackenberg, Inez	Awepa representative from 1999-2000	Programme Officer in Nampula for Dutch NGO HIVOS
Juma, Marcos	President of the Panamo political party; UD coalition MP; member of the Permanent Commission, 3rd Dept Speaker	President of the Panamo
Lipapa, Ernesto Cassimuca	Frelimo MP, Cabo Delgado constituency	Idem
Lôbo de Odadilia, Augusta	OMM in Nampula and nationally	
Machambisse, Francisco Domingos Paulo	Renamo MP, Sofala constituency	Idem

Name	Position held in the period between 1992-1996	Position held in 2008/09 at the time of the interview
Magaia, Sara	Head of the department of information at OMM National Secretariat, jointly responsible for implementation of civic education seminars	
Mapache, Adriano Manuel	Civil servant at the Ministry of Defence	National Coordinator of NIMD
Massane, Alberto		Mayor of Angoche for Renamo (Nampula province)
Mathe, Candido João	OTM Central Sindical, Maputo	Idem
Matsimbe, Elias		Secretary of the Centre for Promotion of Democracy (CPDM); President of the Ecologists-Green party.
Matusse, Ângelo	Representative of Awepa Mozambique from 2000-2008	
Mazula, Brazão	President of CNE from 1993-1994 Rector of Edward Mondlane University UEM, Maputo	
Mendonça, Ana	Trainer in Awepa's civic education programmes and with Parliament	
Moiane, João	OTM Central Sindical Maputo	Idem
Mondlane, Justino	OJM Matola	
Muchanga, Albino Faife Ducuza	Renamo MP, Manica constituency	Idem
Muianga, Rita		Mayor of Xai-Xai for Frelimo, Gaza province
Mulémbwè, Eduardo Joaquim Dinis Erasto	Speaker of Parliament	Idem
Mulémbwè, Joana Manuel	OJM Maputo	
Mupengue, Paulo Naftal	Head of the financial department in the Parliamentary Office.	Personal Assistant to the Secretary General of the Parliamentary Secretariat

Name	Position held in the period between 1992-1996	Position held in 2008/09 at the time of the interview
Mururuia, Pastor Arlindo	CCM Nampula	CCM Nampula/ NGO Amode
Mutungamira, Pastor	CCM Sofala	CCM Sofala, coordinator for an NGO
Nazive, José Efraim		Secretary of OTM in Beira
Pereira, Manuel Fernandes	Political Secretary Renamo MP, Sofala constituency	Renamo MP, Sofala constituency
Rafael, Virgínia	Head of the financial department at OMM Secretariat, jointly responsible for implementation of civic education seminars	
Sengulane, Dinis Salomão, Bispo dos Limbombos	Anglican Bishop, President of the Mozambican Christian Council of Churches	Anglican Bishop
Schade, Ernst	National Coordinator of Redd Barna Mozambique	
Sibambo, David Zefanias	Secretary General of the General Parliamentary Secretariat	Administrative Tribunal
Siemensma, George	Provincial Delegate for Sofala and Inhambane, UNOHAC	
Simango, Daviz		Mayor in Beira for Renamo; after 2008 elections: independent Mayor and President of MDM political party.
Tembe, Carlos	Senior staff member with the OJM national office, jointly responsible for civic education programmes	Head of the Frelimo national department for the municipalities
Tivane, Pastor	CCM Sofala	CCM Provincial Coordinator in Sofala
Ululu, Vicente Zacarias	Secretary General of Renamo; member of the Renamo delegation at the negotiations After 1994: Renamo MP, member of the Permanent Commission, 2nd Dept Speaker	Renamo MP, interim member of the Permanent Commission

List of interviewees

Name	Position held in the period between 1992-1996	Position held in 2008/09 at the time of the interview
Valigy, Ismael	Ministry of Justice, member of CNE, trainer in Awepa's programmes	
Victor, Anselmo	Political representative of Renamo in Maputo. Member of the Verification Commission (COMIVE); member of CNE	Renamo MP; Zambézia constituency
Vitorino, Gertrudes da Conceição Frederico	Foreign Relations Secretary with OMM; coordinator of civic education programmes. Frelimo MP, Maputo constituency	
Zita, Boaventura	Head of communications with CCM Maputo. Coordinator of the civic education programmes	Idem

When only the first name is mentioned, the name is a pseudonym.

List of abbreviations

AGP	Acordo Geral de Paz (General Peace Agreement)
AWEPA	Association for European Parliamentarians for Africa
AWEPA	Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CCM	Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (Christian Council of Mozambique)
CNE	Comissão Nacional de Eleições (National Election Commission)
CJPR	Commission for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation
CPDM	Centre for the Promotion of Multi-party Democracy
EU	European Union
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRI	International Republican Institute
MNR	Mozambican Resistance Movement
MP	Member of Parliament
MPPB	Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (later: Mozambique Political Process Bulletin)
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy.
OJM	Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (Mozambican Youth Organisation)
OMM	Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Organisation of Mozambican Women)
OTM	Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique (Organisation of Mozambican Workers)
ONJ	Organização Nacional de Jornalistas (National Journalists' Organisation)
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional de Moçambique
STAE	Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
US	United States of America

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