

PARLIAMENTARY ASSESSMENT

AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING
FRAMEWORKS & APPLICATION
TO SELECTED COUNTRIES

MPA Capstone 2009

75751
71839
70647
78247

London School of Economics and Political Science

Prepared for the World Bank Institute



TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	8
OVERVIEW.....	14
FRAMEWORK AND ORGANIZATION REVIEW	16
PART I: ACROSS-FRAMEWORK COMPARISON	19
PART II: APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORKS TO SAMPLE COUNTRIES.....	41
PART III: CREATION AND APPLICATION OF HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK	55
CONCLUSION	64
REFERENCES.....	65
ANNEXES	69

List of Figures

Figure 1: CPA Overlap.....	22
Figure 2: NDI Overlap	22
Figure 3: IPU Overlap	22
Figure 4: PC - Budget Overlap.....	22
Figure 5: PC - Audit Overlap	22
Figure 6: Comparison of Composition under Internal vs. External Sub-categories (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks).....	28
Figure 7: Across-Framework Comparison of Composition.....	29
Figure 8: Additional Allocations to Internal Sub-categories (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks).....	32
Figure 9: Additional Allocations to External Sub-categories (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks)	32
Figure 10: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Objective Questions.....	35
Figure 11: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Questions with Precise Wording	37
Figure 12: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Non-Compound Questions	38
Figure 13: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Non-leading Questions	39
Figure 14: Application to Countries - Aggregate Fuzzy Set Ranges	46
Figure 15: Application to Countries – Fuzzy Set Ranges for Oversight.....	48
Figure 16: Application to Countries - Aggregate Median Scores	50
Figure 17: Application to Countries - Median Scores for Oversight	52
Figure 18: Application to Countries - Dummy Percentages	54
Figure 19: Application of Holistic Framework - Aggregate Fuzzy Set Ranges	62
Figure 20: Application of Holistic Framework - Aggregate Median Scores	63
Figure 21: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Objective Questions by Sub-Category.....	81
Figure 22: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Questions with Precise Wording by Sub- Category	81
Figure 23: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Non-Compound Questions by Sub- Category	82
Figure 24: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Non-leading Questions by Sub-Category	82

Figure 25: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Germany..... 92

Figure 26: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Peru 95

Figure 27: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Turkey 98

Figure 28: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Uganda 101

Figure 29: Application of Holistic Framework – Fuzzy Set Ranges for Oversight..... 104

Figure 30: Application of Holistic Framework - Dummy Percentages 105

Figure 31: Application of Holistic Framework - Median Scores for Oversight 106

List of Tables

Table 1: Five Framework Overlap – Example: Budget Review & Review of the Executive..	20
Table 2: Definitions of External Sub-categories.....	25
Table 3: Definitions of Good Question Characteristics.....	34
Table 4: Description of Selected Countries.....	41
Table 5: Five Framework Overlap.....	71
Table 6: Four Framework Overlap.....	73
Table 7: Three Framework Overlap.....	75
Table 8: Definitions of Internal Sub-categories.....	79
Table 9: Definitions of Criteria for Country Selection.....	83

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Rick Stapenhurst for giving us this opportunity and showing great enthusiasm for this project. We would also like to thank Lisa von Trapp for her generous assistance, numerous helpful suggestions, and vital encouragement. We are grateful to Dr. Leandro Carrera for his guidance on methodology, particularly with regard to fuzzy sets. Of course, this report would not have been possible without the help and support of our supervisor, Dr. Joachim Wehner.

The views presented in this report are entirely those of the authors and should not be taken to represent those of the individuals mentioned above, nor of the World Bank Institute or the London School of Economics and Political Science.

List of Abbreviations

CPA – Commonwealth Parliamentary Association

CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks - Commonwealth Parliamentary Association/World Bank Institute/United Nations Development Programme Benchmarks (Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures) (CPA in graphs)

IPU – Inter-Parliamentary Union

IPU Toolkit – Inter-Parliamentary Union Self-Assessment Toolkit for Parliamentarians

NDI – National Democratic Institute

NDI Standards – National Democratic Institute Standards (Toward the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures)

PC – Parliamentary Centre

PC-Audit – Parliamentary Centre – Audit Framework (PC-A in graphs)

PC-Budget – Parliamentary Centre – Budget Process Framework (PC-B in graphs)

WBI – World Bank Institute

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

As parliaments play a crucial role in the effectiveness of national governance systems, many organizations provide support for their strengthening. In working towards this aim, international and non-profit organizations, as well as parliamentary associations, try to help parliaments evaluate their essential needs and greatest challenges. To this end, a number of assessment frameworks have been created by different organizations, displaying different approaches and focus areas. The existence of several different frameworks for the same purpose poses the risk of producing divergent evaluations within a given country and thus creating difficulty and confusion for parliaments attempting to assess themselves.

Prepared for the World Bank Institute, this report examines five parliamentary assessment frameworks developed by different organizations in order to understand how and to what degree they differ. These frameworks are the National Democratic Institute Standards (NDI Standards), the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association/World Bank Institute/United Nations Development Programme Benchmarks (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks), the Inter-Parliamentary Union Self-Assessment Toolkit for Parliamentarians (IPU Toolkit), the Parliamentary Centre - Budget Process (PC-Budget) framework, and the Parliamentary Centre - Parliamentary Audit (PC-Audit) framework. Our report compares frameworks in terms of their composition, their performance on good question design, and the differential scores they generate when applied to sample countries. We then propose a holistic framework based on areas of agreement between frameworks, which may assist these different organizations in harmonizing their frameworks in the future.

Steps of Analysis

Comparing the Frameworks

In order to understand similarities and differences between the chosen assessment frameworks, we compared them question-by-question as well as at the broader topical level. We also compared them based on principles of good question design in order to independently evaluate their structure as assessment tools.

Framework Overlap

To identify question overlap between frameworks, we extended a comparison chart created by Lisa von Trapp of the Parliamentary Strengthening Program of the World Bank Institute. Von

Trapp's chart takes the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks as a base and matches these indicators with indicators/questions from other frameworks. The results from this exercise suggest that:

- Only five indicators from the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks can be matched with indicators/questions from all other frameworks. Five additional indicators from the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks can be matched with three other frameworks. There is a relatively low amount of question-by-question overlap between all frameworks.
- The Parliamentary Centre frameworks have the greatest degree of overlap with all other frameworks. This may be because the PC frameworks focus only on the Oversight functions of parliaments, which is an area addressed by all other frameworks. In contrast, topical areas addressed by other frameworks are not found in all others.

Topical Composition

There is limited overlap between all frameworks at a question-by-question level, but greater commonality is found between frameworks in terms of more general topical content. We next turned to comparison at this level of disaggregation. We generated sub-categories that enable comparison of components and activities of democratic parliaments that each framework attempts to assess. Initially, these sub-categories were internally determined through an examination of given sub-categories of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards, as these are the largest and most comprehensive in our study. We refer to these as "internal sub-categories," as they are the lowest common denominator of internal agreement among frameworks. Recognizing that these sub-categories are biased towards the two larger frameworks, we also conducted a brief literature review and generated sub-categories externally. These are referred to as the "external sub-categories."

We then allocated each indicator/question of each framework to a sub-category, first internal and then external. Recognizing that many indicators/questions of these frameworks are quite broad or ask about multiple topics at once, we lifted the restriction that each question should fit into only one subcategory and assessed number of additional sub-categories (both internal and external) to which a given question may be assigned. The results from these exercises suggest that:

- Allocation of questions to external sub-categories demonstrates priorities of the respective frameworks more clearly as compared to allocation to internal sub-categories. Use of external sub-categories reduces overlap between sub-categories and also decreases bias in favour of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards.

As a result, our further framework comparisons in this report (when applicable at the sub-category level) use external sub-categories. These are the following six sub-categories: Law-making, Representation, Resources, Public Engagement, Oversight and Resources.

When external sub-categories are then used to compare frameworks on their topical composition, results suggest substantial differences between frameworks.

- The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are quite similar to each other when compared to other frameworks. This is also the case for the Parliamentary Centre frameworks. This is likely to be a function of how these frameworks were constructed; the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks were developed in concert with the NDI Standards, and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks were devised by the same organization and differ by only a few questions.
- The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are the only frameworks to have indicators on all six sub-categories. The IPU Toolkit's questions address four sub-categories, namely Law-making, Representation, Public Engagement and Oversight. Questions from the Parliamentary Centre frameworks only address Oversight.
- These differences in composition/content across frameworks are expected given the differences between their creator organizations' priorities and approaches to parliamentary assessment. The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are standards-based frameworks that concentrate on multiple dimensions of democratic legislatures. The IPU Toolkit is mainly informed by core democratic values which emphasize transparency, accessibility, and representation of legislatures. The Parliamentary Centre frameworks, on the other hand, focus solely on the budgetary process.

Good Question Design

The third stage of our between-framework analysis shifted from focusing on content of indicators/questions to a closer examination of their construction. We applied principles of good survey question design in order to assess the strength of each indicator/question on the basis of its objectivity, precise wording, non-compound structure, and its wording as a non-leading question. While good question design was not necessarily a main focus for any of the organizations when designing their frameworks originally, it may be important in ensuring assessment is user-friendly and results can be clearly understood. The results from this examination suggest that:

- There is a high degree of variability in the presence or absence of these various good question characteristics across the framework questions. Overall, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have the highest degree of presence of good question design principles.
- While it is laudable that certain frameworks rank highly in some good question characteristics, ranking poorly in other good question characteristics hinders the framework in its work as an effective assessment tool.

Application to Countries

After this multiple-stage comparison of frameworks with each other, we then applied all five frameworks to four different countries, namely Germany, Peru, Turkey, and Uganda.¹ The purpose of this exercise was to understand whether different frameworks would produce different results when applied to the same country, as well as to what degree and in what ways divergences might occur.

Methodology

In applying the frameworks to countries, we used two different scoring methods simultaneously. One of these methods is a 0 or 1 “dummy” scoring approach that assesses whether the parliamentary function/activity/component addressed by the indicator/question is present in the specific country or not. A score of 0 denotes lack of presence while a score of 1 indicates presence. Results from this scoring method are given as total percentage of presence per framework in one country.

The second method used is based on Charles Ragin’s “fuzzy set social science” approach, which combines aspects of both qualitative and quantitative assessment (Ragin 2000). The fuzzy set scheme identifies degrees of membership in a given set. For our purposes, we define this set as full performance of a country on a given question/indicator. We calibrate five values between no performance (a 0 score) and full performance (score of 1) to indicate degrees of membership in this set. These calibrated points are defined as follows: 0 = no performance (fully out of the set), 0.25 = low performance (more out of the set than in), 0.5= neutral performance (neither in nor out of the set); 0.75= high performance (more in the set than not), and 1= full performance (complete membership in the set). The scores derived using the fuzzy set methodology are presented as ranges between their intersection (minimum) and union (maximum) scores, both in aggregate and by sub-category across frameworks applied to a country. In addition, though it is outside the fuzzy set methodology, we also examined the median scores produced.

Analysis of Results

The results from the country applications suggest that there are different trends across frameworks which are generally consistent across countries. While it is more difficult to see these differences when one examines fuzzy set ranges, they become clearer with an analysis of medians and dummy percentages. In terms of medians and dummy percentages, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards yield higher scores than the IPU Toolkit and the Parliamentary Centre Frameworks across all countries. We believe that this is mainly a function of the structure and content of indicators/questions of the frameworks which reflect

¹ The World Bank Institute (WBI) had a preference for the use of Germany and Turkey, and Peru and Uganda were selected based on diversity of region, GDP, and political system. In addition, we considered language and data availability constraints when selecting sample countries.

each organization's specific approach to parliamentary assessment. We find that results are especially influenced by the extent to which each framework attempts to address the issue of legal presence versus practice and implementation.

Creation and Application of a Holistic Framework

Critical examination of results from earlier between-framework comparison of content overlap forms the basis of our holistic framework construction. While our holistic framework is not intended as an assessment panacea, it does present the base level of agreement between existing frameworks, which may be useful for organizations seeking to use a harmonized framework.

Holistic Framework

In accordance with our previous analysis of content similarities between existing frameworks, we constructed 27 questions based on indicators/questions shared by three or more of the frameworks studied. We chose to construct questions rather than indicators/benchmarks to adhere with organizations' common focus on internal, self-assessment nature of parliamentary evaluation, rather than imposing external directives. This is also why, although we have tried to create questions that follow principles of good question design, we have left some questions fairly subjective. In order to meet the common focus of organizations on qualitative self-evaluation rather than strictly quantitative outcomes, we propose a fuzzy set scoring method that combines the strengths of both assessment methods by examining degrees of membership in a set of full performance.

Application of Holistic Framework to Countries

When we apply the holistic framework to the sample countries, results reflect the robustness of this framework in capturing agreement between the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, NDI Standards, IPU Toolkit, and the PC-Budget and PC-Audit frameworks. Across countries and scoring methods, the holistic framework aligns with either the most common trend of the other frameworks or denotes results between the high and low ranges of these frameworks. Thus, while the holistic framework does not necessarily represent the "ideal" assessment tool, it does provide a solid foundation of agreement upon which further discussions towards a common framework may be based.

Conclusion

Our analysis on comparison of content and construction suggests that there are substantive differences across frameworks although two sets of them tend to display identical trends - the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards on the one hand, and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks on the other. The IPU Toolkit stands on its own and does not display

similarity with the other frameworks. Thus, there are differences across the three sets of frameworks (the IPU Toolkit as one set, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards as a second, and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks as the third), but large similarities within. We believe this is mostly due to differences of organizations with regards to goals, values, membership base and approach to parliamentary assessment. Nevertheless, as our proposed holistic framework suggests, there are some areas of overlap across frameworks despite being very limited. Hence, there is some basis for harmonization in which the organizations express an interest.

OVERVIEW

Strengthening parliaments is recognized as a key ingredient in improving democratic governance worldwide, and a number of training and technical assistance programs focus on this goal. Chief among them is the World Bank Institute's Parliamentary Strengthening Program. As the training and capacity development section of the World Bank Group, the World Bank Institute aims to build skills of individuals globally and help them apply knowledge to meet development challenges in their respective countries (World Bank 2008a). The World Bank Institute's Parliamentary Strengthening Program focuses on building capacity of parliamentarians to fulfil their governance roles. Main objectives of this program are as follows: (1) strengthen parliaments as critical institutions of governance by advocating parliamentary oversight of budgets and constituent representation, (2) increase parliaments' involvement in poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs), (3) support transnational learning networks of parliamentarians, and (4) promote research on parliamentary capacity building (World Bank 2008b).

As part of its work to strengthen parliaments around the world, the World Bank Institute, as well as other organizations with a similar goal, helps parliaments evaluate themselves in order to identify their greatest needs and challenges. Such evaluations not only help parliamentarians address areas of weakness and track improvements in governance over time, they also provide external legitimacy to democratic reformers within a given parliament. At present, a number of different evaluation tools exist, which have been crafted by different organizations with diverse priorities. Acknowledging that these different tools may produce divergent assessments within a given country, the World Bank Institute commissioned the London School of Economics Capstone Team to undertake application of multiple frameworks to sample countries.

This study had three main tasks. First, we examined five parliamentary assessment frameworks constructed by four different organizations to understand how and to what degree they differ in terms of topic as well as construction. Secondly, we applied these frameworks to four selected countries in different regions to determine if they yielded different results within the same country. Critical to both of these objectives was identification and quantification of both differences and similarities between frameworks, as well as qualitative analysis of the same. Finally, we proposed a holistic framework comprised of questions that overlap between three or more of the frameworks originally examined. While this holistic framework is not meant to be an ideal assessment tool, it may serve as a base of agreement that organizations can use to develop a harmonized framework for all to use. We then applied the holistic framework to the sample countries and examined its results against outcomes of the other assessment frameworks.

While there are a number of parliamentary assessment frameworks created by different organizations, we focus on the following five frameworks in this study:² 1. National Democratic Institute Standards (NDI Standards); 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association/World Bank Institute/United Nations Development Programme Benchmarks (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks); 3. Inter-Parliamentary Union Self-Assessment Toolkit for Parliamentarians (IPU Toolkit); 4. Parliamentary Centre - Budget Process (PC-Budget); 5. Parliamentary Centre - Parliamentary Audit (PC-Audit). These frameworks, which vary widely in size, topical focus, and specificity, have been created by four different organizations with different priorities and different structures. These differences are described in the next section.

As the frameworks studied have been developed with diverse goals and foci in mind, we hypothesize that they will indeed produce differential results within the same country. We also expect that some frameworks may be more suited to certain country contexts, such as large versus small countries, or countries with different income levels. We acknowledge that, in many ways, these frameworks are not comparable due to differences between intentions of their creators. For example, both of the Parliamentary Centre frameworks contain questions related only to the budget process, and thus it is likely that these will produce outcomes different from more comprehensive frameworks such as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards. However, it may be confusing as well as inefficient for a given parliament to attempt to strengthen itself according to multiple and differential evaluations. Thus the current study aims to highlight areas of agreement between the frameworks as well as their differences.

² These five frameworks were specified by the World Bank Institute.

FRAMEWORK AND ORGANIZATION REVIEW

The five frameworks we consider were constructed by four different organizations, namely the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and the Parliamentary Centre (PC). Understanding these frameworks requires knowledge of each organization's focus and their priorities in parliamentary evaluation. We consider both organizations and frameworks in turn.

The National Democratic Institute, a non-profit, non-partisan organization based in Washington D.C., USA, works to strengthen democracy by focusing on citizen participation and government accountability (NDI 2009a). Their framework is a result of extensive desk research as well as pilot study application (Lute 2009). NDI notes that their Standards, which are written primarily as indicators rather than as questions, are intended as a reference tool and discussion document for parliamentarians (Lute 2009). Rather than imposing an external ranking, NDI's framework allows parliamentarians as well as civil society groups to discuss their parliament's adherence to core democratic values.

The NDI Standards was one of the earliest assessment documents developed. While the document outlining these standards was published in January 2007, it was developed earlier in concert with the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, and there are a number of similarities between these documents. Comprised of 89 standards, the NDI Standards is divided into four main sections, entitled Election and Status of Legislators, Organization of the Legislature, Functions of the Legislature, and Values of the Legislature (NDI 2007). A summary of the NDI Standards was presented during a parliamentary study group meeting hosted by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Bermuda from October 30 to November 3, 2006 (NDI 2007). This gathering focused on producing benchmarks for democratic legislatures, and produced the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks with the inclusion of many standards presented by the National Democratic Institute. Despite the many similarities between these two frameworks, there are important differences as well, which are analyzed in depth below. It is important to note that the NDI has recently produced a Standards-Based Questionnaire, which consists of fewer standards that ask both about formal power and practical implementation of the given democratic characteristics.³ However, as this tool is not yet published, we focus on NDI's larger Standards framework for the purposes of this study.

The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, headquartered in London, is a member-based organization comprised of "national, provincial, state and territorial Parliaments and Legislatures of the countries of the Commonwealth" (CPA 2009). The breadth of their work includes professional development, technical assistance, poverty reduction, human rights, and services to promote the Commonwealth, from which their members benefit. The

³ Refer to Annex 1 for further discussion on the NDI Standards-Based Questionnaire.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association notes that their decision to use benchmark indicators rather than questions in their assessment framework is partly based on the significant degree of pre-existing consensus on democratic principles among their Commonwealth member countries (Imlach et al 2009). This consensus also makes it easier for parliamentarians to address larger number of indicators during assessment, and thus the CPA is not concerned with the significant size of their framework (Imlach et al 2009).

The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks was produced in 2006 and is comprised of 87 indicators. It was developed by a CPA-organized parliamentary study group hosted by the Legislature of Bermuda and was constructed in close consultation with the National Democratic Institute Standards as mentioned above (CPA/WBI/UNDP 2006; NDI 2007: vii). The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks are phrased as standards rather than as questions and no system to code/categorize responses to these benchmarks is provided by the document itself. Indicators are divided into four main topical headings, namely General, Organization of the Legislature, Functions of the Legislature, and Values of the Legislature, and there are additional sub-categories listed within these main headings. The CPA wants parliamentarians themselves to “own” this assessment tool, and they acknowledge that some changes may be made in the future as the Benchmarks are applied to different regions (Imlach et al 2009).

The Inter-Parliamentary Union, established in 1889 and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, is also a member-based organization, comprised of 154 national parliaments around the world (IPU 2009; Richardson 2009). Its focus in parliamentary assessment is that such evaluation should be firmly rooted with the parliaments themselves, with parliamentarians as the main actors in any assessment conducted (Richardson 2009). The view of the IPU is that the five core values presented by their Toolkit, namely representativeness, transparency, accessibility, accountability, and effectiveness, can be achieved by parliaments in different ways (IPU Toolkit 2008: 6; Richardson 2009). The IPU views parliamentary assessment as an action-oriented, demand-driven process, whereby parliamentarians discuss their answers to the framework’s questions, identify their priorities for improvement, and then formulate a strategy for implementation (Richardson 2009).

The IPU Toolkit differs from the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards in that it is designed as a set of questions for parliamentarians to ask themselves about the characteristics and functioning of their parliaments. Published in 2008, it is comprised of 48 questions that fall under six different headings: The representativeness of parliament, Parliamentary oversight over the executive, Parliament’s legislative capacity, The transparency and accessibility of parliament, The accountability of parliament, and Parliament’s involvement in international policy. Further, while the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards do not have a numeric system that can be used to code responses to their indicators, the IPU makes use of a 1 to 5 scale. This scoring system, largely based on the work of David Beetham and International IDEA’s State of Democracy Assessment Methodology, does not aspire to produce a quantitative ranking (Richardson

2009). Rather, the toolkit is intended as an internal, working document for parliamentarians and guideline for internal reform. According to their definitions, 1=very low/very poor, 2=low/poor, 3=medium, 4=high/good, and 5=very high/very good. When answering questions in this self-assessment toolkit, parliamentarians give their responses accordingly, and then formulate plans for change based on the results.

The Parliamentary Centre, headquartered in Canada and founded in 1968, is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that aims to make legislatures more effective worldwide (PC 2009). In contrast to the other, broader frameworks, the PC frameworks focus only on budgetary concerns, as this was a main orientation of their work at the time assessment frameworks were constructed (Draman 2009). The organization believes that budgetary controls are key to making parliaments more effective and in encouraging governments to provide services for the poor (Draman 2009). The PC frameworks are intended to first provide baseline assessments of parliamentary capacity that can then be used during later re-evaluation. The 0-5 scoring method used is designed to make this process easier, as the PC notes that parliamentarians may not have a great deal of time to give extended, subjective answers to the framework's questions (Draman 2009).

The two parliamentary evaluation frameworks of the PC are almost identical in content, differing only by the phrasing of a couple of questions. The PC frameworks are the smallest considered here, as the PC-Budget framework contains 37 questions and the PC-Audit framework has 36 questions. The PC Frameworks have been developed in cooperation with the World Bank Institute, and their structure differs greatly from the other three frameworks. The PC has devised a "Parliamentary Report Card," which examines parliamentary activity in four areas, namely Legislation, Budget, Oversight, and Representation (Miller 2005). These areas are measured on the basis of five tests, including Level and Range of Activity, Openness and Transparency, Participation, Accountability, and Policy and Program Impact. After developing the Report Card structure, the Parliamentary Centre decided to first focus on developing questions under the "Budget" section, as this area was a programmatic priority for both the Parliamentary Centre and the World Bank Institute (Miller 2005: 7). The PC-Budget and PC-Audit frameworks were created as a result. Both frameworks have a 0 – 5 coding system for responses to their questions, where 0 means the indicator is not present at all, 2.5 means that it is somewhat present, and 5 means that it is very strongly present.

With these organizational priorities and framework structures in mind, we next turn to a comparison of frameworks on the question-by-question level as well as with regard to their topical content. We also examine each framework's adherence to good question design principles, which may have ramifications for effectiveness in application.

PART I: Across-Framework Comparison

1.1 Comparison by indicator/question overlap

As a first step in across-framework comparison, we started with the smallest unit of analysis, the indicators/questions of which the frameworks are composed. To this end, we utilized and extended the comparison table created by Lisa von Trapp of the Parliamentary Strengthening Program of the World Bank Institute. The table⁴ takes the CPA/WBI/UNDP indicators as a base and matches these with indicators/questions from other frameworks. In addition to this qualitative comparison, we also produced a quantitative analysis of the degree of overlap between frameworks.

During our qualitative matching process, we were able to identify a total of five CPA/WBI/UNDP indicators to which indicators/questions of all other frameworks could be matched. However, the number of indicators/questions from the other frameworks that could be matched to these five CPA/WBI/UNDP indicators was higher. For example, several IPU Toolkit and Parliamentary Centre framework questions could be matched to only one indicator of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks (see example in Table 1 below). This may be because the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are often less specific on a given component of democratic governance. As these two frameworks are rooted in international standards and good practice on democratic governance, they cover common areas of international law and practice (Lute 2009). They tend to be less specific and less subjective than the IPU Toolkit and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks (which are more easily matched to multiple questions of other frameworks). As a result, matching indicators/questions across different frameworks is not a straightforward exercise. The focus of different indicators/questions is often very different even when they address the same parliamentary function/activity/component. These difficulties are displayed in the example of five framework overlap provided in Table 1.⁵

Table 1 below shows that while there is much similarity between CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards on the one hand, and between the Parliamentary Centre frameworks on the other hand, matching the indicators of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards with those of the IPU Toolkit and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks is often difficult. The extensive association of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards results from close cooperation during development of these frameworks, particularly during the Bermuda conference in 2006, which brought together experts from organizations such as the CPA, NDI, and WBI, as well as representatives from a number of countries (Lute 2009). These two frameworks cover a number of different topics

⁴ Please refer to Annex 2.

⁵ A more extensive list of overlapping indicators can be found in Annex 2.

and are quite comprehensive in their examination of democratic functioning of parliament. The Parliamentary Centre frameworks stem from the same organization, cover the same, single, topical area (oversight/budget process), and differ by only a few questions. As a result of these commonalities between certain frameworks but large differences with others, we do not observe a very complete match between indicators/questions of all frameworks. An example of this limited overlap is below:

CPA/WBI/UNDP	NDI	IPU	PC - A	PC - B
7.2.1 The Legislature shall have a reasonable period of time in which to review the proposed national budget.	6.3.2 The legislature shall have a reasonable period of time in which to review the proposed budget.	2.3. How well is parliament able to influence and scrutinize the national budget, through all its stages?	I. 3 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?	I. 1 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?
7.2.3 Oversight committees shall have access to records of executive branch accounts and related documentation sufficient to be able to meaningfully review the accuracy of executive branch reporting on its revenues and expenditures.	7.4.2 Public accounts or audit committees shall have access to records of executive branch accounts and related documentation sufficient to be able to meaningfully review the accuracy of executive branch reporting on its revenues and expenditures.	2.1. How rigorous and systematic are the procedures whereby members can question the executive and secure adequate information from it?	IV. 4 Does parliament question government leaders, ministers and officials fully during the budget process?	IV. 4 Does parliament question government leaders, ministers and officials fully during the budget process?
		2.2. How effective are specialist committees in carrying out their oversight function?	IV. 5 Does parliament effectively scrutinize departmental work-plans and monitor their implementation?	IV. 5 Does parliament effectively scrutinize departmental work-plans and monitor their implementation?

Table 1: Five Framework Overlap - Example: Budget Review & Review of the Executive

As overlap between all five frameworks seldom occurs (and even then is often a matter of perception due to wording differences of indicators/questions), we also analyzed overlap for indicators/questions across only four and three different frameworks.⁶ We do not include a chart for two framework overlap, because this only occurred for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards the one hand and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks on the other. As these two sets include frameworks developed together, there may be less added value in examining their overlap, as many similarities between them are expected.

Results of this matching exercise across four and three frameworks suggest that across framework overlap is still limited, as we were only able to identify five and twenty-one overlapping indicators/questions respectively. Overall, the qualitative matching of indicators/questions suggests that there is not substantive overlap across the frameworks on the basis of their individual indicators/questions. This may be surprising given that these

⁶ Please refer to Annex 2.

frameworks share the same goal, measuring democratic performance of legislatures, but is less surprising given the different foci of their creator organizations.

A more quantitative analysis of the overlap, displayed in Figures 1-5 below, confirms this observation that there is little common ground between individual indicators/questions across frameworks. The Parliamentary Centre frameworks have the greatest degree of overlap with all other frameworks, as 39% of the PC-Audit and 35% of PC-Budget exhibit this commonality. The IPU Toolkit has a lower percentage of overlap with all others at 17%, while the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards exhibit just 6% overlap between their indicators/questions and those from other frameworks. These results can be explained by several structural elements of the frameworks. First of all, the Parliamentary Centre frameworks have fewer questions than other frameworks, which means that overlapping questions appear as a larger proportion of their total number of questions. Secondly, as discussed above, multiple questions of one framework (generally PC-Budget and PC-Audit) often match with a single question in another framework (usually CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and/or NDI Standards), which increases percentage of overlap for the PC frameworks but decreases it for CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. In addition, the Parliamentary Centre frameworks focus only on the oversight function of parliaments, which is an area addressed by all frameworks. They may thus have a higher percentage of overlap than more varied frameworks such as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. These results are below.




Figure 1: CPA Overlap




Figure 2: NDI Overlap




Figure 3: IPU Overlap




Figure 4: PC - Budget Overlap




Figure 5: PC - Audit Overlap

Acknowledging that there is little overlap of indicators/questions across frameworks and that the matching process is difficult due to different wording and foci of indicators/questions, we also compared frameworks on the basis of general topics covered as well. In the next section, we analyze the process of creating sub-categories in order to be able to compare frameworks on their topical content.

1.2 Comparison by topical overlap

Framework composition denotes topics covered by each framework such as elections, parliament's role in oversight, or rights of political parties. Examination of framework composition allows us to explicitly identify each framework's priorities for parliamentary assessment and observe differences in their approach, as well as their topical similarities. At this level of comparison, we define overlap more broadly according to topic, even if wording and emphasis of indicators/questions is different. Thus, we may expect to observe greater overlap between frameworks than at the question-by-question level. In order to undertake topical comparison, we organized indicators/questions of all frameworks into sub-categories. We first categorize indicators of each framework by sub-categories generated internally across frameworks and then secondly by external sub-categories. We explain both categorizations below.

Considering that each organization has created its own sub-categories to structure its framework with regard to its own roles, functions, and features, we first compiled a common set of sub-categories applicable to all frameworks. Most of these sub-categories were drawn from existing sub-categories of NDI Standards and CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, as these are the largest and broadest frameworks included in our study. We added additional sub-categories as necessary to fit the requirements of IPU Toolkit and Parliamentary Centre frameworks. This process produced thirteen internal sub-categories, which are the following: Elections, Status of Legislators, Procedure and Sessions, Committees, Political Parties, Interest Groups, Parliamentary Staff, Legislative Function, Oversight Function, Representational Function, Foreign Policy Function, Accessibility, and Ethical Governance.⁷ It is critical to note that these thirteen sub-categories do not necessarily reflect ideal components of an effective parliamentary assessment framework. Rather, our choices reflect an effort to bring together a diverse range of frameworks for effective and meaningful comparison of their scope.

We also analyzed the frameworks based on allocation of indicators/questions to externally generated sub-categories. We constructed these sub-categories after conducting a brief literature review on democratic theory and reports by various independent organizations such as the Hansard Society⁸ and Overseas Development Institute (Barkan 2008; Dahl 1998; Hansard Society 2007; ODI 2007; Olson 1994). These sub-categories, referred as "external sub-categories" are the following: Law-making, Representation, Procedures, Public Engagement, Oversight, and Resources. The table below presents more information on the external sub-categories.

⁷ Please refer to Annex 3 for a description of how we defined each of these internal sub-categories.

⁸ The Hansard Society is an independent and non-partisan political research and education charity in the UK whose aim is to strengthen parliamentary democracy and encourage public involvement in politics.

Sub-category	Questions related to...	Importance
Law-making	The role of the parliament in making and amending legislation	Primary role of parliaments
Representation	Elections, representativeness of the parliament in terms of minority groups and political parties	Essential reason behind existence of parliaments
Procedures	Procedures that ensure the autonomy of the parliament	Provides insights into whether parliaments have made legal provisions for meetings so that institutions and functions do not only exist on paper
Public Engagement	Accessibility of the parliament by the public including provisions on transparency, media relations etc.	Informing the public of governance is a primary role of parliaments, crucial for effective oversight
Oversight	The effectiveness of the parliament in holding the executive accountable	Primary mechanism of government accountability
Resources	Information on amount and types of resources needed by the parliament to fulfil its functions	Without adequate resources, parliaments cannot fulfil roles and duties adequately

Table 2: Definitions of External Sub-categories

Our objective in creating external sub-categories was to move away from the internal sub-category bias toward the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards and instead allow for a more objective comparison of frameworks. It was also our intention that, due to their smaller number and more overarching nature, the external sub-categories would facilitate a clearer, more definitive comparison of frameworks.

1.2.1 First Choice Sub-Category Allocation

Before comparing frameworks across the newly created sub-categories we had to match each indicator/question to a sub-category, which we did first for the compiled thirteen internal sub-categories, and then for the six external sub-categories. Our findings from this exercise suggest that allocation based on external sub-categories provides a stronger comparative ground. Analysis of frameworks according to internal sub-categories appears less effective as this large number of sub-categories is both overlapping and unclear and represents a bias towards the content of CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. Using the external-sub-categories reduces this bias and also provides more consistent distribution of questions within and across frameworks. Our comparative analysis of composition across frameworks thus uses the external sub-categories.

Examination under Internal Sub-categories

Allocation of indicators/questions from each framework to internal sub-categories shows that not all categories are addressed by all frameworks.⁹ For example, only indicators/questions from the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards can be allocated to the first six sub-categories (Elections, Status of Legislators, Procedure and Sessions, Committees, Political Parties, and Interest Groups). The IPU Toolkit and Parliamentary Centre frameworks do not have questions that can be associated with these categories. In fact, all questions from the Parliamentary Centre frameworks can be allocated only to the sub-category Oversight since both frameworks focus exclusively on the budget process. This is a trend noted above in the discussion of the overlap across individual indicators/questions. Thus internal sub-categories provide a less than ideal basis for across-framework comparison as many are not addressed by the indicators/questions in three frameworks studied. This is may be expected given that we compiled the internal sub-categories using the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Democratic Standards as a model, which emphasizes content and construction of these two frameworks. As the largest frameworks, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards provide the lowest common topical denominator between all frameworks, which makes the bias unavoidable if the exercise focuses only on internally-generated sub-categories.

Despite this bias, the comparison of frameworks based on internal sub-categories does suggest that there are significant differences in distribution of questions across frameworks with respect to each sub-category. For example, although all frameworks have indicators/questions that address the oversight function of parliaments, both percentage and absolute number of these questions across frameworks vary considerably. We allocated all questions from the Parliamentary Centre frameworks to Oversight, but only about 10% and 15% of the indicators/questions from the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks/NDI Standards and IPU Toolkit respectively. However, in terms of absolute numbers, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks has

⁹ For a complete overview of the internal sub-categories please refer to Annex 3.

more questions on this category than the NDI Standards and IPU Toolkit. We observe this same situation in other sub-categories as well. When considering sub-categories Parliamentary Staff and Legislative Function, the percentage distribution of indicators/questions shows that the IPU Toolkit has the greatest number of its total questions in these sub-categories. However, CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have in both cases a higher raw number of questions in these sub-categories. The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the IPU Toolkit have a similar percentage of their indicators/questions in Accessibility, but raw number of questions is much greater for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks on this topic. Looking at percentages versus raw numbers again changes the results for the sub-category Ethical Governance. With regard to this sub-category, IPU Toolkit has the highest percentage share of indicators/questions, but it actually has the same number of raw indicators/questions in this sub-category than the NDI Standards.

Examination under External Sub-categories

There are two important advantages to comparing frameworks based on external sub-categories rather than internal sub-categories. First, external sub-categories provide a better comparative basis because more sub-categories are addressed by more of the frameworks. For example, questions of the IPU Toolkit can be allocated to four of six external sub-categories whereas using internal sub-categories, IPU Toolkit questions can be allocated to only six of thirteen sub-categories. This improvement in reflecting content of frameworks is primarily because external sub-categories were not drawn from one specific framework but were instead compiled after literature review on democratic components of parliamentary functioning.

Secondly, external sub-categories reflect general improvement in evenness of distribution of indicators/questions within frameworks. The percentage of indicators/questions in each sub-category is not skewed toward only a few sub-categories, which was the case when internal sub-categories were used. External sub-categories generate a more effective breakdown which helps to summarize and specify the focus areas of frameworks more clearly. To illustrate this, we present the distribution of indicators within the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks under internal versus external sub-categories in Figure 6 below. Here we observe the trend toward more even composition under the external sub-categories, which is observed for other frameworks as well.




Figure 6: Comparison of Composition under Internal vs. External Sub-categories (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks)

As presented on Figure 6, when internal sub-categories are used for analysing composition, the sub-categories Status of Legislators, Procedure and Sessions, Accessibility, Parliamentary Staff and Oversight Function all contain more than 10% of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks indicators. All other sub-categories contain less than 10% of the indicators, with Interest Groups and Foreign Policy Function allocated only 1% of indicators each. The allocation of indicators to external sub-categories changes the view of CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmark composition quite substantially. The sub-category with the most abundant indicators remains Oversight Function, but now an even greater number of questions are allocated to this topic. Other sub-categories also increase in their percentage of total composition. With the exception of the external sub-category Resources, which consists of 9% of the indicators, all sub-categories consist of over 10% of the indicators, presenting a clearer, more definitive distribution.

Due to these advantages of using external sub-categories, we base our main comparison on composition across frameworks on these sub-categories. The results of this comparison are displayed in the figure below.




Figure 7: Across-Framework Comparison of Composition

As observed in Figure 7, our examination suggests that composition differences across frameworks with respect to individual sub-categories do remain. In examining this comparison across frameworks, we sometimes make a distinction between percentage distribution and the raw number of indicators/questions that each framework has in a given sub-category. Such a comparison sometimes renders very different results as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards contain more than twice the number of indicators/questions than the other frameworks.

Indicators/questions on Oversight comprise a large percentage of all frameworks, and this remains the only sub-category to which at least some questions from all frameworks could be allocated. Both Parliamentary Centre frameworks rank highest for Oversight with all of their questions falling into this category. They are followed by the IPU Toolkit and NDI Standards while the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks has the lowest percentage of indicators/questions in this sub-category as compared with its peer frameworks. Yet, this is a slightly distorted view due to size differences of frameworks. When looking at absolute number of questions, both Parliamentary Centre frameworks have the greatest number of questions in this sub-category, though it may be noted that the PC-Budget framework has one more question in this sub-category than does PC-Audit due to the slight size difference between these frameworks. They are followed by the NDI Standards and CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, respectively. In terms of raw numbers of indicators/questions, the IPU Toolkit has the fewest questions on this topic.

Three sub-categories are addressed only by the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, NDI Standards and the IPU Toolkit, and these are Law-making, Representation and Public Engagement.

Across frameworks, questions in the IPU Toolkit are most extensive for Law-making both in terms of percentage composition as well as absolute number of indicators/questions. For the sub-category Representation, the IPU Toolkit has the greatest percentage of questions, but NDI Standards and CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks have higher absolute numbers of indicators. Within Public Engagement, the IPU Toolkit and the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks have the same, slightly greater percentage of indicators/questions as compared to the NDI Standards. Yet, when looking at absolute number of questions, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks has the greatest number of indicators/questions, whereas NDI Standards is second, and the IPU Toolkit has the fewest number of indicators/questions on this topic.

Only the NDI Standards and the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks have indicators that can be classified in the sub-category Procedures, and the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks has a greater percentage and absolute number of indicators in this topical area as compared with the NDI Standards. This is also the case for the sub-category Resources, where the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks has more indicators both in percentage and absolute terms.

These differences in composition/content across frameworks may be expected given the differences in their focus areas and general approach to parliamentary assessment. The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are intended to serve as reference documents on standards for all activities of democratic legislatures (Imlach et al 2009; Lute 2009). As their creator organizations focus on the multiple dimensions of democratic legislatures and democratic development more generally, these frameworks' indicators address a diverse range of areas including elections, oversight of executive, independent judiciary, and availability of resources. As a result, they have indicators across all external sub-categories. The IPU Toolkit is mainly informed by good practises that the IPU has generated through working closely with parliamentary focus group leaders and extensive interactions with over 75 parliaments. These good practises set out the core values that serve as the IPU's blueprint for parliamentary strengthening. These core values include representation, transparency, accessibility and effectiveness at the national and international level (Richardson 2009). As a result, the IPU Toolkit's composition is heavier on sub-categories such as Public Engagement and Representation while it lacks questions on sub-categories such as Resources and Procedures which are not as directly related to IPU's core values. The Parliamentary Centre frameworks, on the other hand, are distinct from other frameworks in their focus solely on the role of the parliaments in the budgetary process. The Parliamentary Centre sees the budget as an extremely important document, especially in developing countries, as it has key importance for development and reduction of poverty (Draman 2009). Through use of their frameworks, the organization aims to contribute to parliamentarians' understanding of the complex nature of a democratic budgetary process and outcomes (Draman 2009). In this sense, the frameworks only focus on the Oversight sub-category since the budget is a document prepared by the executive and its scrutiny, amendment, and approval are important mechanisms of legislative oversight of the executive.

Overall, allocation of indicators/questions to external sub-categories demonstrates priorities of all frameworks more clearly as compared with allocation to internal sub-categories or even only the utilization of indicator/question overlap. Analysis of frameworks according to internal sub-categories appears less effective as this large number of sub-categories is both overlapping and unclear. Moreover, use of internal sub-categories represents a bias towards the content of CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards, as certain sub-categories in this set will not contain any indicators/questions from the other three frameworks. An analysis according to the external-sub-categories reduces this bias and also provides more consistent distribution of indicators/questions within and across frameworks.

1.2.2 Analysis of Possible Allocations to Additional Sub-Categories

Our second area of analysis is examination of extent to which indicators/questions from all frameworks can be assigned to additional or multiple sub-categories, beyond their original allocations discussed above. Allocations to additional sub-categories suggest overlap across sub-categories, primarily due to indicators/questions being framed in such a way that they refer to multiple topics within each indicator/question. Although some overlap is inevitable as parliamentary functions are quite intertwined, a high degree of overlap hinders effective evaluation and scoring of indicators/questions when applied to different country contexts.

In order to examine whether there is significant overlap, we lift the restriction that an indicator/question can be allocated to only one sub-category, and list all possible additional sub-categories under which an indicator/question may be classified. A systematic analysis of additional allocations with respect to internal vs. external sub-categories checks the robustness of our decision to use external sub-categories. Our results suggest that indeed, when questions are classified into external sub-categories, number of questions that we can allocate to more than one sub-category decreases extensively for all frameworks (as compared with additional allocations to internal sub-categories). This indicates clearer definition and scope of each external sub-categories vis-a-vis internal sub-categories.

As suggested by Figure 8 below, when its indicators/questions are classified into internal sub-categories, only about half of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks can be allocated to one sub-category only (48%). Just over a third of its indicators (36%) can be allocated to one additional sub-category, approximately a sixth to two additional sub-categories (13%), and about 2% of indicators can be allocated to three additional sub-categories. However, when considered within external sub-categories, more than 81% of indicators in each sub-category fall into only one sub-category. Referring to Figure 9, for five sub-categories, no more than 20% of indicators can be allocated to one additional sub-category, and only in one sub-category, Law-making, can indicators can be allocated to two additional sub-categories. There are no cases where indicators can be allocated to three additional categories. This reduction of potential overlap between sub-categories themselves is also observed when indicators/questions of NDI Standards and the IPU Toolkit are examined.




Figure 8: Additional Allocations to Internal Sub-categories (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks)




Figure 9: Additional Allocations to External Sub-categories (CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks)

A similar trend is observed for the Parliamentary Centre Budget and Audit frameworks. For these frameworks, although percentage of questions that can be allocated to one sub-category only decreases when additional allocation is allowed, the additional number of sub-categories to which these questions can be allocated also decreases. To illustrate with an example, when the questions are classified into internal sub-categories, 35% of Parliamentary Centre Budget questions are allocated into one sub-category only. 49% of the questions can be allocated into one, 14% can be allocated to two, and 9% can be allocated to three additional sub-categories. When the questions are classified into external sub-categories, we allocate 27% of them into one category only. However, we can allocate the rest of the questions (73%) into one

additional sub-category, and there are no more cases where questions can be allocated into two or more additional sub-categories. We view this as an improvement in avoiding confusion across sub-categories.

Overall, our findings from this exercise of lifting the restriction on allocation to a single sub-category and allowing for multiple allocations suggest that when external sub-categories are used, number of questions that can be allocated to more than one sub-category decreases substantially for all frameworks. This indicates important reduction in confusion between sub-categories and blurriness of areas to be evaluated.

In order to understand more about construction of each indicator/question with respect to principles of social science research survey design, we next turn to an examination of indicators/questions of all frameworks with regard to their objectivity, precise wording, and qualities of being non-compound as well as non-leading.

1.3 Good Question Design

In addition to analysis conducted based on indicator/question overlap and on internal and external sub-categories, we also examined construction of indicators/questions in each framework on the basis of whether each is objective, precisely worded, non-compound, and non-leading. Each of these principles is regarded in social research methods literature as a necessary component in the optimal design of indicators/questions.

Design is an important issue because it has critical implications for accuracy and quality of information provided. Bryman notes that primary sources of error in social research stem from poorly worded questions, the way in which information is processed as well as collected, and misunderstanding on the part of the person responding to the questions (Bryman 2008: 193). The choice of our criteria on good question design reflects these concerns. Precise wording detects any poorly worded questions, objectivity and non-leading design have implications on whether the information is presented and/or collected in a biased way, and preference for non-compound questions attempts to examine whether questions are clear and leave no room for possible misunderstanding.

Detailed definitions of these characteristics of good question design are presented in Table 3 below:

Good question characteristic	Definition
Objective	The question/indicator has <i>only one answer</i> , regardless of who is answering the question and leaves <i>no room for subjective interpretation</i>
Precise Wording	Regardless of interpretation of question by different people, <i>terms</i> within question/indicator are <i>clear</i> and <i>precise</i>
Non-Compound	The question/indicator asks only about <i>one specific topic</i> rather than multiple ones to ensure that the response <i>does not fall into different categories</i> and generate multiple answers
Non-Leading	The question/indicator <i>does not suggest an answer within the question</i> which would lead reader to answer in a particular manner

Table 3: Definitions of Good Question Characteristics

We are aware that none of the parliamentary assessment frameworks considered here are designed to be used for quantitative analysis of scores (Lute 2009; Richardson 2009). Instead, their emphasis is mostly on generating qualitative discussion on directions for further strengthening (Richardson 2009). Nevertheless, we feel that an assessment of indicator/question design is an important dimension to analyze since effectiveness of such discussions depends on the quality of information generated using these frameworks. In this sense, application of good question design principles to indicators in parliamentary assessment frameworks helps reveal the effectiveness of the frameworks in providing accurate and high quality information.

1.3.1 Coding Schemes

In order to analyze each framework with regard to these four components of good question design, we applied a 1 or 0 (dummy) coding scheme to each indicator/question to denote whether each characteristic is either present or absent. For example, we gave an indicator/question a score of “1” if it was objective and a score of “0” if it lacked objectivity. We acknowledge that some indicators/questions may be more or less objective (or precise, non-leading, etc.) than others. However, using a coding system that allows for distinction based on degrees of presence of the characteristics is difficult and caused more confusion than clarity when tested. As a result, we use a coding system that provides clear distinctions as to whether each characteristic is present or not.

1.3.2 Comparison of Frameworks on Good Question Design

In order to compare frameworks on good question design principles, we examined aggregate results across frameworks and also disaggregated results by sub-category. For some design principles, we observe a great deal of difference across sub-categories. For example, with regard to objectivity and non-compoundedness, Law-making tends to have more indicators/questions that adhere to these good question principles while Resources generally has fewer indicators/questions that score well. This holds true across frameworks. Other good question design principles, such as precise wording, show very little difference across sub-categories. When precise wording is measured, all sub-categories of all frameworks score relatively high, which is consistent with aggregate results of the frameworks on this good question design principle. It is difficult to identify many consistent trends across frameworks at the sub-category level, and the differences between sub-categories in a given framework are often not very large. Thus, we present only the aggregate results below, as these allow us to discuss the greater differences that we observe across frameworks on the four good question design principles we consider.

Objectivity

Our first level of analysis identifies the proportion of objective questions in each of the frameworks. In order to satisfy this objectivity requirement, the indicator/question should not be phrased in a way that leaves the answer to the subjective interpretation of the respondent. If a question contained any words or asked for data that could be interpreted differently by different readers, it was classified as non-objective or “0” code. Further, the answer to the indicator/question also had to be found in written sources that could not be disputed, such as in a country’s Constitution or a parliamentary Code of Conduct. The results for objectivity across all five frameworks are given below.




Figure 10: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Objective Questions

Figure 10 suggests that significant portions of the frameworks are composed of indicators/questions that are not objective, though the percentage of objectivity varies across frameworks. The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have the greatest percentage of objective indicators. This result may not be surprising, as many indicators in these frameworks focus on international standards and are written as statements rather than as questions about opinions, which may be more subjective. This is a major concern for the IPU Toolkit, which lacks objective questions. The IPU Toolkit is designed as a self-assessment toolkit which asks parliaments about their opinions on parliamentary values and functions. For example, almost all of the questions in the IPU Toolkit start with “how effective...” or “how adequate...” which depend on interpretation and cannot be answered without subjectivity. The Parliamentary Centre Budget and Audit frameworks also have a small percentage of objective questions. Unlike the IPU Toolkit, this does not stem from the way the questions are asked. Instead, the lack of objectivity is due to the nature of the issue addressed by the questions. The Parliamentary Centre frameworks address a variety of issues within the budgetary process only and include many questions open to interpretation. For instance, PC-Audit question B8 addresses the fairness of media reporting on the budgetary process.¹⁰ Although the question is not structured as to ask *how* fair the reporting is, the response will depend on the individual respondent’s definition of “fair,” which is ultimately affected by his/her subjective views on media in the given country.

Precise Wording

In contrast with objectivity discussed above, the good question principle of precise wording examines each indicator/question regardless of interpretation differences. Here we consider whether it is clear what each indicator/question is asking, whether or not two people may provide different answers due to differences in perspective. For example, PC-Budget question B6, “Do media provide full and informative coverage of the parliamentary budget debate?” is clearly subjective, as “full” and “informative” may be interpreted in different ways by different readers. However, this question may still be considered precise, as it asks for clear, specific information that can be generally understood. In contrast, a non-precise question leaves a general sense of confusion, as the respondent may be unclear as to what is being asked. In the Parliamentary Centre Budget example above, the question is clearly concerned with media and the parliamentary budget debate, which is more precise.

Results from our evaluation of precise wording across all five frameworks in Figure 11 below show that indicators/questions of all frameworks are quite precise.

¹⁰ Question B8 of the Parliamentary Centre Audit Framework: Do the media report fairly on opposition regarding the budget?




Figure 11: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Questions with Precise Wording

While the IPU Toolkit has 0% objectivity as discussed above, it receives a 100% score for precise wording. This means that in the IPU Toolkit, the terms addressed in each question are clear, but how each question is answered depends on the respondent's perspective and interpretation. Across frameworks, there is a high degree of precise wording, as no framework scores below 90% and only one framework, Parliamentary Centre Audit, scores below 95%. It is important to note that in smaller frameworks, only a few indicators/questions might be imprecisely worded, but they appear as a larger portion of the total in these smaller frameworks. This is the case for both Parliamentary Centre frameworks. Both frameworks have only two questions that feature unclear terms. On the other hand, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have a greater number of indicators that are imprecisely worded, but because the frameworks are large, they appear as a smaller proportion of the total.

One possible reason why all frameworks have relatively precise wording may be due to creator organizations' interest in encouraging use of their frameworks in many different countries. Some organizations such as the CPA and the IPU are member-based, and their frameworks are intended to be used in diverse contexts. This requires the frameworks to be easily translated to other languages (Imlach et al 2009). The frameworks are also intended to be used by different groups such as parliamentarians, NGOs, and civil society organizations, who do not necessarily have the same degree of technical expertise and knowledge. As a result, clarity of indicators/questions may be an area of priority across creator organizations.

Non-Compound Questions

A third component of good question design is the quality of being non-compound. Non-compound questions are those that are not “double-barrelled,” but instead ask just one question. More specifically, non-compound questions have only one answer, and do not contain multiple questions/components. In this exercise, questions identified as being non-compound questions, are coded as “1” whereas double-barrelled questions are coded as “0.” These results are presented in Figure 12 below.




Figure 12: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Non-Compound Questions

All frameworks score relatively low on non-compound questions, meaning that many frameworks contain “double-barrelled” questions. With 56% of its questions defined as non-compound, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks scores best, followed by the NDI Standards with 47%. The Parliamentary Centre Budget and Audit frameworks rank in the middle with the former achieving 32% and the latter reaching 36%. The IPU Toolkit has the lowest score with 29% non-compound questions. One reason why we see this trend may be due to concern by some organizations, especially the IPU and Parliamentary Centre, about having a too extensive list of indicators/questions. These organizations’ frameworks are intended to be used as self-assessment tools by parliamentarians (Draman 2009; Richardson 2009), who might find it extremely time-consuming to reflect on a long list of questions, ultimately discouraging them from using the framework. As a result, these organizations cluster different issues together within the same indicator/question to make their frameworks shorter and thus seemingly easier to get through. The same level of concern may not be present for the

CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards as they are intended to be used as-needed as reference documents, not necessarily as surveys (Imlach et al 2009; Lute 2009).

Non-leading Questions

The fourth characteristic used to assess good design of framework indicators/questions is the characteristic of being “non-leading.” Leading questions influence the respondent towards thinking in a certain way by including the answer or pointing the respondent to the “desired” response. A question defined as non-leading is one that does not suggest an answer within the question, in the sense that the wording of the question does not bias the respondent to feel that he/she should provide a particular response. The results from this exercise are presented in the figure below.




Figure 13: Comparing Frameworks on Overall Percentage of Non-leading Questions

The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have the highest percentage (85%) of non-leading questions. The Parliamentary Centre Budget and Audit frameworks consist of 30% and 28% non-leading questions, respectively. None of the questions in the IPU Toolkit are non-leading. This is, again, likely due to the way the questions in the Toolkit are asked. The questions contain adjectives that have positive connotations attached to them, instead of being neutral, such as “adequate” and “effective.” However, we acknowledge that the IPU Toolkit’s goal is to stimulate discussion, which may be difficult without use of such wording.

Conclusion

Above we have analyzed indicators/questions based on the following characteristics of optimal question design: objectivity, precision, non-compoundness, and being non-leading. This exercise shed further light on the differences among indicators/questions across different

frameworks. Our analysis suggests that there is a high degree of variability of presence or absence of these good question design characteristics across frameworks. While some frameworks rank highly in some characteristics, they may rank very poorly in other good question design characteristics. When evaluated according to their design, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards tend to have similar results, as do the PC-Budget and PC-Audit frameworks. It should be noted that while it is laudable that certain frameworks rank highly in particular good question characteristics, ranking poorly in other areas may critically hinder effectiveness of a given framework when applied in practice to a sample country's parliament.

In the next section, we examine results of the frameworks when they are applied to four sample countries.

PART II: Application of Frameworks to Sample Countries

2.1 Country selection

The primary criteria for our sample country selection were determined by the preferences of the World Bank Institute (WBI). First, the WBI suggested that we focus on a limited number of cases in order to allow for a reasonably thorough analysis of the parliamentary structure of each specific case. Our client expressed a preference for selection of four diverse cases in order to capture the variety of possible country realities when applying the frameworks. Secondly, there was desire for assessment of countries that had not previously seen extensive WBI parliamentary analysis and WBI involvement.

More specifically, the WBI had a preference for assessment of the Turkish parliamentary structure, of another European country – for which Germany was suggested - and of a Latin American country. Due to the fact that salient languages in our team include English, Turkish, German, and Spanish, this selection seemed a convenient choice in terms of ease of data gathering and research. To make the following selection process systematic and to establish the greatest diversity possible, while keeping in mind WBI involvement and data availability constraints, we established a list of diversity criteria for comparison of possible countries.¹¹ Research on these criteria and resulting country choices are given in the table below (Bundesrat 2008; Bundestag 2008; CIA 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d; Congress of Republic of Peru 2008; Grand National Assembly of Turkey 2008; Parliament of Uganda 2008; The Economist 2008; EISA 2008; UNDP 2008; World Bank 2008c; 2009):





	Client criteria		Data	Diversity criteria					
	Client preference	Other WBI studies		Sufficient Data Availability	General		Parliamentary system		
					WBI Income Group/ GDP per capita (PPP)	Pop. (Million)	Parl. reform	Govt. Type	Parliament structure
 Germany	Yes	No	Yes (German, English)	High income/ \$34,100	82	1998	Parliamentary	Bicameral	Federal
 Turkey	Yes	No	Yes (Turkish, English)	High income/ \$12,000	72	2007	Semi-presidential	Unicameral	Unitary
 Peru	Open (Latin America)	No	Yes (Spanish, English)	Upper Middle income/ \$7,600	29	Pending	Presidential	Unicameral	Unitary
 Uganda	Open (suggested)	No	Yes (English)	Lower Middle income/ \$1,000	31	2001	Presidential	Unicameral	Unitary

Table 4: Description of Selected Countries

¹¹ Please refer to Annex 5 for definitions of these criteria.

2.2 Methodology

Once country selection was finalized, we next focused on the appropriate method of analysis to assess how frameworks may perform differently within a given country. Intrinsic differences among the frameworks such as depth, breadth, and variation of topical categories present a challenge when providing an independent assessment of their similarities and differences. For example, divergences include different structures, topics covered, and methods of scoring answers. Some frameworks have their own methods of scoring (IPU Toolkit has a scoring system of 1-5, while the PC-Budget and PC-Audit frameworks have a scoring system of 0-5) while others do not. Some frameworks have the entirety of questions concentrated within one sub-category (PC-Budget and PC-Audit) whereas others have questions in each sub-category (NDI Standards and CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks).

In order to conduct our comparison, we answered all questions in each framework using information obtained from sources from each country including the following: Constitution, parliamentary Code of Conduct, parliamentary Rules of Procedure, parliamentary website, other government and civil society organization websites, academic literature, and other primary sources as relevant and necessary.¹² Answers to each question were coded in two different ways simultaneously.

The first coding method utilized is a “0 or 1” (dummy) scoring, which was applied uniformly across all frameworks. A score of “0” represents absence/lack of presence of a legislative question/indicator in a particular country, while a score of “1” represents presence (to any degree). Results from this scoring method are presented as total percentage of presence per framework in one country. The advantage of this method is that it can be easily applied to all frameworks and provides an equal comparative ground. However, an important shortcoming of this scoring method is that it is unable to capture variation or degree of presence between indicators/questions as well as between countries. For example, two questions may refer to transparency of parliament, but one may mandate that certain procedures are in place whereas the other question may discuss this topic much more broadly. While the two questions assess transparency very differently and to divergent degrees, both will be scored as a “1” with the “0 or 1” coding system if there is some amount of transparency present in the given country. In this sense, the dummy scoring is not able to capture a great amount of variation and thus does not generate a rich source of data for examination.

The second scoring system used simultaneously with dummy scoring is fuzzy set methodology. Fuzzy set logic, originally coined by Lotfi Zadeh, was expanded and applied by Charles Ragin (Ragin 2000: 160). We make use of Ragin’s methods in our coding of all frameworks applied to sample countries. Inherent features of this coding system are that it allows for a calibrated approach with distinct values, including a mid-point, to determine

¹² For a detailed list of individual sources used for country coding please refer to Annex 6.

degrees of membership within a set. This methodology enables us to combine the benefits of quantitative and qualitative analysis to analyse the characteristics of a small number of cases (Ragin 2000). In assessing parliamentary performance and measures of democracy, it is very difficult to use standard quantitative analysis as matters considered are more subjective. Thus these areas are usually assessed qualitatively to ensure that country specific characteristics and variety are taken into account. Yet we also wanted to provide a quantitative, performance-based assessment. Fuzzy set methodology allows us to do both. It allows us a quantitative assessment using calibrated scores but without losing the more qualitative characteristics captured by the set we define.

Using fuzzy set methodology allows us to move beyond relatively simplistic definitions of presence in a Yes/No fashion and to instead provide a richer understanding of the data by including scores that allow for more graduated results (Dunleavy et al 2006). It is useful to consider two indicators from the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks as examples. Indicator 1.3.2, “In a bicameral Legislature, a legislator may not be a Member of both Houses,” can be more easily answered as either 0, no performance (fully out of the set) or 1, full performance (complete membership in the set). However, other indicators can be met/answered according to varying degrees of membership, such as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks’ indicator 7.1.1, “The Legislature shall have mechanisms to obtain information from the executive branch sufficient to exercise its oversight function in a meaningful way.” In this indicator, the strength of these mechanisms, their sufficiency, and “meaningful way” may all vary greatly. Fuzzy set scoring allows us to show these differences by calibrating degrees of membership in a set.

For our purposes in this study, we define the set of membership as full performance of a country on a given indicator/question. These calibrated points are defined as follows:

- 0 = no performance (fully out of the set)
- 0.25 = low performance (more out of the set than in)
- 0.5 = neutral performance (neither in nor out of the set)
- 0.75 = high performance (more in the set than not)
- 1 = full performance (complete membership in the set).

We present the scores derived using the fuzzy set methodology as ranges between their minimum (intersection) and maximum (union) scores, both in aggregate and by sub-category across frameworks applied to a country. Stepping out of the fuzzy set methodology, we also examined medians of scores generated. Although we acknowledge that this methodology is not intended to explore measures of central tendency, this information is useful for purposes of this study. Ranges observed may be (and often are) driven by single indicators/questions, and these do not necessarily tell us much about the concentration of the degree of membership. In contrast, median scores do provide information about concentration towards membership in or

out of the set. For example, a country may receive a score of 1 on all indicators/questions except one which receives a score of 0. In this case, that framework would yield a range between 0 and 1 in the given country. By looking at this range, one would not be able to tell whether scores are clustered more towards full performance or no performance. As a result, there is added value in examining medians, as they measure central tendency of performance of a country on a specific framework.

Application of frameworks to sample countries also necessitates discussion of possible weighting of scores.¹³ Instead of giving equal importance to all sub-categories in a given framework, we implicitly weighted them by the number of indicators/questions allocated to each. In practice, this means that the sub-category Oversight is always weighted more, across frameworks, as it contains the greatest number of indicators/questions. In contrast, the sub-category Resources, for which only CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have questions, is weighted less. Various organizations may choose to employ different weighting systems based on their respective priorities. However, as the frameworks are still in their early stages of being tested, none of the frameworks address issues of weighting. This may also be due to the fact that almost all of the organizations express their framework's goal as generating internal discussion rather than providing strictly quantitative, hard data results. Thus we do not add an additional weighting scheme beyond what it is implied by the distribution of indicators/questions across sub-categories.

2.3 Framework Analysis

When we apply all frameworks to each sample country, we find differences between frameworks but generally similar trends across countries. The fact that the framework comparison looks similar in each country may suggest that the frameworks have generally been successfully designed to be broadly applicable, regardless of a country's local characteristics, such as income level or type of government. This represents a clear strength of existing framework designs, as all organizations suggest that they intend their evaluation tools to be used across a diversity of countries. However, there are some exceptions to the general trends that may indeed be due to country-specific differences as well as differential data availability. Below we present our analysis of trends observed as well as exceptions to the general results¹⁴.

When examining the results below, it should be noted that indicators/questions for which we were unable to find information were dropped from final scores and analysis of results. All frameworks are designed to be applied by parliamentarians themselves, not answered through desk research. Parliamentarians themselves know more about the country context and have

¹³ Weighting is relevant with regard to dummy percentages but is not part of the fuzzy set methodology as such.

¹⁴ Please refer to Annexes 7 and 8 for more detailed descriptions of individual country characteristics as well as country-specific analysis of results at the sub-category level.

access to information where necessary. Thus, the information may not necessarily be “missing;” it may instead be that we were not able to access it externally.

We first consider results obtained from fuzzy set scoring, which allow us to examine the different variances of each framework’s membership in the set of full performance. A wide range between intersection and union points indicates a diverse performance on the democratic principles examined by a given framework. A more narrow range indicates the opposite. We first present aggregate results, and then disaggregate these to discuss sub-category results, with a focus on Oversight. As explained above, we also step outside the fuzzy set methodology and consider the medians in order to assess the central tendency of framework performance. Finally, we look at percentages of dummy scoring, which reflect amount of presence of a given parliamentary characteristic/component addressed by the indicator/question.

2.3.1 Aggregate Fuzzy Set Ranges

Trends within and across countries are presented below in Figure 14:




Figure 14: Application to Countries - Aggregate Fuzzy Set Ranges

First, it should be noted that the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards perform similarly within each of the countries. Their ranges present an aggregate intersection score of 0 and a union score of 1 for Germany, Peru, and Uganda. Although the aggregate union scores in Turkey for these frameworks is also 1, the intersection scores are 0.25, which suggests that all areas addressed by indicators have some degree of presence unlike in other countries. A tighter range within the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards for Turkey can be explained by two potential reasons. First of all, through the process of its candidacy for membership in the European Union, Turkey has introduced a series of political reforms, and indicators/questions may be picking up the effect of these reforms in increasing the scope of democratic parliamentary characteristics encompassed in the Turkish Parliament's legal framework (though not necessarily its practice). Secondly, part of our data for Turkey was generated from an interview and continued correspondence with an expert working in the

Turkish Parliament.¹⁵ This source and dimension of information is unique to our analysis of Turkey and the insights gained resulted in scoring of at least minimal presence of all indicators.¹⁶

The IPU Toolkit presents unique results in aggregate fuzzy scores both within and across countries. Due to the nature of the IPU Toolkit, questions provide a medium to encourage dialogue and discussion rather than hard-data scoring of standards. The Toolkit yields the tightest ranges of performance across all sample countries, and intersection and union scores are identical across Germany, Peru, and Uganda (intersection scores of 0.25 and union scores of 1). This translates to a range of membership from low performance to full performance. Slightly different results are observed in Turkey. While the IPU Toolkit also has an aggregate intersection score of 0.25, the aggregate Union score is 0.75 rather than 1. This may also be a function of the additional source of information used for Turkey and may indicate areas where democratic practice is not yet be aligned with what is codified in law.

The PC-Budget and PC-Audit frameworks are similar in question design, which may affect their range of membership in the set of full performance. The trend within and across all countries is the same for these two frameworks, as all countries reflect an intersection score of 0, no performance, and a union score of 1, full performance. Although the PC-Budget and PC-Audit frameworks focus on the budgetary process, they provide a wide range of questions within this area, resulting in a wide range of performance.

2.3.2 Fuzzy Set Ranges for Oversight

One shortcoming of analyzing results on an aggregate level is that, as discussed in the section above on methodology, range is a sensitive measure that can be affected by single indicators/questions. Thus aggregate results may be limited in their use to compare frameworks. If examination is based only on aggregate ranges, one is unable to observe differences between the frameworks with regard to topical areas, here measured by sub-categories. For example, as the analysis of aggregate fuzzy set ranges based on sub-categories in Annex 8 suggests, in the aggregate graphs above, the no performance (0) scores for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards in three of the four countries are driven by scores generated by a few indicators from a single sub-category, Public Engagement. Thus there is value in breaking down aggregates and providing a separate analysis of ranges based on sub-categories. In order to examine these differences between frameworks at the sub-category level, we consider Oversight as an example, as indicators/questions on this sub-category are present across all frameworks. The results are presented below in Figure 15.

¹⁵ We sought this source because the amount of published information on Turkey, in both Turkish and English, was insufficient to answer the majority of indicators/questions in the frameworks studied.

¹⁶ Such results may indicate possible differences in evaluation if assessment is conducted by parliamentarians/parliament-based groups rather than through desk research.




Figure 15: Application to Countries – Fuzzy Set Ranges for Oversight

As in the aggregate analysis above, frameworks yield consistent trends across the four countries, and some frameworks have identical ranges. In Oversight, the similarities are even more pronounced, as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, the NDI Standards, and the IPU Toolkit all yield the same range width, though the intersection and union points for IPU are lower than the other two frameworks. This similarity between CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards scores appears across almost all sub-categories and is not confined to Oversight.¹⁷ A similar case exists for Parliamentary Centre Budget and Parliamentary Audit frameworks, which both have ranges from 0 to 1 (no performance to full performance) across all countries. Such similarities are indicative of the large degree of overlap between the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards as well as between the Parliamentary Centre frameworks.

In order to understand the reasons for wide versus more narrow ranges, it is helpful to consider structure and content of indicators/questions of the frameworks. Here generalizations are

¹⁷ Please refer to Annex 8 for a more detailed analysis.

difficult as the frameworks vary widely. For example, both of the Parliamentary Centre frameworks have wide ranges from no performance (0) to full performance (1). One might think that such a wide range reflects imprecise indicators/questions, while more narrow ranges, such as those of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, NDI Standards, and IPU Toolkit may reflect more specific, precise questions. However, both Parliamentary Centre frameworks concentrate only on Oversight and thus have upwards of thirty questions on this sub-category, many more than any other framework. As we noted above, the most significant amount of overlap between all frameworks occurs in the sub-category Oversight. Thus the PC frameworks may include questions about more commonly agreed upon democratic practices in this area, which the other frameworks may also share. However, the PC frameworks also have a large number of questions about components of Oversight that may be less common or still emerging as good practices (and thus not included in the other frameworks). For example, the PC frameworks ask extensively about consultation of different groups, such as the poor, women, and civil society groups. As these practices may not yet be institutionalized in many countries, they may broaden all countries' ranges of performance as assessed by the PC frameworks.

The ranges produced by fuzzy set scoring can be used by parliamentarians to understand their adherence with full performance as well as their degree of no performance on democratic principles. In order to more accurately evaluate the areas where they may need improvement, it is useful to disaggregate ranges into sub-category ranges. However, what remains in question is the concentration of scores within the given ranges. If parliamentarians can identify topical areas where their performance is heterogeneous (where there is a wide range between performance results) as well as where there scores are most commonly located (measure of central tendency), it will help them target plans to strengthen their democratic functioning. Similarly, if scores present a narrow range, parliamentarians can examine intersection and union points to understand if this range is closer to full performance on the democratic principles evaluated or if it tends toward no performance on the particular area. Knowing the distribution of scores within this range helps parliamentarian target strategic changes even more closely. Due to the importance of understanding not only range of performance but also where results are concentrated on the spectrum, we next discuss median scores of performance.

2.3.3 Aggregate Median Scores

We consider measures of central tendency of performance in order to understand more about how different frameworks may show very different concentrations of results within the same country. Median scores for all frameworks in all four sample countries are below in Figure 16.




Figure 16: Application to Countries - Aggregate Median Scores

Across countries, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have measures of central tendency closer to full performance, the IPU Toolkit generally generates a mid-level score, and both PC-Budget and PC-Audit frameworks yield the lowest scores, or those closest to no performance (entirely out of the set). The inclination of CPA/WBI/UNDP and NDI frameworks toward full performance may be explained by the fact that their indicators concentrate largely on official procedures specified by a country’s Constitution, Rules of Procedure, or other official documents. It may be due to this more legal, theoretical approach of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards that even diverse countries are able to obtain scores closer to full performance. For example, a typical indicator of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks that also appears in the NDI Standards is 1.6.1 which states “Legislators shall have the right to resign their seats.” This indicator is likely to generate a score of 1 in a country with basic democratic procedures codified in law. Issues related to this right’s implementation and exercise in practice are not queried by the indicator. Although some of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmark and NDI Standards indicators are more oriented toward implementation than the above example, a large proportion of indicators address legal existence. Moreover, the parliamentary rights/components/characteristics addressed by these indicators are generally those that are in line with international democratic practice and therefore already institutionalized in the legal frameworks of many democracies. This is likely to be the reason why these frameworks display a tendency towards full performance across countries.

While the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards provide fewer benchmarks about specific details of implementation, a practice-centered approach is more characteristic of the IPU Toolkit and the PC frameworks. The IPU Toolkit as well as the PC frameworks produced lower measures of central tendency (toward no performance, out of the set) across all sample countries, which may reflect challenges of implementing all democratic practices outlined in official, legal documents. In addition, Parliamentary Centre frameworks include specific and detailed questions on the budget, and it may be more difficult to find evidence of full performance in each area. This result may also be due to limitations of external research in assessing actual practice, despite our efforts to be thorough and our contact with parliamentary experts in several cases.

The low scores of the PC frameworks are especially noticeable in Peru. We attribute this to the fact that Peru has the common international regulations on parliamentary oversight in place, but as it is also a strong presidential system, the executive still influences parliament to a great extent in practice (Santiso and Belgrano 2004). This example also illustrates how the PC frameworks pick up on the difference between legal codification and actual practice much more than any of the other frameworks.

This examination of central tendencies enables us to understand not only range of performance, but also more about where scores are concentrated in their distribution between intersection (minimum) and union (maximum) points. Main reasons for these concentrations are content and structure of the indicators/questions as discussed, as well as divergent foci of organizations that created these frameworks.

2.3.4 Median Scores for Oversight

When we disaggregate results to examine median scores in the sub-category Oversight, the trends across frameworks are the same,¹⁸ but important differences are elucidated as well. While the central tendency of CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards is toward full performance in the aggregate, these frameworks do not produce full performance results in most sub-categories. Concentration of performance for these frameworks is often not at full performance as the aggregate suggests, but around 0.75 (high performance) when sub-categories are considered. These results are presented below:




Figure 17: Application to Countries - Median Scores for Oversight

On the one hand, the breakdown to sub-categories can reveal individual differences between frameworks that are very similar, as can be seen by the difference in concentration of performance for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards in Germany. This difference is driven by three indicators¹⁹ that are part of the NDI Standards but not of the

¹⁸ The central tendency of CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards remains toward membership in the set of full performance, while IPU Toolkit generally reflects neither full nor lack of performance, while Parliamentary Centre frameworks express results toward low performance.

¹⁹ NDI Standards Indicator 1.4.4: After the legislature votes to lift the immunity of a legislator, it has no power to mandate changes to or otherwise affect proceedings involving the legislator before other branches of government.

CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks. This example illustrates that even frameworks that are largely alike and generally perform similarly can show substantive differences when analyzed on smaller levels. Thus an analysis according to sub-categories can be especially helpful when one is interested in differences between otherwise similarly performing frameworks. On the other hand, the breakdown to sub-categories also shows similarities between frameworks that are quite different, as can be seen by the same performance of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, the NDI Standards, and the IPU Toolkit in Peru as well as the similar performance of the IPU Toolkit and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks in Turkey. Thus it may be easier to examine certain similarities and differences between frameworks at the sub-category level, but it is important to keep in mind that analysis at this level can also be driven by a few, very specific indicators/questions.

2.3.5 Dummy Percentages

In order to more generally assess presence of democratic principles in parliaments, we turn to an examination of 0 or 1 dummy scores across frameworks. Dummy percentages in Figure 18 below reflect the amount of presence (to any extent) of specified democratic principles in the given frameworks. These scores show much higher degrees of presence than might be indicated above by fuzzy set scoring. Fuzzy set scoring focuses on degrees of membership in the set of full performance, which means that if there is low performance on a given indicator/question, a score of 0.25 may be given. In contrast, when one considers dummy scoring, if there is any presence of a characteristic, a score of 1 is given. Sizable differences between dummy scores and medians, both across frameworks and across countries, may indicate that many characteristics are present, but not very strongly.

¹⁹continued NDI Standards Indicator 7.3.1: The legislature shall have a non-partisan ombudsman or a similar body that investigates complaints of executive branch malfeasance, makes recommendations and reports directly to the legislature.

NDI Standards Indicator 10.1.1: The legislature shall approve and enforce rules on conflicts of interest that promote the independence of legislators from private interests or unreasonable political pressures.




Figure 18: Application to Countries - Dummy Percentages

2.3.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, across countries and scoring methods, frameworks produce generally similar trends. However, these trends show large amounts of difference between frameworks when applied to sample countries. While it is more difficult to see these differences when one examines fuzzy set results, they become clearer with an analysis of medians and dummy scores. There may be a number of reasons for these differences. For example, each organization has created a framework with different goals and intentions, which influence both structure and content of the frameworks studied in this report. The CPA and NDI created benchmark indicators, whereas the IPU strongly focused their framework as a self-assessment, discussion tool. In addition, results are influenced by the extent to which each framework's indicators/questions address issues as function of legal presence versus issues of practice and implementation.

PART III: Creation and Application of Holistic Framework

Although each framework is constructed by a different organization reflecting their own unique approach to parliamentary assessment, many members of the organizations with whom we spoke expressed interest in working towards a harmonized framework. Most organizations recognize that the availability of several parliamentary assessment frameworks, each with a very different set of indicators or questions, is confusing for parliamentarians and others who seek to improve the democratic performance of their legislatures. The organizations also recognize that their frameworks are still “works in progress.” While they were constructed after extensive research and often in cooperation with parliamentarians and other practitioners, the frameworks are still relatively new and in the early stages of being tested. Most organizations are thus open to further changes and improvements, especially as many are currently working toward application of their frameworks to sample countries, which will further inform the assessment process. However, while many organizations note the benefits of greater coordination and collaboration, challenges for both creation and acceptance of a harmonized framework remain. Each organization has different priorities and may be unwilling to compromise on or relinquish these foci. For example, the CPA and IPU are member-based organizations that have designed their frameworks specifically to address needs and characteristics of their members. Thus it may be difficult for each to change their approach to align more closely with the other. Other organizations encounter similar challenges.

As a result of these challenges but also with the intention to provide a unified method of evaluation for local stakeholders, we created a holistic framework comprised of questions that address topics on which there is overlap of three or more frameworks.²⁰ We acknowledge that organizations have a strong preference for their own approach and wish to retain their identity. Thus, our harmonized framework identifies common elements across frameworks and brings them together in a new way, but building on what the organizations themselves have already created.

3.1 Structure of Holistic Framework

Our holistic framework is comprised of 27 questions that are designed to allow parliaments to conduct self-assessments. Our decision to use questions rather than indicators adheres with the design of the IPU Toolkit and PC frameworks, as well as the approach employed by the new NDI Standards-Based Questionnaire.²¹ All organizations also noted that they want their tools to be used by parliamentarians themselves, as well as civil society groups and others within a

²⁰ We imposed this restriction that overlap must occur between at least three frameworks so as to not bias the holistic framework toward the two sets of frameworks that have extensive overlap between each other only, namely the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards as well as the PC-Budget and the PC-Audit.

²¹ Please refer to Annex 1 for a discussion of NDI’s new survey tool.

given country. None of the organizations interviewed characterized their tool as primarily an external assessment, and thus we have designed our holistic framework according to the same orientation and values.

While our intended audience is parliamentarians, this can be interpreted broadly depending on the country context. For example, in some countries, it may work well for a group of senior level parliamentarians, from both ruling and opposition parties, to undertake self-assessment. Senior parliamentarians may have the most detailed knowledge about the inner-workings of parliament, and including both ruling and opposition parliamentarians will help balance the assessment. However, in sharply divided parliaments, use of this target group may result in a zero sum assessment, if both ruling and opposing parliamentarians simply respond with only their parties' respective interests in mind. In countries with newer parliaments, this approach may also not work, as there may be few senior parliamentarians, and thus a different subgroup within parliaments may be relevant. For example, in some countries, it may be useful to involve heads of committees, particularly those on budgetary committees. However, in small parliaments or those without a strong committee system, this may not present the best approach. In some contexts, it may work best for a panel comprised of individuals both internal and external to the parliament to work together to conduct parliamentary self-assessment. This panel may include senior level parliamentarians, well-informed non-parliamentary experts such as university professors, and senior public servants.²² The fact that the exact scope of the target audience may differ from country to country should not be a significant problem, as our holistic framework does not intend to provide an external ranking of parliaments.²³ The main point to keep in mind is that the holistic framework is intended as a parliament-centered, self-assessment, not as an evaluation tool for use by donor agencies or other external bodies interested in solely in hard data on democratic functioning of parliaments.

As a self-assessment tool, our holistic framework tries to meet the dual goals of generating discussion as well as providing a baseline assessment for parliaments who wish to measure their own progress over time. This is not an easy balance to achieve. In order to accomplish this goal, we have considered principles of good question design, scoring methods, and weighting of questions. We consider each of these elements in turn.

While we have tried to adhere to the principles of good question design outlined in Part I above, we have also included more subjective questions that allow parliamentarians to ask “to what extent” and “how much” in order to engage in more detailed discussions. To this end, almost half of our questions are subjective. An organization that prefers an assessment framework where parliamentarians can give themselves a more precise baseline estimate may

²² When the Parliamentary Centre applied their PC-Audit framework to several countries in Africa, their target audiences were similarly comprised groups (Langdon 2005).

²³ If this were the intention, it would be critical that the same groups/types of individuals were consulted in each country in order to make the data comparable.

alter our “to what extent” wording and focus on questions that ask “do,” rather than “how” or “how much.” We more closely follow the other principles of good question design, with only two questions being compound and one being non-precise.

In order to ask questions that adequately capture overlap between frameworks, we have had to make some questions more general in their content and wording. As some frameworks are much more specific, particularly with regard to certain topics,²⁴ but others provide broader benchmarks, our questions try to capture both elements but tend towards being more expansive. While we have not reproduced exact questions from any framework, we have tried to converge their ideas into the questions we present. At the same time, we have tried to pare down longer questions to be more direct, clear, and specific. Such questions may make evaluation easier but might not generate as fruitful discussions as more detailed questions. Our holistic framework attempts to balance these various elements.

As our holistic framework asks questions (rather than providing benchmarks), we also provide a scoring method that can be used for responses. The wording of some questions asks for presence of a given characteristic, such as when we begin a question with “do” “is” and “are there.” We recognize that such questions usually assess only the legal existence of a given characteristic and do not address its implementation. Thus, in other questions (many of which are subjective as noted above), we focus more closely on degree of implementation and actual practice. While questions about presence can be answered with a “no” or “yes” response, which aligns with our 0 or 1 dummy scoring method above, questions about degree of performance (“to what extent,” etc) require more nuanced responses. Given the nature of the questions and the task at hand, it may be difficult to provide strong purely quantitative results. In addition, such a hard data-focused result is contrary to the intentions of the organizations studied here. Thus, we suggest fuzzy set scoring of our holistic framework. A wide variety of answers can be accommodated using this method, which recognizes degrees of membership in a set. As explained in Part II of the report, this scoring system is as follows: 0 = no performance (fully out of the set), 0.25 = low performance (more out of the set than in), 0.5= neutral performance (neither in nor out of the set); 0.75= high performance (more in the set than not), and 1= full performance (complete membership in the set). Importantly, while we offer a scoring method, the goal of the harmonized framework is primarily to generate qualitative discussion about how to improve the democratic workings of the Legislature in a given country. However, our framework can also be scored and the variance of score ranges discussed in order to provide baseline guidance to a country seeking to track improvement over time. In addition to use of fuzzy set ranges, we also recommend that users of our holistic framework consider medians, as described in Part II above, in order to understand concentration of performance more clearly and identify areas for improvement.

²⁴ For example, both of the Parliamentary Centre frameworks focus exclusively on the budget and thus ask very detailed questions on this topic.

With regard to weighting the scores of the holistic framework, it should be noted that weighting is outside the purview of fuzzy set scoring, which considers degrees of membership in a set. However, if one were to want to introduce weighting and thus alter this scoring method (or translate it for a different use), one may consider that a weighting system is already implicit in the distribution of questions across sub-categories. Sub-categories with more questions are those where there is greater agreement among the frameworks, and these are thus given greater weight than those with fewer questions (meaning there was less overlap among frameworks). If a given organization were to want to use the same number of questions but change the weighting in order to indicate a certain area of priority, this could be done by multiplying scores of a given sub-category by two or the desired additional weight. If an organization views all sub-category topics as equal priorities and does not want to weight according to amount of agreement between frameworks, one could also weight each sub-category score by one-sixth of the total, or 16.67%. This type of weighting would assume that there is complete substitutability across sub-categories and indicators/questions, in the sense that it is possible to compensate a low score in one sub-category with a higher score on another one. If it were important to an organization not that each sub-category be weighted equally, but rather that a given parliament have some degree of presence of all democratic principles and functions described by all sub-categories, one can multiply all sub-category scores rather than adding them to achieve an aggregate framework score. This will have the effect of giving the country a zero score if any of the sub-categories contains indicators/questions that can be answered entirely in the negative. Thus, in contrast to the previously discussed weighting, this type of weighting assumes complete non-substitutability between sub-categories and indicators/questions in the sense that one low score brings down the overall score.

3.2 Content Areas of Holistic Framework

In order to determine the content of the holistic, we examined both question-by-question overlap as well as topical, or sub-category overlap. Examination of overlap at both levels of disaggregation is critical, as overlap between sub-categories does not necessarily mean that frameworks agree on how indicators/questions should be formulated to address the given topic. As explained above in Part I: Across-Framework Comparison, we utilized Lisa von Trapp's comparison chart in order to examine question-by-question overlap. 26% of the questions in our holistic framework reflect overlap between all five frameworks, while 19% and 57% of questions represent overlap between four and three frameworks respectively²⁵. In order to address topical overlap, we looked closely at the topics of these questions more broadly and distributed questions accordingly across sub-categories. An explanation of these results follows.

²⁵ The amount of overlap is noted in brackets at the end of each question below.

The Parliamentary Centre frameworks, which have the largest amount of overlap with all other frameworks, focus on a sub-category topical area addressed by all frameworks, Oversight. However, not all frameworks cover areas addressed by others. For example, indicators on Resources and Procedures are only found in the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. This may also be part of the reason that 44% of the indicators in these two frameworks can be matched to each other but not to questions in other frameworks, while a quarter of each cannot be matched to any other framework. The percentage of non-matching indicators is slightly higher for the IPU Toolkit with 38% non-matching questions. This result may seem strange given that all sub-categories in the IPU Toolkit are also found in the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. As the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are quite extensive while the IPU Toolkit is more condensed, it seems plausible that the former two frameworks might address most of the issues that the IPU Toolkit covers as well. Thus this degree of non-overlap elucidates that overlap is not merely a function of size or topic but also due to the focus of individual indicators/questions. While the IPU Toolkit's sub-categories are all included in both the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards, the specific focus within the sub-category and the degree of detail specified by the indicators/questions is often very different.

In terms of topical content, we do however observe a great deal of overlap between the frameworks in the sub-category Oversight. While this overlap is partially driven by Parliamentary Centre frameworks' concentration of all its questions in this sub-category, many indicators/questions (from all frameworks) that have a 5-framework overlap are classified under Oversight. This provides important guidance for our holistic framework as it highlights an area of commonality among all frameworks and additionally indicates some degree of consensus on the types of indicators/questions on this topic in each framework. Oversight was also highlighted during our interviews with the organizations as an important area of focus for a parliament seeking to strengthen itself. As a result of this focus, seven of the twenty-seven questions of our holistic framework focus on Oversight. Interestingly, while Representation was also cited during interviews as a key role of parliaments, the organizations seem to disagree on how best to assess this area, as there is little overlap. Thus, there are only two questions on Representation in the holistic framework. We also found a relatively large amount of overlap between frameworks on Law-making as well as Public Engagement, and our holistic framework has six and five questions on these areas respectively.

Given this question-by-question and content overlap, as well as the structural explanation discussed above, we have created the following holistic framework:

HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK

1. Procedures

- 1.1. Are there procedures in place for the Legislature to call itself into regular and extraordinary session? *(3 overlap)*
- 1.2. Does the Legislature enforce a code of conduct? *(3 overlap)*
- 1.3. How autonomous is the Legislature from the executive in adopting and amending its own rules of procedure? *(3 overlap)*

2. Representation

- 2.1. Does the electoral system insure accountability of the Legislature to the electorate? *(3 overlap)*
- 2.2. Do candidate eligibility criteria insure that members of marginalized groups can run for office? *(3 overlap)*

3. Law-making

- 3.1. To what extent does the Legislature have opportunities to debate bills prior to a vote? *(4 overlap)*
- 3.2. Is the Legislature autonomous from the executive in its ability to amend the proposed agenda for debate? *(3 overlap)*
- 3.3. Does the Legislature consult policy experts in reviewing legislation? *(4 overlap)*
- 3.4. Do committees have the power to amend legislation? *(3 overlap)*
- 3.5. To what extent are legislators able to freely express their opinions without executive and legal interference? *(3 overlap)*
- 3.6. To what extent does the Legislature have opportunities to debate international commitments prior to adoption? *(3 overlap)*

4. Oversight

- 4.1. To what extent is parliament able to review the national budget? *(5 overlap)*
- 4.2. Are legislators able to utilize independent audit reports? *(5 overlap)*
- 4.3. Is there an effective system in place for committees to carry out their oversight function? *(3 overlap)*
- 4.4. Do members of the opposition chair key budgetary committees? *(4 overlap)*
- 4.5. Is the Legislature able to effectively question the executive in order to hold it accountable for its actions? *(3 overlap)*
- 4.6. To prevent potential conflicts of interest, are legislators required to disclose their financial interests? *(3 overlap)*
- 4.7. How effective is legislative oversight of military and intelligence forces? *(3 overlap)*

5. Public Engagement

- 5.1. To what extent are citizens given opportunities to participate in the legislative process? *(5 overlap), (3 overlap)*

5.2. Are there procedures in place to consult marginalized groups during the legislative process? (*5 overlap*)

5.3. Is the work of the Legislature transparent to all citizens? (*5 overlap*)

5.4. Does the Legislature insure that the media has access to its workings? (*5 overlap*), (*3 overlap*)

5.5. Are committee hearings open to the public? (*4 overlap*)

6. Resources

6.1. Does the Legislature insure that resources are distributed across majority and minority parties in a manner that does not unduly advantage either party? (*3 overlap*)

6.2. Do legislators receive compensation on a non-partisan basis? (*3 overlap*)

6.3. Does the Legislature have resources to hire professional staff? (*3 overlap*)

6.4. To what extent are legislators provided resources to fulfill their constituency responsibilities? (*4 overlap*)

3.3 Application of Holistic Framework to Germany, Peru, Turkey, and Uganda

In order to evaluate whether our holistic framework accurately reflects the common ground between frameworks, we applied it to our sample countries, using the same data as for the original application of frameworks. We expect that it should produce scores that reflect the range of variance (between minimum and maximum degrees of membership in the full performance set) most common among the other frameworks. The results are below.




Figure 19: Application of Holistic Framework - Aggregate Fuzzy Set Ranges

Across countries, the holistic framework produces the same results as those given by four of the five existing frameworks. This means that the holistic framework’s assessment of a country’s performance aligns with the most common assessment of performance range by the other frameworks (which largely agree among themselves in terms of range, though not in terms of concentration of scores). When we disaggregate the results of the holistic and compare them with other frameworks in individual sub-categories, the results either align with the most common trend or are located in the middle of frameworks with high and low ranges. The results of the sub-category Oversight, for which all frameworks have questions, are provided in Annex 9.

In order to check whether the distribution of performance of the holistic scores is the same as those in the other frameworks, we again step outside the fuzzy set methodology to examine medians of framework scores. This measure of central tendency gives us information beyond our range comparison above to make clear that the concentration of holistic scores is again between our high and low estimates of the other frameworks. These results are given below.




Figure 20: Application of Holistic Framework - Aggregate Median Scores

This pattern of results holds true across scoring methods, as it is observed in the aggregate dummy scoring outcomes as well.²⁶

This application of the holistic framework to sample countries does not necessarily prove it is a superior tool as compared to the existing frameworks. However, by producing a range of performance and concentration of scores similar to common trends of existing frameworks, it does adequately capture their overlapping areas of agreement.

²⁶ Please refer to Annex 9 for figures on the dummy percentages.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to examine five parliamentary assessment frameworks developed by different organizations in order to assess how and to what degree they differ. To this end, we were tasked with three objectives: to compare frameworks on content and construction, to apply them to select countries, and to propose a holistic framework with the goal of harmonizing the frameworks. Our analysis featured in this report aims to contribute a deeper understanding of differences and commonalities across frameworks and assist organizations in a possible harmonization and collaboration effort.

Our analysis on comparison of content and construction suggests that there are substantive differences across frameworks although two sets of them tend to display identical trends - the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards on the one hand, and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks on the other. The IPU Toolkit stands on its own and does not display similarity with the other frameworks. This is because the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards were constructed in concert, and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks were devised by the same organization and differ by only a few questions. The application of frameworks to sample countries confirms these findings. Across all scoring methods that we use, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards generate very similar scores. This is also the case for Parliamentary Centre frameworks. The scores generated by the IPU Toolkit tend to be different than those generated by other two sets of frameworks. Thus, there are differences across the three sets of frameworks (the IPU Toolkit as one set, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards as a second, and the PC frameworks as the third), but large similarities within. We believe this is mostly due to differences of organizations with regards to goals, values, membership base and approach to parliamentary assessment. Nevertheless, as our proposed holistic framework suggests, there are some areas of overlap across frameworks despite being very limited. Hence, there is some basis for harmonization in which the organizations express an interest.

Throughout our examination, we aimed to preserve our independence and neutrality and avoided subjective judgment as much as possible. This is also inherent in our proposed framework; rather than presenting an ideal assessment tool, it is a balanced approach to parliamentary assessment, drawing together elements from all frameworks. The findings from the application of this holistic framework to the sample countries enhance this point; on every scoring method, the holistic framework yields scores that tend towards the most common trend of the other frameworks or fall between the high and low ranges of other frameworks. However, if harmonization is their end goal, organizations will be required to take subjective stances on what constitutes a more efficient composition, a better design, and an effective approach based on their goals and objectives.

REFERENCES

- Barkan, J. (2008) Legislatures on the Rise? *Journal of Democracy*. 19 (2) pp.124-137.
- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BpB). 2009. Bundestag. http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_lemmata.html?guid=11ZSR4 (accessed 1 March 2009).
- Bundesrat. 2008. http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_090/sid_EAC05ECB5823E2413ED9DC8D02D1573F/DE/Home/homepage_node.html?_nnn=true (accessed 26 October 2008).
- Bryman, A. (2008) *Social Research Methods*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2009. The World Factbook: Peru. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html> (accessed 1 March 2009).
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2008a. The World Factbook: Germany. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html> (accessed 21 October 2008).
- , 2008b. The World Factbook: Peru. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html> (accessed 21 October 2008).
- , 2008c. The World Factbook: Turkey. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html> (accessed 21 October 2008).
- , 2008d. The World Factbook: Uganda. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html> (accessed 21 October 2008).
- Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. 2009. <http://www.cpahq.org/> (accessed 22 January 2009).
- CPA/UNDP/WBI Benchmarks. 2006, December. Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures. http://www.cpahq.org/uploadedFiles/Information_Services/Publications/CPA_Electronic_Publications/Recommended%20Benchmarks%20for%20Democratic%20Legislatures.pdf (accessed 20 October 2008).
- Congress of the Republic of Peru. 2008. <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/> (accessed 26 October 2008).

Dahl, R. (1998). *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Deutscher Bundestag. 2009. Vom Parlamentarischen Rat zur meistbesuchten Volksvertretung der Welt. <http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/index.html> (accessed 1 March 2009).

Doganay, Ülkü (2007) The Turkish Parliament on Democracy. *Parliamentary Affairs*. 60 (3) pp. 388- 408.

Draman, R. (2009). *Parliamentary Centre*. [interview by the authors] London/Accra, 12 February 2009.

Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., and Tinkler, J. (2006) *Digital Era Governance: IT Corporations, the State, and E-Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). (2005) *Mali Saydamlık İzleme Raporu [Fiscal Transparency Monitoring Report]*.

Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA). (2008) <http://www.eisa.org.za/> (accessed 25 October 2008).

Globalis. 2009. Peru – Seats in Parliament held by women. http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?IndicatorID=63&Country=PE (accessed 22 March 2009).

Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 2008. <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/index1.htm> (accessed 27 October 2008).

Hansard Society. 2007. <http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/> (accessed 11 Dec 2008)

Imlach, A., Dhar, M., and Broom, D. (2009) *Commonwealth Parliamentary Association* [interview by the authors] London, 27 February 2009.

Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 2009. What is the IPU? <http://www.ipu.org/english/whatipu.htm> (accessed 22 January 2009).

Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 2008. Evaluating Parliament: A Self-Assessment Toolkit for Parliamentarians <http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/self-e.pdf> (accessed 20 October 2008).

Langdon, S. (2005). Parliamentary Audits and Budget Review in Africa. (Provided to authors by Rick Stapenhurst, World Bank Institute).

Lute, B. (2009) *National Democratic Institute* [interview by the authors] London/Washington D.C., 13 February 2009

Miller, R. (2005) *The Development of Standards for Democratic Legislatures*. (Provided to authors by Rick Stapenhurst, World Bank Institute).

National Democratic Institute. 2009a. What We Do. <http://www.ndi.org/whatwedo> (accessed 22 January 2009).

----- . 2009b. Peru. <http://www.ndi.org/content/peru> (accessed 22 March 2009).

National Democratic Institute. 2007, January. *Toward the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures* (National Democratic Institute Standards). http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2113_gov_standards_010107.pdf (accessed 20 October 2007).

Olson, D. (1994) *Democratic Legislative Institutions*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Overseas Development Institute. (2007) *Parliaments and Development*. Briefing Paper 18, April.

Parliamentary Centre. 2009. http://www.parlcent.ca/index_e.php (accessed 22 January 2009).

Parliamentary Centre. 2004a. *Indicators of Parliamentary Performance in the Budget Process*. http://www.parlcent.ca/indicators/budget_process_e.php (accessed 28 October 2008).

----- . 2004b. *Parliamentary Centre – Audit Framework* (Provided to authors by Rick Stapenhurst, World Bank Institute).

----- . 2004c. *Parliamentary Centre Report Card* http://www.parlcent.ca/indicators/index_e.php (accessed 28 October 2008).

Parliament of Uganda. 2008. <http://www.parliament.go.ug/> (accessed 27 October 2008).

Ragin, C. (2000). *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Richardson, A. (2009) *Inter-Parliamentary Union*. [interview by the authors]. London/Geneva, 13 February 2009.

Rubin, M. and Bartle, J. (2005). *Integrating Gender Into Government Budgets: A New Perspective*. *Public Administration Review*. May/June 2005. 65 (3) pp.259-272.

Santiso, C. and Belgrano, A. (2004). *Legislative Budget Oversight in Presidential Systems: Governance of the Budget in Peru*. Paper prepared for the XVI Regional Seminar on Fiscal

Policy organised by the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), January 26-29, 2004, Santiago de Chile. pp. 1-52.

The Economist. 2008. Country Briefings. www.economist.com/countries (accessed 24 October 2008).

Today's Zaman. 2008, 1 August. An Overview of AK Party history, closure case process. <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=149053> (accessed 1 March 2009).

United Nations Development Programme. 2008. Governing Systems and Executive-Legislative Relations. <http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Parl-Pub-govern.htm> (accessed 15 December 2008).

World Bank. 2009. Country Classifications. <http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0> (accessed 15 February 2009)

-----, 2008a. About the World Bank Institute. <http://go.worldbank.org/53LOBQ2OK0> (accessed 3 Nov 2008).

-----, 2008b. Topic: Parliament. <http://go.worldbank.org/BUTNWF7EY0> (accessed 3 Nov 2008).

-----, 2008c. World Bank Institute Country Programs. <http://go.worldbank.org/X08LE1OLF0> (accessed 25 October 2008).

ANNEXES

1. Discussion of NDI Standards-Based Questionnaire
2. Individual Question Overlap between Frameworks
3. Definitions of Internal Sub-categories
4. Good Question Design: Disaggregation by Sub-category
5. Definition of Criteria Used for Country Selection
6. Data Sources for Country Scoring
7. Parliament Characteristics: Sample Countries
8. Country Analysis by Sub-Category
9. Holistic Framework Applied to Countries
10. Holistic Framework- Survey Instrument
11. World Bank PowerPoint Presentation (12 March 2009)

ANNEX 1: Discussion of NDI Standards-based Questionnaire

It is important to keep in mind that the NDI is releasing a new Standards-Based Questionnaire in the next few months, which is based on but significantly different from their existing NDI Standards. From a large, 89-standards reference document, they have created a new standards-based questionnaire consisting of 25 questions. These are not actually in the form of questions, but NDI refers to them as questions, as they ask the respondent whether or not he/she agrees with the statement. Unlike the original NDI Standards framework, the new Standards-Based Questionnaire provides a scoring system, where respondents check boxes according to whether they Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, or Strongly Disagree. There are also two additional options, “I am not aware” and “Not Applicable,” which respondents use as relevant. All questions have two parts, the first of which asks about the standard as codified in law, whereas the second part examines actual practice of that particular standard within the given country.

The new, shorter list of questions, which is sourced from the original NDI Standards framework examined in this report, reflects the challenges and questions that the NDI field offices encounter repeatedly (Lute 2009). Topics covered vary across the Questionnaire; areas of focus include adoption and amendment of the rules of procedure, committee involvement, balance between executive and legislature, and review of the budget. As the National Democratic Institute is a program-oriented organization, the information generated by these questions will be used to guide future programming efforts (Lute 2009). However, it is important to understand that this new survey is not intended to provide a hard score, ranking, or external assessment of a given country’s parliament. Rather, it is for internal assessment only and provides a given country with an analysis of perceptions of local stakeholders, including legislators, legislative staff, and NGOs.

As the NDI’s Standards-Based Questionnaire was still evolving during the course of this study and was not yet published, we were unable to include it in our analysis here. If we had been able to use it, we acknowledge that our results would have changed significantly. One of the main themes in our results is the similarity between the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards, but the new Standards-Based Questionnaire differs greatly from the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks. NDI’s new survey tool is less than half the size of the previous NDI Standards, and its content is inevitably more narrowly focused. Further, the indicators/questions of the new Standards-Based Questionnaire tend to be less compound and more objective than the earlier NDI Standards. Thus, if we had been able to use the Standards-Based Questionnaire, it is likely that our results for good question design principles would have changed greatly. In addition, trends observed in the application of frameworks to countries may have also adjusted according to the revised content of the NDI tool. Finally, the holistic framework, which is based on the overlap between the frameworks studied, may have also changed, as the overlap would be different.

ANNEX 2: Individual Question Overlap between Frameworks

5 Framework Overlap

CPA Benchmark	NDI Democratic Standards	IPU Self-Assessment Tool Questions	PC Budget	PC Audit
6.3.1. Opportunities shall be given for public input into the legislative process.	11.1.1 The legislature shall create and utilize mechanisms for receiving and considering public views on proposed legislation.	3.3 How systematic and transparent are the procedures for consultation with relevant groups and interests in the course of legislation?	C 1 Does parliament ensure public input and participation during the budget process?	C 1 Does parliament ensure public input and participation during the budget process?
			C 2 Does parliament ensure that the poor are able to participate when it reviews the government's diagnosis of poverty and setting of priorities?	C 2 Does parliament ensure that the poor are able to participate when it reviews the government's diagnosis of poverty and setting of priorities?
		4.7 How much opportunity do citizens have for direct involvement in legislation (e.g. through citizens' initiatives, referenda, etc.)?	C. 3 Does parliament consult the poor in carrying out its evaluations of poverty reduction programs?	C. 3 Does parliament consult the poor in carrying out its evaluations of poverty reduction programs?
			C.3 Does parliament employ gender analysis in seeking to influence budget priorities? In monitoring the budget?	C.3 Does parliament employ gender analysis in seeking to influence budget priorities? In monitoring the budget?
			C. 5 Does parliament consult women's groups during the budget process?	C 5 Does parliament consult women's groups during the budget process?
			C 6 Does parliament consult civil society organizations and business in its review of the budget?	C 6 Does parliament consult civil society organizations and business in its review of the budget?
7.2.1 The Legislature shall have a reasonable period of time in which to review the proposed national budget.	6.3.2 The legislature shall have a reasonable period of time in which to review the proposed budget.	2.3. How well is parliament able to influence and scrutinize the national budget, through all its stages?	A 3 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?	A 1 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?

7.2.3 Oversight committees shall have access to records of executive branch accounts and related documentation sufficient to be able to meaningfully review the accuracy of executive branch reporting on its revenues and expenditures.	7.4.2 Public accounts or audit committees shall have access to records of executive branch accounts and related documentation sufficient to be able to meaningfully review the accuracy of executive branch reporting on its revenues and expenditures.	2.1. How rigorous and systematic are the procedures whereby members can question the executive and secure adequate information from it?	D 4 Does parliament question government leaders, ministers and officials fully during the budget process?	D 4 Does parliament question government leaders, ministers and officials fully during the budget process?
		2.2. How effective are specialist committees in carrying out their oversight function?	D 5 Does parliament effectively scrutinize departmental work-plans and monitor their implementation?	D 5 Does parliament effectively scrutinize departmental work-plans and monitor their implementation?
7.2.4 There shall be an independent, non-partisan supreme or national audit office whose reports are tabled in the Legislature in a timely manner.	7.4.3 There shall be an independent, non-partisan Supreme or National Audit Office that conducts audits and reports to the legislature in a timely way.	2.5. How far is parliament able to hold non-elected public bodies to account?	D 3 Does the PAC work with independent audit authorities to uncover financial irregularities and promote program efficiency?	D 3 Does the PAC work with independent audit authorities to uncover financial irregularities and promote program efficiency?
			II. 4 Does parliament receive timely information from internal audits conducted by the government?	II. 4 Does parliament receive timely information from internal audits conducted by the government?
			B 5 Do independent auditors (e.g. Auditor General) report to parliament? Are their reports timely, informative and independent?	B 5 Do independent auditors (e.g.) Auditor General report to parliament? B 6 Are reports of auditors to parliament both timely and independent?
9.1.1 The Legislature shall be accessible and open to citizens and the media, subject only to demonstrable public safety and work requirements.	9.1.1 The legislature shall ensure that the buildings of the legislature shall be accessible and open to citizens and the press, subject only to demonstrable public safety and work requirements.	4.1 How open and accessible to the media and the public are the proceedings of parliament and its committees?	B 6 Do the media provide full and informative coverage of the parliamentary budget debate?	B 7 Do the media cover budget debates fully?
		4.2 How free from restrictions are journalists in reporting on parliament and the activities of its members?		

Table 5: Five Framework Overlap

4 FRAMEWORK OVERLAP

CPA Benchmark	NDI Democratic Standards	IPU Self-Assessment Tool Questions	PC Budget	PC Audit
2.5.2 The Legislature shall provide adequate opportunity for legislators to debate bills prior to a vote.	2.4.2 The legislature shall provide meaningful opportunity for legislators to publicly debate bills prior to a vote.		A 3 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?	A 1 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?
3.1.4 Committee hearings shall be in public. Any exceptions shall be clearly defined and provided for in the rules of procedure.	3.1.4 There shall be a presumption that committee hearings are open to the general public; the legislature shall publicly codify any exceptions to the presumption and give advance notice before a non-public committee meeting.		B 2 Are parliamentary committee meetings open to the public and the media?	B. 2 Are parliamentary committee meetings open to the public and the media?
3.2.3 Committees shall have the right to consult and/or employ experts.	3.2.3 All committees shall have the right to consult and/or hire experts.		C 7 In reviewing the budget, does parliament consult policy experts and utilize their knowledge?	C 7 In reviewing the budget, does parliament consult policy experts and utilize their knowledge?
7.2.2 Oversight committees shall provide meaningful opportunities for minority or opposition parties to engage in effective oversight of government expenditures. Typically, the Public Accounts Committee will be chaired by a Member of the opposition party.	7.4.1 The legislature shall ensure that public accounts committees provide opposition parties with a meaningful opportunity to engage in effective oversight of executive branch expenditures.		D 1 Does parliament have a public accounts committee (PAC) or equivalent that examines past expenditures?	D 1 Does parliament have a public accounts committee (PAC) or equivalent that examines past expenditures?
			D 2 Are measures taken to ensure its independence such as by the appointment of an opposition MP as Chair?	D 2 Are measures taken to ensure its independence such as by the appointment of an opposition MP as Chair?
8.1.1 The Legislature shall provide all legislators with adequate and appropriate resources to enable the legislators to fulfill their constituency responsibilities.	8.2.1 The legislature shall provide all legislators with sufficient resources to enable the legislators to fulfill their constituency responsibilities, including travel to and from their constituencies.	5.1 How systematic are arrangements for members to report to their constituents about their performance in office?	B 9 Do parliamentarians inform their constituents about the budget?	

		<i>4.5 How adequate are the opportunities for electors to express their views and concerns directly to their representatives, regardless of party affiliation?</i>	
--	--	--	--

Table 6: Four Framework Overlap

3 FRAMEWORK OVERLAP

CPA Benchmark	NDI Democratic Standards	IPU Self-Assessment Tool Questions	PC Budget	PC Audit
1.1.1 Members of the popularly elected or only house shall be elected by direct universal and equal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.	1.1.1 Members of the popularly elected or only House shall be directly elected through universal and equal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.	5.2 How effective is the electoral system in ensuring the accountability of parliament, individually and collectively, to the electorate?		
1.2.1 Restrictions on candidate eligibility shall not be based on religion, gender, ethnicity, race or disability.	1.2.1 Restrictions on candidate eligibility shall not be based on religion, gender, ethnicity, race or physical ability.	1.2 How representative of women is the composition of parliament?		
		1.3 How representative of marginalized groups and regions is the composition of parliament?		
1.4.1 Legislators shall have immunity for anything said in the course of the proceedings of legislature.	1.4.1 Legislators shall have immunity for speech conducted during the exercise of their duties; former legislators shall never be liable for speech conducted during the exercise of their duties as a legislator.	1.8 How secure is the right of all members to express their opinions freely, and how well are members protected from executive or legal interference?		
1.5.1 The legislature shall provide proper remuneration and reimbursement of parliamentary expenses to legislators for their service, and all forms of compensation shall be allocated on a non-partisan basis.	1.5.1 The legislature shall provide all legislators with fair remuneration and adequate physical infrastructure, and all forms of remuneration and infrastructure shall be allocated on a non-partisan basis.	5.6 How publicly acceptable is the system whereby members' salaries are determined?		
2.1.1 Only the legislature may adopt and amend its rules of procedure.	2.1.1 Only the Legislature may adopt and amend its rules of procedure.	2.6. How far is parliament autonomous in practice from the executive, e.g. through control over its own budget, agenda, timetable, personnel, etc.?		

2.3.3 The legislature shall have procedures for calling itself into extraordinary or special session.	2.2.2 The legislature shall have and follow procedures for calling itself into extraordinary or special session.	2.6. How far is parliament autonomous in practice from the executive, e.g. through control over its own budget, agenda, timetable, personnel, etc.?		
2.4.1 Legislators shall have the right to vote to amend the proposed agenda for debate.	2.3.1 Legislators shall have the right to vote to amend the proposed agenda for debate.	2.6. How far is parliament autonomous in practice from the executive, e.g. through control over its own budget, agenda, timetable, personnel, etc.?		
2.5.1 The Legislature shall establish and follow clear procedures for structuring debate and determining the order of precedence of motions tabled by Members.	2.4.1 The legislature shall create and follow clear procedures for structuring debate and determining the order of precedence of motions tabled by members.	3.1 How satisfactory are the procedures for subjecting draft legislation to full and open debate in parliament?		
3.2.2 Committees shall scrutinize legislation referred to them and have the power to recommend amendments or amend the legislation.	3.2.2 All committees shall have the power to amend legislation.	3.2 How effective are committee procedures for scrutinizing and amending draft legislation?		
3.2.4 Committees shall have the power to summon persons, papers and records, and this power shall extend to witnesses and evidence from the executive branch, including officials.	3.2.4 Committees shall have the power of summons to examine persons, papers and records, including witnesses and evidence from the executive branch.	2.1. How rigorous and systematic are the procedures whereby members can question the executive and secure adequate information from it? 4.6 How user-friendly is the procedure for individuals and groups to make submissions to a parliamentary committee or commission of enquiry?		
4.2.2 The Legislature shall provide adequate resources and facilities for party groups pursuant to a clear and transparent	4.2.3 The legislature shall provide adequate resources and facilities for party groups pursuant to a clear and transparent	1.6 How adequate are arrangements for ensuring that opposition and minority parties or groups and their members can		

formula that does not unduly advantage the majority party.	formula that does not unduly advantage the majority party.	effectively contribute to the work of parliament?		
5.1.2 The Legislature, rather than the executive branch, shall control the parliamentary service and determine the terms of employment.	5.1.1 The legislature, rather than the executive branch, shall control its staff.	2.6. How far is parliament autonomous in practice from the executive, e.g. through control over its own budget, agenda, timetable, personnel, etc.?		
5.2.1 The Legislature shall have adequate resources to recruit staff sufficient to fulfill its responsibilities. The rates of pay shall be broadly comparable to those in the public service.	5.2.1 The legislature shall have adequate resources to hire staff sufficient to fulfill its responsibilities. Non-partisan staff shall be recruited and promoted on the basis of merit and equal opportunity.	2.7. How adequate are the numbers and expertise of professional staff to support members, individually and collectively, in the effective performance of their duties?		
6.1.2 Only the Legislature shall be empowered to determine and approve the budget of the Legislature.	6.3.3 Only the legislature shall be empowered to determine and approve the budget of the legislature.	2.6. How far is parliament autonomous in practice from the executive, e.g. through control over its own budget, agenda, timetable, personnel, etc.?		
6.3.2 Information shall be provided to the public in a timely manner regarding matters under consideration by the Legislature.	11.1.2 Information shall be provided to the public in a timely manner regarding matters under consideration by the legislature, sufficient to allow the public and civil society to provide their views on draft legislation.	4.3 How effective is parliament in informing the public about its work, through a variety of channels?		
7.1.1 The Legislature shall have mechanisms to obtain information from the executive branch sufficient to exercise its oversight function in a meaningful way.	7.1.2 The legislature shall have mechanisms to obtain information from the executive branch sufficient to meaningfully exercise its oversight function	2.1. How rigorous and systematic are the procedures whereby members can question the executive and secure adequate information from it?		

7.1.2 The oversight authority of the Legislature shall include meaningful oversight of the military security and intelligence services.	7.1.3 The oversight authority of the legislature shall include meaningful oversight of the security and intelligence forces and of state-owned enterprises.	2.5. How far is parliament able to hold non-elected public bodies to account? 6.7 How rigorous is parliamentary oversight of the deployment of the country's armed forces abroad?		
	9.1.2 The legislature shall not use credentialing of the media in the legislature for the purpose or with the effect of creating a ruling party bias.		B 7. Do the media report fairly on opposition criticism regarding the budget?	B 8. Do the media report fairly on opposition regarding the budget?
10.1.2 The Legislature shall approve and enforce a code of conduct, including rules on conflicts of interest and the acceptance of gifts.	10.2.1 The legislature shall create a system for recording and making public all activities with, and exchange of gifts or favors between, lobbyists and legislators/legislative staff.	5.3 How effective is the system for ensuring the observance of agreed codes of conduct by members?		
10.1.3 Legislatures shall require legislators to fully and publicly disclose their financial assets and business interests.	10.1.2 Legislatures shall require legislators to fully disclose their financial assets and business interests.	5.4 How transparent and robust are the procedures for preventing conflicts of financial and other interest in the conduct of parliamentary business?		
		6.3 How far is parliament able to influence the binding legal or financial commitments made by the government in international fora, such as the UN? 6.2 How adequate & timely is the information available to parliament about the government's negotiating positions in regional & universal/global bodies?	A 7 Does parliament review and debate the PRSP before final adoption by the government and presentation to international financial institutions?	A 5 Does parliament review and debate the PRSP before final adoption by the government and presentation to international financial institutions?

Table 7: Three Framework Overlap

ANNEX 3: Definitions of Internal Sub-Categories

Sub-category	Definition/ What the allocated questions address	Importance
Elections	How elections to parliament are conducted, standards followed	Implications for representativeness of parliament
Status of Legislators	Special rights and legal standing of legislators	Implications for whether legislators are equipped to fulfil their duties/ responsibilities
Procedure and Sessions	Formal rules regarding sessions, voting, and debate	Implications for how legislative and oversight functions are carried out
Committees	Establishment/composition, activities and rights of parliamentary committees	Tools of legislature oversight - Crucial for effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny
Political Parties/ Party Groups	Formation, activities and rights of political parties/party groups in parliament	Directly related to representativeness of parliament
Interest Groups	Formation, activities, and rights of interest groups in parliament	Implications for representativeness of parliament
Parliamentary Staff	Rules, legislative responsibilities, and rights of parliamentary staff	Implications for capacity of parliament to fulfil its diverse range of roles and responsibilities
Legislative Function	Degree of involvement in and ability of legislature in debating, amending, formulating, and passing legislation	Primary role of parliaments
Oversight Function	Activities, involvement, and ability of legislature to hold executive accountable for its actions and policies	Primary mechanism of government accountability
Representational Function	Degree of representativeness of legislature	Primary role of parliaments
Foreign Policy Function	Involvement of legislature in foreign policy and foreign affairs	Check on executive, implications for accountability role

Accessibility	Degree of transparency, openness, and public participation in activities of parliament	Informing the public of governance is one of the primary roles of parliaments, crucial for effective oversight
Ethical Governance	Parliamentary code of conduct	Crucial for preventing unlawful activity and discrimination

Table 8: Definitions of Internal Sub-categories

ANNEX 4: Good Question Design: Disaggregation by Sub-category




Figure 21: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Objective Questions by Sub-Category




Figure 22: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Questions with Precise Wording by Sub-Category




Figure 23: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Non-Compound Questions by Sub-Category




Figure 24: Comparing Frameworks on Percentage of Non-leading Questions by Sub-Category

ANNEX 5: Definition of Criteria Used for Country Selection

Characteristics	Definition
<u>General</u>	
Level of development/GDP per capita (PPP)	Refers to the economic status of the country as high income, upper middle income, lower middle income, or low income according to the World Bank's classification of economies as well as to its GDP per capita (PPP) in 2007 as reported by the CIA World Factbook.
Population Size	Refers to the number of inhabitants within the country as reported by the CIA World Factbook
<u>Parliamentary System</u>	
Parliamentary Reform	Refers to reforms affecting the legislative system – recent reforms would make parliamentary assessment more interesting
Type of Governance	Refers to whether the power balance within a country is bend more towards the executive (Presidential system), the legislature (Parliamentary system), belongs to a different system (i.e. Constitutional Monarchy) or falls somewhere in between.
Parliamentary Structure	Refers to whether the legislature of a country is unicameral or bicameral.
Political Structure	Refers to whether political system is a unitary (centralized) or a federal one.

Table 9: Definitions of Criteria for Country Selection

ANNEX 6: Data Sources for Country Scoring

GERMANY

Bundestag. 2009. Vom Parlamentarischen Rat zur meistbesuchten Volksvertretung der Welt. <http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/index.html> (accessed 1 March 2009)

Bundestag. 2008a. German Bundestag: The Bundestag in Brief http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/index.html (accessed 17 October 2008).

-----, 2008b. Gender Budgeting Initiative. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/067/1606792.pdf> (accessed 22 October 2008).

-----, 2008b. Rules of Procedure. http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/rules.pdf (accessed 1 November 2008).

Bundestrat. 2008a. http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_090/nn_11592/EN/Home/homepage_node.html?_nnn=true (accessed 20 October 2008).

-----, 2008b. Committees. http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_099/nn_10940/EN/organisation-en/ausschuesse-en/ausschuesse-en-node.html?_nnn=true (accessed 15 Nov 2008)

-----, 2008c. Roles and Functions: Bundesrat Responsibilities http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_090/nn_11004/EN/funktionen-en/aufgaben-en/aufgaben-en-node.html?_nnn=true (accessed 18 October 2008)

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BpB). 2009a. Bundestag. http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_lemmata.html?guid=11ZSR4 (accessed 1 March 2009).

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BpB). 2009b. Wissen. <http://www.bpb.de/wissen/AAWR80,0,0,Wissen.html> (accessed 1 March 2009).

Buzer. 2008, June 8. Bekanntmachung zur Änderung der Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestags. <http://www.buzer.de/gesetz/8347/index.htm> (accessed 10 November 2008).

Central Intelligence Agency. 2008. The World Factbook: Germany. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html> (accessed 1 November 2008).

Federal Court of Audit. 2008.

http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/home-en?set_language=en (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

Finance Ministry. 2008. Budget.

<http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/bundeshaushalt2008/html/index.html> (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2008. PARLINE: Germany, Deutscher Bundestag (Federal Diet).

http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2121_A.htm (accessed 1 November 2008).

-----, 2008. Women in Parliaments: World Classification. <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm> (accessed 25 October 2008).

Lohmann, S. (1998) Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-92. *World Politics*, 50 (3) (p.401-446) [online]

http://muse.jhu.edu.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/journals/world_politics/v050/50.3lohmann.html (accessed 1 November 2008).

Parliamentary Council, Germany. 2008. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of

Germany. http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges_material/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf Berlin: German Bundestag. (accessed 20 October 2008).

Parliament of South Africa. 2008. Public Participation in Other Parts of the World.

http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=311 (accessed 1 November 2008).

Wehner, J. (2001) Reconciling Accountability and Fiscal Prudence? A Case Study of the Budgetary Role and Impact of the German Parliament. *Journal of Legislative Studies* 7 (2), Summer. pp. 57-78 [online]

<http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/jls/2001/00000007/00000002/art00005> (accessed 16 Nov 2008).

Wehner, J. (2006) Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutions. *Political Studies* 54 (4) pp. 767-785.

Wehner, J., and Byanyima, W. (2004) *Parliament, the Budget, and Gender*. [online]

http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/budget_en.pdf (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

World Bank. 2008. PovertyNet: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Questions and Answers.

<http://go.worldbank.org/ZLBKFM2V90> (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

PERU

Congress of the Republic of Peru. 2008a. About Congress.

<http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ingles/index.htm> (accessed 3 February 2009).

-----, 2008b. Functions. <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ingles/funciones.htm> (accessed 15 January 2009)

-----, 2008c. Rules of Procedure.

<http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/RelatAgenda/reglamento.nsf/regla> (accessed 15 January 2009).

-----, 2006. Political Constitution of Peru.

http://www.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/cons_doc/constitutions/data/Peru/peru.pdf . (accessed 15 January 2009).

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2009. Congress of the Republic. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2251_A.htm (accessed 20 January 2009).

Montenegro, J. 2008, July 7. Presupuesto de la Republica. *Law & Iuris Peru*.

<http://lawiuris.wordpress.com/2008/07/07/presupuesto-de-la-republica/> (accessed 1 February 2009).

Santiso, C. and Belgrano, A. (2004). Legislative Budget Oversight in Presidential Systems: Governance of the Budget in Peru. Paper prepared for the XVI Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy organised by the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), January 26-29, 2004, Santiago de Chile. pp. 1-52.

World Bank. 2008. PovertyNet: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Questions and Answers. <http://go.worldbank.org/ZLBKFM2V90> (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

TURKEY

Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 2009a. Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.

<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Anayasa.htm> (in Turkish). (accessed 2 February 2009).

-----, 2009b. Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.

<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/english.htm> (in English). (accessed 23 January 2009).

-----, 2009c. Constitutional Tradition and Parliamentary Life.

http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/about_tgna.htm (in English) (accessed 23 January 2009)

-----, 2009d. Rules of Procedure. <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ictuzuk/ictuzuk.htm> (accessed 2 February 2009).

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2009. PARLINE: Grand National Assembly of Turkey, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2323_A.htm (accessed 23 January 2009)

OECD. 2007. Public Budgeting in Turkey. *OECD Journal on Budgeting*. 7 (2), pp.1-54

Şahin, M. (2009) (mustafasahin@tbmm.gov.tr) *Regarding indicators/questions of parliamentary assessment frameworks*. Emails received by one of the authors on 21 January, 20 January (2 emails), 19 January (2 emails), 14 January, 2009.

Şahin, M. (2009). *Legislative Expert, Grand National Assembly of Turkey*. [interview by one of the authors] Ankara, Turkey, 5 January 2009.

State Planning Organization. 2000. Report on Public Financial Management and Fiscal Transparency in Turkey. Ankara, Turkey. (Provided to the authors by Hakan Hakkı Yılmaz, TEPAV)

World Bank. 2008. PovertyNet: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Questions and Answers. <http://go.worldbank.org/ZLBKFM2V90> (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

UGANDA

German Technical Corporation. 2003. Engendering PRSPs in Africa – Uganda’s Parliamentary Budget Office Experience. http://www2.gtz.de/gender-prsp/english/papers/working_groups/Hannington_Ashaba_3A.pdf (accessed 1 February 2009).

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2009. PARLINE: Uganda Parliament http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2329_A.htm (accessed 28 January 2009).

Parliament of Uganda. c.2009a. www.parliament.go.ug (accessed 29 January 2009).

-----, c.2009b. Rules of Procedure. <http://www.parliament.go.ug/files/rules%20of%20procedure%20for%20the%208th%20parliament%20of%20uganda.pdf> (accessed 29 January 2009).

-----, 2005. The Constitution Amendment Act 2005. [online at Uganda Law Library, 2007] http://www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.com/files/constitution/Constitutional_Amendment_Act_2005.pdf (accessed 2 February 2009).

-----, 1995. Uganda 1995 Constitution. [online at Uganda Online Law Library, 2007]
http://www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.com/files/constitution/constitution_1995.pdf (accessed 1 February 2009).

Republic of Uganda. 2003. Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review): Findings and Recommendations. Constitution Amendment Act. 13 of 2000. [online at Uganda Online Law Library, 2007]
http://www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.com/files/constitution/Commission_of_Inquiry.PDF (accessed 2 February 2009).

Suruma, E. 2008, June 12. Republic of Uganda – Ministerial Budget Speech, Financial Year 2008/09. Delivered at the 3rd Session of the 8th Parliament of Uganda.
http://www.finance.go.ug/docs/BudgetSpeechFY202008_09_12thJune2008_Final.pdf (accessed 1 February 2009).

Tanzarn, N. 2003. National Gender Budget Report. Forum for Women in Democracy.
http://www.gender-budgets.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,16/ (accessed 1 February 2009).

Wehner, J., and Byanyima, W. (2004) *Parliament, the Budget, and Gender*. [online]
http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/budget_en.pdf (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

World Bank. 2008. PovertyNet: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Questions and Answers.
<http://go.worldbank.org/ZLBKFM2V90> (accessed 15 Nov 2008).

World Bank Institute and National Democratic Institute. (2008). *Parliamentary Strengthening Program: Sourcebook on Legislative Budget Offices*. (Provided to the authors by Lisa von Trapp, World Bank Institute).

ANNEX 7: Parliament Characteristics: Sample Countries

As acknowledged in the main body of the report, countries to which we apply the frameworks are very different in kind. We find this difference, however, to be a strength rather than a limitation in our framework application, because it shows that the emergence of common trends in framework performance is likely due to characteristics of the frameworks themselves rather than an intrinsic characteristic shared by all countries. Nonetheless, our analysis shows some important differences in performance across these countries. Therefore, below we briefly present general background information on parliamentary characteristics of sample countries, which may partially contribute to differences observed.

Germany

The German parliament was created in its current form in 1949. In conjunction with the creation of the other parliamentary chamber representing the federal states– the Bundesrat – at the same time, this marked the beginning of the new Federal Republic of Germany in the Western part of the country four years after the end of the Nazi regime. Since then Parliament is the democratic power centre of the federal Republic and its powers are based on the Basic Law – a form of Constitution (BpB 2009). The Basic Law gives particular strength to political parties, even though a party can only enter parliament if it has reached at least 5% of the votes in the national elections. This is meant to prevent dissolution of political parties as well as a fragmenting of parliament into too many miniscule parties, which would render law-making ineffective. The Federal Republic of Germany has seen 16 national parliamentary elections thus far. After the election in 1990, the 12th German Bundestag became the first parliament of the reunited Germany. In the wake of reunification, parliament also decided to move the location of parliament back to Berlin, which had been the traditional capital of the country before the separation of East and West. The move was conducted in 1999; modernizing parliamentary infrastructure in the process (Bundestag 2009).

Peru

The Republic of Peru declared independence in 1821 and returned to democratic leadership in 1980 after years of military rule (CIA 2009). Peru follows a unicameral legislative system with Congress consisting of 120 seats, and members being elected by popular vote and serving five year terms (Congress of the Republic of Peru 2008). The last elections were held in 2006, with the next planned to be held in 2011. Since Peru's independence and leadership under its presidential head of government, the Congress has aspired to represent Peruvians through various missions including formulation and enactment of legislation, Parliamentary oversight of the Executive, and public administration. The goal of Congress is to represent the plural opinion of the nation, and Members of Congress are elected with the duties to serve the nation, legislate, control, and represent the public's views and interests (Congress of the Republic of Peru 2008). Current challenges faced by the Congress of the Republic include modernizing its systems, infrastructure, and procedures.

Turkey

Since 1923, Turkey is a secular parliamentary republic where legislative authority rests with the Grand National Assembly of Turkey which embodies all powers of sovereignty (Grand National Assembly of Turkey 2008). All activities of the Assembly are guided by its own Rules of Procedure. It is a unicameral body, comprised of 550 parliamentarians who are elected through a party-list proportional representation system and assumed to represent the whole nation. Elections are conducted every 5 years. In order to gain representation in the Assembly, political parties need to win 10% of the national cast. Although this disadvantages small political parties, some of which are regional and sometimes results in a few political parties being represented, it also prevents political instability by ruling out the possibility of a situation where no political party has the necessary majority to form a government (Doganay 2007). Currently, there are four parties represented in the Assembly, with the ruling party holding an outright majority.

Uganda

The current parliament of Uganda, its eighth since independence in 1962, was elected in 2006 and will complete its 5-year term in 2011 (Parliament of Uganda 2008). The Parliament of Uganda operates according to the specifications of the 1995 Constitution, its own Rules of Procedure, and other laws of Uganda (Parliament of Uganda 2008). The Parliament, presided over by the Speaker, consists of members directed elected by their constituencies, as well as one female representative for every district and other special representatives of the youth, workers, army, and disabled persons (Parliament of Uganda 2008). The main functions of the Parliament of Uganda are as follows: pass laws, provide the means for carrying out the work of the Government (through taxation and taking loans), scrutinize the work of the Government, debate various topics included in the President's State of the Nation address, and approve Presidential nominations for ministers, judges, ambassadors, and others (Parliament of Uganda 2008). The Parliament of Uganda has taken different forms in the past, as it was the "National Assembly" during three of its eight incarnations, was completely absent during much of the 1970s (no legislature branch of government during this period), and was run entirely by the National Resistance Army in the late 1980s/early 1990s (Parliament of Uganda 2008). It has only taken on its present form following passage of the 1995 Constitution mentioned above.

ANNEX 8: Country Analysis by Sub-Category

In addition to examining aggregate results of each framework applied to each sample country, we also focused on differences between framework results at the sub-category level. As none of the organizations who have created the frameworks intend them to generate a ranking of parliaments, disaggregation at the sub-category level may help countries to better understand areas where they are already strong as well as where they might be able to improve. Below we discuss these results.

Germany




Figure 25: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Germany

In Germany, the different disaggregated ranges of sub-categories clearly show the previously discussed differences across frameworks as well as their commonalities. In general, frameworks yield consistent ranges across sub-categories with occasional small differences between the IPU Toolkit on the one hand and the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards on the other hand, as well as between the latter two frameworks themselves.

Regarding Law-making, intersections for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards are higher than the IPU Toolkit, but unions are the same for all three frameworks. The IPU Toolkit also has a lower intersection and a wider range than either CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks or NDI Standards, which have the same range. The indicators that drive this difference seem to be the low values of 0.25 which the IPU Toolkit receives for indicators such as 3.4²⁷ that are very difficult to be answered affirmatively because of their vague nature. These are essentially scored low because of the nature of the dominant political party regime in Germany that tends to restrict individual MP action (BpB 2009).

In contrast to the situation regarding Law-making, both the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have wider ranges than does the IPU Toolkit for Representation. Again, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are exactly the same in terms of intersection and union reflecting the similarity of those frameworks. Both of these measures are lower for the IPU Toolkit. One possible explanation of this difference is the focus of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks on political parties and its detailed yet normative indicators on election standards. These standards are very clearly regulated in Germany; thus the country receives high scores on these indicators. Again the questions of the IPU Toolkit are much more controversial and thus receive lower scores.

For the sub-category Procedures the range of the NDI Standards is much larger than for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks. This is a difference driven by the score of 0 that the NDI indicator 5.3.2²⁸ receives. The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks does not contain this indicator.

While for the sub-category Law-making intersection scores for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are twice that of the IPU Toolkit, the situation reverses itself for Public Engagement. Here the intersections for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards are 0, whereas it is 0.5 for the IPU Toolkit. Incidentally the median of the IPU Toolkit is the same as the intersection showing that there are a lot of intermediate scores brought out by the IPU Toolkit in this sub-category. This seems to be due public engagement not being well institutionalized in Germany despite efforts made to improve this area (Rubin and Bartle 2005).

For details on the sub-category Oversight please refer to the main report. The differences in ranges across frameworks – long ranges for PC-Audit and PC-Budget frameworks and shorter ranges for the other three frameworks - follows very much the trend described there.

²⁷ IPU Toolkit 3.4: How adequate are the opportunities for individual members to introduce draft legislation?

²⁸ NDI Standards 5.3.2: No partisan or non-partisan staff of the legislature, including the secretary-general, shall have any legislative or procedural authority, including voting, in the legislature.

For the sub-category Resources the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks has a more narrow range. This is due to the single NDI indicator 5.4.1²⁹ scoring 0.5. While this indicator is reflected partly in the CPA/WBI/UNDP Indicator 9.1.3, it is the focus on specifications of the media relations facility that brings about a lower scoring in the NDI Standards, as not all of the specified details are met in Germany.

²⁹ NDI Standards 5.4.1: The legislature shall have a non-partisan media relations facility that shall be sufficiently and consistently funded under the administrative budget and operate under the office of the secretary-general.

Peru




Figure 26: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Peru

In Peru, the various ranges of sub-categories verify an overall trend of similarities and differences across frameworks. All frameworks mostly yield consistent ranges across sub-categories. The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards show differences from the IPU Toolkit and in some instances also from each other. Overall the IPU Toolkit follows a trend towards neither lack of nor full membership in the set of full performance.

For Law-making, the IPU Toolkit shows the same high performance as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards as it achieves the same union score at full performance, but its intersection is lower at 0.25 when compared to the other two frameworks. Yet while the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards have a few indicators that achieve full performance as well as a few indicators that achieve neither full nor lack of performance, the full performance scoring for the IPU Toolkit is driven only by a single question; namely question 3.6.³⁰ This reflects the fact that these large frameworks also have more indicators allocated to the sub-category Law-making, which allows them to easier show variety in one topical area. The IPU Toolkit shows in turn a trend towards neither full nor complete lack of performance.

With regard to the sub-category Representation, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, NDI Standards, and the IPU Toolkit perform very similar showing generally a high degree of performance. While the IPU Toolkit does not achieve a full performance score, its concentration of scores is otherwise often high as its intersection at the low performance level is again only due to a single question, which drives the range down; namely question 1.2 of the IPU Toolkit.³¹ Its low performance reflects the fact that gender equality in Parliament is still only emerging in Peru even though improvements have been achieved since the beginning of the new millenium (Globalis 2009). In contrast, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards have a greater number of indicators that are responsible for the high union as well as the low intersection. Again the IPU Toolkit tends more towards a neither full nor lack of performance.

In the sub-category Public Engagement, union scores for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and the NDI Standards are 1, connotating full performance of particular features. Yet unlike in the other sub-categories, which always show some degree of performance per sub-category, an intersection score of 0 indicating no performance on some indicators in Public Engagement reflects the fact that exclusion from the political life poses a large ground for dissatisfaction for many Peruvians (NDI 2009b).

Within the sub-categories of Procedures and Resources, the NDI Standards display a range that is twice that of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks. For the sub-category Procedures this is driven by a score of 0 (no performance) that the NDI Standards indicator 5.3.2³² receives, which is not part of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks. For the sub-category Resources there

³⁰ IPU Toolkit 3.6: How careful is parliament in ensuring that legislation enacted is consistent with the constitution and the human rights of the population?

³¹ IPU Toolkit 1.2: How representative of women is the composition of parliament?

³²NDI Standards 5.3.2: No partisan or non-partisan staff of the legislature, including the secretary-general, shall have any legislative or procedural authority, including voting, in the legislature.

are even more indicators of the NDI Standards that show no or low performance. This difference in results puts more emphasis on the fact that small differences between largely similar frameworks can drive very different results.

As explained in the main body of the report Oversight is a sub-category specific to the Parliamentary Centre frameworks. Again the wide ranges from zero to full performance indicate the variety and detail of questions on the budget and on parliamentary oversight utilized by these frameworks range of questions posed within these frameworks. However, unlike the Parliamentary Centre frameworks that show the concentration of no performance, the other three frameworks show at least some degree of performance. Again this shows that the PC frameworks pick up on the difference between legal codification and actual practice much more than any of the other three frameworks. Peru has all the common international regulations on parliamentary oversight in place, but as it is also a strong presidential system, where the executive still influences parliament to a great extent in practice (Santiso and Belgrano 2004).

Turkey




Figure 27: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Turkey

The disaggregated ranges on sub-categories for Turkey suggest that while there are common trends for individual frameworks, there are differences across frameworks. Frameworks generally yield consistent ranges across sub-categories. The ranges yielded by the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards display great similarity. This is also the case for the Parliamentary Centre Budget and Parliamentary Centre Audit frameworks. The IPU Toolkit, on the other hand, does not display similarities with any other framework. This presents a situation where there are differences in the ranges yielded by the IPU Toolkit and the other two sets of similar sets of frameworks.

In Law-making and Representation, all three frameworks, namely the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, NDI Standards, and IPU Toolkit yield tight ranges. However, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards have higher union and intersection scores than the IPU Toolkit. This may be due to the fact that the CPA/WBI/UNDP and NDI indicators take a more legal approach and address the standards in official documents/legal framework whereas the IPU questions address how effective these standards are carried out in practise. As a part of the efforts to advance in its candidacy for membership in the European Union, Turkey has undertaken a series of political reforms through institutional changes and constitutional amendments. However, as reflected by recent EU progress reports, there is question on how effective these are carried out in practise. One example of this is the frequent closure cases on political parties, deeming them “unconstitutional,” which weakens the representation function of the Parliament by restricting the expression of certain interests. The most well-known case is the closure filed against the ruling party, the AKP in March 2008, who had received half of the votes in the national election of 2007. The Party was accused of being “a focal point of unsecular activity” (Today’s Zaman 2008) and demands were made for a five-year political ban on all current and former party members including the Prime Minister and the President. Although the Constitutional Court ruled not to close the party, the process raised concerns both within and outside the country.

Procedures provides a clear example of the similarity between the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. Both frameworks have the same tight range and the same intersection and union scores.

In Public Engagement, the IPU Toolkit’s consistency across sub-categories becomes clearer; the framework yields the same range as it does in Law-making and Representation. However, this is not the case for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. The ranges for these frameworks are again exactly the same but in this sub-category, they are much wider, running from 0.25 to 1. Thus, although they have a higher union score than the IPU Toolkit, they share the same intersection with this framework. It is important to note that the increase in the width of the range of these two frameworks results from only 1-2 indicators that receive a score of 0.25. For instance, only indicator 6.3.1³³ of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks receives 0.25. Thus, one factor in explaining this divergent trend for public engagement is the sensitivity of the range to outliers in overall scores. Another explanation is the fact that ensuring public engagement in the work of the Parliament has been somewhat problematic in

³³ CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks 6.3.1: Opportunities shall be given for public input into the legislative process.

Turkey even at the legal level. Although media involvement is generally well ensured, opportunities for direct citizen participation are limited and not fully formalized. However, this should not be considered solely as a “supply side” issue. Many studies suggest that there is relatively little public demand for greater opportunities for involvement in the work of the Parliament in Turkey compared to European states (TEPAV 2005).

Resources presents an exception to the similarity between the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards. The CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks yield a much tighter range than the NDI Standards; although both frameworks have the same union score of 1, the intersection score for the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks is 0.75 whereas for NDI Standards, it is 0.5 as in all other sub-categories. This is driven by indicator 5.4.1 of the NDI Standards that addresses two different components at the same time unlike the equivalent indicator in the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks.³⁴ When applied to Turkey, this indicator generates a score of 0.5.

³⁴ NDI Standards 5.4.1: The legislature shall have a non-partisan media relations facility that shall be sufficiently and consistently funded under the administrative budget and operate under the office of the secretary-general.

Uganda




Figure 28: Fuzzy Set Ranges across Sub-categories - Uganda

With reference to the graphs above, it is difficult to identify common trends among frameworks across sub-categories. In some sub-categories, a given framework, such as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks, has a narrow range, as is the case for Law-making, Procedures, Oversight and Resources. However, this range widens for Representation and doubles for Public Engagement. While a tighter range may indicate better concentrated, more precise results, a broad range may also be driven by a single outlier question or missing information. In this case, the lower bound of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks range is driven by two questions about the openness to the public of committees³⁵ in which Uganda is given a zero score. The upper bound is also driven by a question about the public nature of votes, but this time the focus is on the plenary rather than committees, and Uganda receives a full score.³⁶

While one must look closely to determine what may be driving the width of a broader range, more narrow ranges may indeed give us a more precise indication of how a given country scores with respect to the particular democratic principle of the sub-category. However, it is important to understand that this does not necessarily mean that frameworks with smaller, more precise ranges ask “better” indicators/questions than those with more broad ranges. For example, a smaller range may reflect indicators/questions on a topical area for which many components are codified in the laws of the particular country (or commonly across countries), and thus the range of responses is much more narrow and specific. These sorts of indicators/questions are just as likely to be very detailed as compared with indicators/questions of another framework on a topic less codified in law. In order to illustrate this, one can examine the category of Oversight above. The amount of variance in the Parliamentary Centre frameworks is the largest, which is unsurprising as all of these frameworks’ questions are on this topic. Thus, the questions ask for those very straightforward indicators that are commonly found and commonly institutionalized across countries. For example, question B5 of both frameworks asks: “Do independent auditors (e.g. Auditor-General) report to Parliament? Are their reports timely, informative, and independent?” The use of independent auditors by Parliament may be more likely codified in law than other questions of the Parliamentary Centre frameworks, such as those that ask about Parliament’s consultation with the poor, women, civil society organizations, businesses, and policy experts (C3-C7). Thus, it is more likely that the range is narrower for the former rather than the later questions. It is also more likely that larger frameworks such as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards, which cover a wider span of topics, will have fewer questions on this topic – and may include only the questions more likely to be standardized and codified across countries, such as that above about independent auditors.

In our examination of ranges disaggregated by sub-categories, we observe different trends. For example, the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks has the largest range in Law-making, Representation, Public Engagement, and Resources, but a much tighter range in Oversight and

³⁵ CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks 3.1.4: Committee hearings shall be in public. Any exceptions shall be clearly defined and provided for in the rules of procedure. Indicator 3.1.5: Votes of committee shall be in public. Any exceptions shall be clearly defined and provided for in the rules of procedure.

³⁶ CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks 2.6.1: Plenary votes in the Legislature shall be public.

Procedures. The NDI Standards follows this same trend, but its range is twice as wide as the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks in Procedures.³⁷ This wider range is driven by a single indicator that received a no performance (0) response, the NDI indicator 5.3.2.³⁸ However, if one considers the performance of the CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards in Resources, the two ranges are exactly the same,³⁹ which is unsurprising as their questions are almost exactly the same under this sub-category.

³⁷ Median is the same for both CPA/WBI/UNDP Benchmarks and NDI Standards.

³⁸ NDI Standards 5.3.2: No partisan or non-partisan staff of the legislature, including the secretary-general, shall have any legislature or procedural authority, including voting, in the legislature.

³⁹ The medians are also the same.

ANNEX 9: Holistic Framework Applied to Countries

Below we present three sets of graphs from country applications with the holistic framework included. These are fuzzy set ranges for Oversight, dummy percentages, and median scores for Oversight. As discussed for the aggregate ranges in the main body of the text, these graphs display the tendency of the holistic framework to follow the most common trends of all the frameworks.




Figure 29: Application of Holistic Framework - Fuzzy-Set Ranges for Oversight




Figure 30: Application of Holistic Framework - Dummy Percentages




Figure 31: Application of Holistic Framework - Median Scores for Oversight

ANNEX 10: Holistic Framework- Survey Instrument

LSE HOLISTIC PARLIAMENTARY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Dear Respondent,

This survey instrument is designed to enable you to internally assess the democratic functioning of your legislature, and is not intended to provide an external ranking. To this end, it identifies six main areas of parliamentary performance that can be used to target strengthening efforts. Please respond to all of the questions below, using the following scale:

- 0 = no performance
- 0.25 = low performance
- 0.5 = neutral performance
- 0.75 = high performance
- 1 = full performance

If a given question is not applicable to your legislature, please tick the N/A box.

Institution Name:


Date of Completion:

QUESTION	0	0.25	0.5	0.75	1	N/A
PROCEDURES						
1.1. Are there procedures in place for the Legislature to call itself into regular and extraordinary session?						
1.2. Does the Legislature enforce a code of conduct?						
1.3. How autonomous is the Legislature from the executive in adopting and amending its own rules of procedure?						
REPRESENTATION						
2.1. Does the electoral system insure accountability of the Legislature to the electorate?						
2.2. Do candidate eligibility criteria insure that members of marginalized groups can run for office?						
LAW-MAKING						
3.1. To what extent does the Legislature have opportunities to debate bills prior to a vote?						

3.2. Is the Legislature autonomous from the executive in its ability to amend the proposed agenda for debate?					
3.3. Does the Legislature consult policy experts in reviewing legislation?					
3.4. Do committees have the power to amend legislation?					
3.5. To what extent are legislators able to freely express their opinions without executive and legal interference?					
3.6. To what extent does the Legislature have opportunities to debate international commitments prior to adoption?					
OVERSIGHT					
4.1. To what extent is parliament able to review the national budget?					
4.2. Are legislators able to utilize independent audit reports?					
4.3. Is there an effective system in place for committees to carry out their oversight function?					
4.4. Do members of the opposition chair key budgetary committees?					
4.5. Is the Legislature able to effectively question the executive in order to hold it accountable for its actions?					
4.6. To prevent potential conflicts of interest, are legislators required to disclose their financial interests?					
4.7. How effective is legislative oversight of military and intelligence forces?					
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT					
5.1. To what extent are citizens given opportunities to participate in the legislative process?					
5.2. Are there procedures in place to consult marginalized groups during the legislative process?					
5.3. Is the work of the Legislature transparent to all citizens?					
5.4. Does the Legislature insure that the media has access to its workings?					
5.5. Are committee hearings open to the public?					

6.1. Does the Legislature insure that resources are distributed across majority and minority parties in a manner that does not unduly advantage either party?						
RESOURCES						
6.2. Do legislators receive compensation on a non-partisan basis?						
6.3. Does the Legislature have resources to hire professional staff?						
6.4. To what extent are legislators provided resources to fulfill their constituency responsibilities?						

ANNEX 11: World Bank PowerPoint Presentation (12 March 2009)



The slide features the LSE logo in the top left corner, which includes the text 'THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE'. The background shows a building with a clock tower. The main title is 'PARLIAMENTARY ASSESSMENT' in a rounded rectangle. Below it, a blue box contains the subtitle 'AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING FRAMEWORKS & APPLICATION TO SELECTED COUNTRIES'. Further down, it says 'PREPARED FOR THE WORLD BANK INSTITUTE'. At the bottom, it lists 'By the LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE MPA CAPSTONE' and the date 'March 2009'.


PARLIAMENTARY ASSESSMENT

*AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
& APPLICATION TO SELECTED COUNTRIES*

PREPARED FOR
THE WORLD BANK INSTITUTE

By the LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE
MPA CAPSTONE

March 2009




The slide has the LSE logo on the left and a globe icon on the right. The title 'Agenda' is centered at the top. A bulleted list follows, and a small number '2' is in the bottom right corner.

Agenda

- Objectives
- Background of Frameworks
- Between-Framework Comparison
- Country Analysis
- Holistic Framework
- Conclusion

2



The slide has the LSE logo on the left and a globe icon on the right. The title 'Objectives' is centered at the top. It features three blue boxes on the left labeled 'ISSUE', 'TASKS', and 'GOAL', each with corresponding bullet points in a light blue box on the right. A small number '3' is in the bottom right corner.

Objectives

ISSUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Existence of various assessment tools to measure parliamentary performance created by various organizations with diverse approaches
TASKS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Examination of five existing parliamentary assessment frameworks to identify areas of similarity & difference• Application of frameworks to sample countries and examination of results• Proposal of holistic framework
GOAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide an independent analysis of parliamentary assessment frameworks

3

Background of Frameworks

CPA/WBI/UNDP

- 87 indicators (benchmarks)
- Reference document
- Constructed in concert with NDI Democratic Standards
- Member-based organization
- No suggested scoring

NDI

- 89 indicators (standards)
- Reference document
- Constructed in concert with the CPA/WBI/UNDP
- No suggested scoring

IPU

- 48 questions
- Self-assessment tool
- Reflects IPU's core values
- Member-based organization
- Suggested scoring: 1-5

Parl. Centre- Budget

- 37 questions
- Parliamentary Report Card
- Specific to budgetary process
- Suggested scoring: 0-5

Parl. Centre- Audit

- 36 questions
- Parliamentary Report Card
- Specific to budgetary process
- Suggested scoring: 0-5

4

Between-Framework Comparison: Indicator Overlap (1)

5 Framework Overlap: Budget Review & Review of the Executive

CPA/WBI/UNDP	NDI	IPU	PC-A	PC-B
7.2.1 The Legislature shall have a reasonable period of time in which to review the proposed national budget.	6.3.2 The legislature shall have a reasonable period of time in which to review the proposed budget.	2.3. How well is parliament able to influence and scrutinize the national budget, through all its stages?	I. 3 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?	I. 1 Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?
7.2.3 Oversight committees shall have access to records of executive branch accounts and related documentation sufficient to be able to meaningfully review the accuracy of executive branch reporting on its revenues and expenditures.	7.4.2 Public accounts or audit committees shall have access to records of executive branch accounts and related documentation sufficient to be able to meaningfully review the accuracy of executive branch reporting on its revenues and expenditures.	2.1. How rigorous and systematic are the procedures whereby members can question the executive and secure adequate information from it? 2.2. How effective are specialist committees in carrying out their oversight function?	IV. 4 Does parliament question government leaders, ministers and officials fully during the budget process? IV. 5 Does parliament effectively scrutinize departmental work-plans and monitor their implementation?	IV. 4 Does parliament question government leaders, ministers and officials fully during the budget process? IV. 5 Does parliament effectively scrutinize departmental work-plans and monitor their implementation?

5

Between-Framework Comparison: Indicator Overlap (2)



4 Framework Overlap: Example Consultation of Exports & Constituency Relationship

CPA/WBI/UNDP	NDI	IPU	PC-A	PC-B
8.2.3 Committees shall have the right to consult and/or employ experts.	8.2.3 All committees shall have the right to consult and/or hire experts.	5.1 How systematic are arrangements for members to report to their constituents about their performance in office?	III. 7 In reviewing the budget, does parliament consult policy experts and utilize their knowledge?	III. 7 In reviewing the budget, does parliament consult policy experts and utilize their knowledge?
8.1.1 The Legislature shall provide all legislators with adequate and appropriate resources to enable the legislators to fulfill their constituency responsibilities.	8.2.1 The legislature shall provide all legislators with sufficient resources to enable the legislators to fulfill their constituency responsibilities, including travel to and from their constituencies.			II. 9 Do parliamentarians inform their constituents about the budget?

3 Framework Overlap: Candidate Eligibility & Legislative Involvement in International Commitments

CPA/WBI/UNDP	NDI	IPU	PC-A	PC-B
1.2.1 Restrictions on candidate eligibility shall not be based on religion, gender, ethnicity, race or disability.	1.2.1 Restrictions on candidate eligibility shall not be based on religion, gender, ethnicity, race or physical ability.	1.2 How representative of women is the composition of parliament?		
		6.3 How far is parliament able to influence the binding legal or financial commitments made by the government in international fora, such as the UN?	7.5 Does parliament review and debate the PRSP before final adoption by the government and presentation to international financial institutions?	1.7 Does parliament review and debate the PRSP before final adoption by the government and presentation to international financial institutions?

6



- ### LSE Between-Framework Comparison: Good Question Design (1)
- Frameworks are not designed for quantitative analysis
 - Design is important due to implications for *accuracy and quality of information*
 - Generally, sources of error in survey data stem from
 - poorly worded questions
 - way in which information is collected
 - misunderstanding by person at whom the question is directed
 - Differences in design principles may drive differences in results
- 9


LSE

Between-Framework Comparison: Good Question Design (2)

• Coding: Present vs. non-present

Good question characteristics	Definition
Objective	The question/indicator has <i>only one answer</i> , regardless of who is answering the question and leaves <i>no room for subjective interpretation</i>
Precise Wording	Regardless of interpretation of question by different people, <i>terms</i> within question/indicator are <i>clear and precise</i>
Non-Compound	The question/indicator asks only about <i>one specific topic</i> rather than multiple ones to ensure that the response <i>does not fall into different categories</i> and generate multiple answers
Non-Leading	The question/indicator <i>does not suggest an answer within the question</i> which would lead reader to answer in a particular manner

10



LSE




Country Analysis (1)


Fuzzy-set Methodology

- Degrees of membership
 - **0** = no performance (fully out of the set)
 - **0.25** = low performance (more out of the set than in)
 - **0.5** = neutral performance (neither in nor out of the set)
 - **0.75** = high performance (more in the set than not)
 - **1** = full performance (complete membership in the set).
- Ranges – Union (Max.) & Intersection (Min.)


- Median scores – measures central tendency of performance

12





Holistic Framework (1)



Structure


- 27 questions, targeting parliamentarians
- Self-assessment tool
- Balance between generating discussion and providing baseline assessment
- Principles of good question design – no leading, few compound, few non-precise, but still some subjective questions
- Scoring method: fuzzy sets, application of medians

Content


- Question by Question:

5 framework overlap: 26%
 4 framework overlap: 19%
 3 framework overlap: 57%
- Topical - more Oversight, less Representation

16



Holistic Framework (2)



Procedures

- 1.1. Are there procedures in place for the Legislature to call itself into regular and extraordinary sessions? (3 overlap)
- 1.2. Does the Legislature enforce a code of conduct? (3 overlap)
- 1.3. How autonomous is the Legislature from the executive in adopting and amending its own rules of procedure? (3 overlap)

Representation

- 2.1. Does the electoral system insure accountability of the Legislature to the electorate? (3 overlap)
- 2.2. Do candidate eligibility criteria insure that members of marginalized groups can run for office? (3 overlap)

Law-making

- 3.1. To what extent does the Legislature have opportunities to debate bills prior to a vote? (4 overlap)
- 3.2. Is the Legislature autonomous from the executive in its ability to amend the proposed agenda for debate? (3 overlap)
- 3.3. Does the Legislature consult policy experts in reviewing legislation? (4 overlap)
- 3.4. Do committees have the power to amend legislation? (3 overlap)
- 3.5. To what extent are legislators able to freely express their opinions without executive and legal interference? (3 overlap)
- 3.6. To what extent does the Legislature have opportunities to debate international commitments prior to adoption? (3 overlap)

Oversight

- 4.1. To what extent is parliament able to review the national budget? (5 overlap)
- 4.2. Are legislators able to utilize independent audit reports? (5 overlap)
- 4.3. Is there an effective system in place for committees to carry out their oversight function? (3 overlap)
- 4.4. Do members of the opposition chair key budgetary committees? (4 overlap)
- 4.5. Is the Legislature able to effectively question the executive in order to hold it accountable for its actions? (3 overlap)
- 4.6. To prevent potential conflicts of interest, are legislators required to disclose their financial interests? (3 overlap)
- 4.7. How effective is legislative oversight of military and intelligence forces? (3 overlap)


Public Engagement

- 5.1. To what extent are citizens given opportunities to participate in the legislative process? (5 overlap), (3 overlap)
- 5.2. Are there procedures in place to consult marginalized groups during the legislative process? (5 overlap)
- 5.3. Is the work of the Legislature transparent to all citizens? (5 overlap)
- 5.4. Does the Legislature insure that the media has access to its workings? (5 overlap), (3 overlap)
- 5.5. Are committee hearings open to the public? (4 overlap)


Resources

- 6.1. Does the Legislature insure that resources are distributed across majority and minority parties in a manner that does not unduly advantage either party? (3 overlap)
- 6.2. Do legislators receive compensation on a non-partisan basis? (3 overlap)
- 6.3. Does the Legislature have resources to hire professional staff? (3 overlap)
- 6.4. To what extent are legislators provided resources to fulfill their constituency responsibilities? (4 overlap)

17







Holistic Framework: Limitations




- Does present a base level of agreement, but is not a perfect tool
- Not all-inclusive or comprehensive framework
- Based only on overlap of particular frameworks analyzed

18





Conclusion



Two sets of frameworks tend to display identical trends

- These are the CPA/WBI/UNDP and NDI frameworks on the one hand, and the Parliamentary Centre frameworks on the other
- The IPU framework does not display similarities with the other frameworks

There are substantive differences across these three sets of frameworks

- Differences of organizations with regards to priorities, values, membership base and approach to parliamentary assessment may be main drivers of these differences

Nevertheless, there is some basis for harmonization

- As the proposed holistic framework suggests, there are some areas of overlap across frameworks, though limited

22