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Linkage has traditionally been identified as a central function of legislatures. Given the Parliament's initial institutional preeminence in Hungary after 1990 and underdeveloped linkages through organized interests or stable and cohesive parties, the linkage function of elected representatives was of special importance. This article examines the pattern of MP constituency linkage in the first democratically elected Hungarian Parliament (1990), the political context within which this pattern was established, and the conceptions MPs held of their representative focus.

“Linkage between legislators and their constituents depends on how members of the legislature conceptualize their constituency—their focus of representation; on their attentiveness to their constituents—their representational style; on their ability to maintain contacts with their constituents through various means of communication; and on their ability to act in a manner responsive to constituents. Each of these factors is to some extent determined by properties of the political system in which a legislature acts” (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979, 192). In identifying linkage as a central function of legislatures, Loewenberg and Patterson outline an important research agenda in the comparative study of legislatures. They point to the importance of both conceptualization and practice—how representatives perceive their linkage roles and how they actually maintain contact with their constituencies (however constituency might be defined). Moreover, they direct attention to the importance of political context in determining how these roles are performed.

This research agenda is especially important in analyzing the democratization process in eastern and central Europe in recent years. In the initial postcommunist period, parliaments served as both symbols and institutional expressions of political change. In most eastern and central European states after 1990, parliaments rapidly became identified as the quintessential institutions of democracy. Political ac-

tivity and popular attention were drawn to, and often transfixed by, the new representative institutions (see Ágh 1994; Longley 1994). Given Parliament's initial preeminence and underdeveloped linkages through organized interests or stable and cohesive parties (see Ágh 1993), the linkage function of elected representatives in Parliament was likely to be especially important in securing popular support for the new elites in a period of simultaneous political and economic transition.

What this article examines therefore is how representatives in the Hungarian Parliament of 1990 conceptualized linkage and the extent to which these first democratically elected MPs developed contact with their electorates in the novel constitutional context in Hungary. As a hybrid system—that is, one based on single-member constituencies but also incorporating MPs from both regional and national lists and with party allegiances in Parliament—the Hungarian parliamentary system is especially conducive to our investigation of the properties of political context that determine the performance of linkage roles.

Linkage and the Hungarian Parliament before 1990

To gain some perspective on the post-1990 political context it is necessary, first, to understand the pretransition context. All the more so because the practice of representation after 1990 reflects some of the tendencies apparent under the old regime. Before 1990 the Hungarian Parliament was supposed to be the “ultimate decision-making body of the country” (Róna-Tas 1991, 361). In reality it served merely as a rubber stamp of the party state. Parliament met infrequently, on only a few days a year, and until the 1985 elections members of Parliament who had been returned in uncontested elections invariably voted for what they had to vote for. The emphasis was clearly therefore on representativeness rather than on representation. Parliament was a representative institution insofar as it was based on a microcosmic representation of the demographic characteristics of Hungarian society (always of course within the overarching confines of party membership). Members of the Hungarian Parliament, as the passive receptors of party state policies, were held to assent to those policies and so “legitimize” them precisely because of their proportionate representativeness. As such, representation could be characterized as a contact function whereby, literally, contact between governors and governed could be sustained. The microcosmic composition of the legislature served as representation of the wider society “to whom rulers speak and over whom they govern” (Nelson 1982, 8).

Even with this conception of representation, however, linkages between constituents and representatives became increasingly important as MPs developed their role as intermediaries between citizens and the state bureaucracy and as constituents demanded more attention. The enactment of Law III of 1966 (after which national elections were to be based on geographical constituencies) started a trend whereby the notion that MPs were to act as lobbyists for their constituents became pronounced. While this development did not negate the microcosmic conception—the Communist party continued to claim that it alone integrated and embodied the interests of the entire political community—the 1966 Law did allow a parallel and unofficial focus on constituency representation to develop in the role orientations of MPs. In 1970 Law III further increased the importance of locality by enabling individual constituents to nominate candidates and also by allowing votes at constituency meetings to determine party nominations.

The significance of constituency focus was implicitly, and negatively, acknowledged again in Law III of 1983. This constitutional law introduced a compulsory multinomination system (so that at least two candidates had to stand for election) and established a national list of 35 MPs who would be freed from constituency responsibilities. (List members tended subsequently to be high-ranking party members.) After competitive elections were introduced in 1985, the composition of the new Parliament, though less representative than its immediate predecessor, still sought to represent the wider occupational, ethnic, and gender characteristics of society (see Róna-Tas 1991, 362–63). More positively, the importance of the performance of constituency roles can be gauged from two facts: first, most of the interpellations in the 1980s concerned local affairs (see Kerekes 1987, 132); second, 84% of respondents to a Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute survey in March 1988 agreed that MPs should be recalled from office if their constituents were dissatisfied with their parliamentary performance (Kurtán, Sándor, and Vass 1990, 449). Competitive elections therefore had a limited impact on the visibility of representatives in the collective minds of constituents. Surveys conducted by the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute revealed that marginally more respondents were able to recall their MP's name after 1985 than before that date. In 1984 67% of respondents could not recall their MP's name; in 1985 the figure fell to 58%; and in 1988 the corresponding figure was 60% (Kurtán, Sándor, and Vass 1988, 645). Indeed, the articulation of constituency grievances and demands by reformists within parliament, party, and state apparatuses were eventually to prove vital in exposing the extent of the crisis of the Kádár regime and in galvaniz-

ing support for political change. A realm of independent action was thus afforded and legitimized by the representative focus of constituency, a focus which, after 1988, was increasingly counterposed to that of party. This quasi-representation and its positive linkage function largely contributed to the positive public perceptions of the last communist parliament. Thus, in the years immediately preceding transition, reform-minded critics more often than not advanced their general criticisms of the regime by reference to specific local problems and grievances. In return, reformists within Parliament enjoyed positive public evaluation as individuals, which came to be reflected in the high popularity of the Hungarian Parliament as a whole.

The New Hungarian Parliament

The first Hungarian Parliament after the introduction of multi-party elections assembled on 2 May 1990, following the constitutional settlement and declaration of the Republic of Hungary on 23 October 1989. A negotiated revolution had taken place through constitutional discussion between the state party and opposition groups between March and October 1989. And what made the process of transition in Hungary so different from that in other east-central European countries was that Parliament—both as an institution and as the symbol of democratization—was at the center of constitutional debate (see Ilonszki 1994). Indeed, the new parliamentary system, as a negotiated settlement between old and emerging political elites, displayed both continuities with and radical departures from the pre-1990 Parliament. Nowhere was this constitutional duality better illustrated than in the hybrid electoral system adopted for the first democratic elections. In the negotiations preceding the adoption of the new electoral law most of the opposition parties proposed a list system, whereas the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP, the government party), supported by the Free Democrats, argued in favor of a single-member simple plurality system. At the time, the HSWP believed that its candidates would benefit from their high political visibility and public popularity. (This proved to be a practical miscalculation, as only five HSWP MPs were returned at the 1990 election.)

Perhaps not surprisingly, a compromise was eventually negotiated. The new electoral system was a hybrid; of the 386 MPs, 176 were elected in individual constituencies, a further 152 came from regional party lists organized around 20 regions, and the remaining 58 MPs were drawn from national party lists (see Ilonszki 1993, 253–65; Szoboszlai 1991, 207–09).

Two distinct foci of representation—geographical constituency and party—characterized the new Parliament. Indeed, voters themselves had two votes: one for a constituency representative and the other for a party list. Although Hungarian society is far from traditional in sociological terms, voters' close identification with locality and region, in combination with the practical experience of constituency linkage before 1990, tended to reinforce personal links and the areal dimension of representation. A dichotomy developed within Parliament itself whereby the representational focus of constituency could be called on as a legitimate countervailing force to party. Indeed, the cross-cutting influence of constituency focus was one explanation of the fluidity of partisan identification in Parliament after 1990 (see Szarvas 1992, 11–13).

A characteristic of Parliament between 1990 and 1993 was volatility of party allegiance. There was a significant movement of MPs from one party faction to another caused either by factional splits and expulsions or by individual defections (see Table 1).

One consequence was that the three-party government coalition decreased from 59.6% of seats in May 1990 to 51.2% of seats (and a majority of only two) in November 1993. In this process it was “evident that those members elected in individual districts have changed [party] places most frequently” (Szarvas 1992, 12). In part, party switching occurred because the party identification of constituency MPs had been only recently acquired or was politically expedient at the time of the first elections. But party list MPs have also broken with their factions. In these circumstances the individuals concerned have kept their memberships in Parliament but the party has effectively lost a seat.¹ As the number of partisan-sensitive issues processed by Parliament increased after 1990, as the demand for party cohesion increased within Parliament, as the number of occasions when the majority coalition bloc voted against the three-party opposition bloc almost doubled (from 14.4% of votes in 1990 to 28.3% in 1993—see Hanyecz and Perger 1993, 140–65), as party loyalty became the norm among the governing parties—with Christian Democrats (KDNP) and Democratic Forum (MDF) MPs voting together 95% of the time, so party identification became crystalized. With party allegiance becoming more starkly defined, those MPs with weak partisan identification came increasingly to dissent or indeed defect from party faction. In so doing, they invariably justified their actions by highlighting constituents' reservations about specific policy or general disillusion with the exercise of party politics in Parliament.

TABLE 1
Party Composition of the Hungarian Parliament 1990–93
(percentages in parentheses)

Party	May 2, 1990	December 1, 1992	July 1, 1993
Coalition Parties			
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)	165 (42.7)	159 (41.3)	138 (35.8)
Independent Smallholders (FKgP)	44 (11.4)	36 (9.4)	36 (9.4)
Christian Democrats (KDNP)	21 (5.5)	22 (5.7)	23 (6.0)
Opposition Parties			
Free Democrats (SzDSz)	94 (24.4)	85 (22.1)	85 (22.1)
Socialists (MSZP)	33 (8.5)	33 (8.5)	33 (8.5)
Young Democrats (FIDESz)	22 (5.7)	23 (6.0)	24 (6.2)
Independents ^a	7 (1.8)	27 (7.0)	35 (9.1)
Party of Hungarian Life and Justice (MÉIP) ^b	–	–	11 (2.9)
Total	386 (100.0)	385^c (100.0)	385^c (100.0)

^aThe increase in the number of independents is due primarily to MPs changing faction and to a split within the FKGP in 1992.

^bMÉIP was formed after expulsions from the MDF.

^cOne seat in the Parliament was vacant.

Constituency focus was also sharpened in the new Parliament by public opinion data. For example, a Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute survey in autumn 1989 found that respondents ranked the opinion of constituents as the most important factor representatives should consider in the performance of their parliamentary duties (a score of 4.7 on a 5-point scale). When asked whether MPs should vote according to the demands of their constituency, or according to their own conscience, 69% of respondents chose the former, 10% the latter, and the remainder maintained that there should be a balance between constituency and individual conscience. When asked specifically about how party MPs should vote, 69% again said they should vote according

to the demands of their constituency, with only 13% believing that representatives should vote in the interests of the party. The significance of these findings is that they predated the first democratic elections and sent a clear message to incoming MPs.

Conceptions of the Focus of Representation

Hungary after 1990 provides a novel context, therefore, within which to investigate conceptions of the focus of representation. It was important to gauge conceptions of legislative roles at a time when MPs had sufficient experience in their new jobs to make reasoned assessments and also sufficient time to have accumulated practical experience of linkage with their various constituencies. Yet it was equally important to investigate representatives' own ideas before the novelty of their experience had worn off or before they began to reinterpret how they performed their roles in the glare of increasing western academic attention. To this end a questionnaire was sent to all 384 sitting MPs in March 1992. The survey was conducted under the auspices of the Centre of Democracy Studies at the University of Economic Sciences, Budapest. A major problem in administering the survey (the first of its type at the time, as far as the authors know) was that MPs were openly suspicious of the political purposes for which the results might be used. Despite the authors' assurances that the questionnaire was exclusively for the advancement of academic knowledge, a response rate of only 31% was secured. Indeed, in view of the MPs' suspicions and their unfamiliarity with the very idea of such an academic survey, the authors decided not to send follow-up surveys which might antagonize them. Nonetheless, as Tables 2 and 3 illustrate, respondents were broadly representative of the party composition of Parliament and of the type of electoral mandate. The findings that follow are, of necessity therefore, merely indicative and tentative, but their significance is that they are drawn from a vitally important period in the development of the Hungarian Parliament. It was imperative to have collected such data at the earliest possible stage in order to gauge the nature and degree of linkages between representative and represented, no matter how exploratory and statistically limited the results turned out to be.

To identify conceptions of representative focus, Hungarian MPs were initially asked which, if any, of the following they thought they primarily represented: the nation (all citizens of the country), a particular social stratum, an ethnic group, a political party, an organized interest group, a city or region, or a specific electoral constituency.² Of the 117 respondents, nearly one-third (32.5%, $n = 38$)

TABLE 2
Members of the Hungarian Parliament, March 1992,
by Party Fraction
(percentages in parentheses)

Party Fraction	Members of Parliament	Survey Respondents
Hungarian Democratic Forum	159 (41.4)	46 (41.0)
Independent Smallholders	45 (11.7)	12 (10.7)
Christian Democrats	21 (5.5)	7 (6.3)
Free Democrats	86 (22.4)	25 (22.3)
Socialists	33 (8.6)	13 (11.6)
Young Democrats	23 (6.0)	6 (5.4)
Independent	17 (4.4)	3 (2.7)
Undeclared	–	7
Total	384 (100.0)	119 (100.0 ^a)

^aTotal is for those respondents who declared a party allegiance.

TABLE 3
Members of the Hungarian Parliament, March 1992,
by Source of Electoral Mandate
(percentages in parentheses)

Type of Mandate	Members of Parliament	Survey Respondents
Constituency/Direct	174 (45.3)	56 (47.5)
Regional List	120 (31.3)	36 (30.5)
National List	90 (23.4)	26 (22.0)
Undeclared	–	1 –
Total	384 (100.0)	119 (100.0 ^a)

^aTotal is for those respondents who declared the source of their electoral mandate.

TABLE 4
 Primary Focus of Representation Cited by Respondents, March 1992,
 by Source of Electoral Mandate
 (percentages in parentheses)

Focus of Representation	Source of Mandate		
	Constituency/Direct	Party List	All
Nation (All Citizens)	21 (37.4)	17 (27.8)	38 (32.5)
Constituency	24 (42.9)	2 (3.3)	26 (22.2)
Party	5 (8.9)	15 (24.6)	20 (17.1)
Social Stratum	2 (3.6)	10 (16.4)	12 (10.3)
City or Region	2 (3.6)	9 (14.8)	11 (9.4)
Ethnic Group	0 (0.0)	1 (1.6)	1 (0.8)
Interest Group	0 (0.0)	2 (3.3)	2 (1.7)
Other	2 (3.6)	5 (8.2)	7 (6.0)
Total	56 (100.0)	61 (100.0)	117 (100.0)

identified the nation as their primary focus, 22% (n = 26) identified electoral constituency, and 17% (n = 20) identified party. Fully 10% regarded themselves as representatives of a particular social stratum, and a further 9% (n = 11) identified a city or region as their primary focus of representation. Seven MPs specified other foci, including young people and the Hungarian nation. (In this sense “nation” has a symbolic meaning different from “all citizens of the country.”)

Table 4 reveals the differences between MPs returned by a constituency and those drawn from a party list. Not surprisingly, MPs drawn from lists identify party, region, or nation (the bases of the party lists themselves) as their primary foci of representation. However, nearly as many constituency MPs (41% versus 42.6%) also identify with the wider geographical areas of nation and city or region. What distinguishes the former from the latter more clearly, however, is the emphasis on electoral constituency (42.9% versus 3.3%). Even so, two MPs drawn from party lists still identified a specific electoral constituency as their primary focus of representation. This is perhaps indicative of a wider strategy whereby list MPs, in an attempt to enhance

their future electoral prospects, associate with, and promote themselves in, a particular constituency.

Linkages with Constituency

The extent to which constituents influence the voting decisions of representatives has been a central research question in Anglo-American democracies over the past three decades. Exactly how this influence is exerted, how the constituency is perceived, how demands are articulated and transmitted, and how they are received and decoded by the representative has preoccupied western political scientists (see for example Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978; Jewell 1982; Kingdon 1989; McCrone and Stone 1986). What emerges from this olympian effort, however, is simply that it is extremely difficult to discover empirically why or how far the voting records of representatives follow the wishes of their constituents. The present study consciously avoided these difficulties, preferring instead to follow Jewell's (1982, 17) advice that "it is more important to determine *how* legislators respond to constituents" than to focus exclusively on policy responsiveness in terms of the congruence between voting behaviour and constituency opinion.

Indeed, the term responsiveness has been identified as a useful alternative to the complex and catchall term representation (Johannes 1984, 4). Following the lead of Eulau and Karps (1977), successive studies have sought to operationalize, individually or collectively, the four components of responsiveness: policy responsiveness (the interaction of representative and represented in the making of public policy), service responsiveness (attentiveness to constituents' nonlegislative demands as encapsulated in the term casework), allocative responsiveness (beneficial distributional policies, pork-barrel allocations), and symbolic responsiveness (the building and maintenance of constituency support). Most attention has focused on the first, third, and fourth components of responsiveness, but here we examine the second dimension—casework—to establish how Hungarian MPs are linked to their constituencies. In so doing, we share the belief of Johannes (1984, 225) that casework provides an important channel of communication between representative and represented. In Hungary this is particularly true since interest representation is underdeveloped and organized groups capable of linking citizens to government are relatively absent (see Vass 1992). The processes and mechanisms by which such communication is established and sustained is therefore of some significance in examining the linkage between MP and constituents.

TABLE 5
Means of Communication with Constituents Cited by
Respondents, March 1992, by Source of Electoral Mandate
(percentages in parentheses)

Means of Communication	Source of Mandate		
	Constituency/Direct	Party List	All
Meetings	45 (80.4)	44 (71.0)	89 (75.4)
Regular Visits	48 (85.7)	28 (45.2)	76 (64.4)
Local Office	43 (76.8)	19 (30.6)	62 (47.5)
Permanent Staff	37 (66.1)	19 (30.6)	56 (47.5)
Letters	33 (58.9)	18 (29.0)	51 (43.2)
Only Limited Contact	2 (3.6)	3 (4.8)	5 (4.2)
No constituency	0 (0.0)	24 (38.7)	24 (20.3)

Note: Respondents had the option of choosing more than one response.

To examine the points of contact and the transmission of information between Hungarian representatives and those whom they represent, respondents were asked how they maintained contact with their constituencies. Table 5 outlines the responses. The immediately apparent finding is that 20% of respondents had no constituency. In fact this is a direct reflection of the number of MPs drawn from the national party list. However, list MPs clearly identified a constituency of their own and 31% of all party list members claimed to maintain local offices with permanent staffs. Of regional list MPs, 36% ($n = 13$) also made such a claim as did, more surprisingly, 23% ($n = 6$) of respondents drawn from the national list.

Of directly elected respondents, 77% ran local offices and over two-thirds employed permanent staffs to facilitate contact with constituents. To investigate the extent to which representatives actively sought direct contact with their constituents, we asked MPs whether they held surgeries—specific office hours when constituents could meet with them. Not surprisingly, 30% ($n = 18$) of party list MPs held no surgeries, and a further 13% ($n = 8$) held office hours only infrequently—less than once a month. Nonetheless, 57% of party

list MPs in the sample held regular surgeries, with nearly one-quarter (23%, $n = 14$) claiming to hold weekly surgeries and a further 20% operating fortnightly surgeries.

In contrast, all directly elected respondents claimed to hold surgeries, with only two (3.6%) estimating that they held office hours less than once a month. Over half held weekly meetings (57%, $n = 32$), nearly one-quarter held fortnightly meetings, and a further 16% ($n = 9$) held monthly surgeries.

To discover how involved Hungarian MPs had become in casework and to what extent they performed the role of welfare officer or local promoter (see Searing 1985; Wood 1987), the questionnaire first asked how many constituents attended respondents' surgeries. Directly elected MPs estimated that on average 17 constituents attended each surgery, whereas list MPs, who held less frequent office hours, estimated an average attendance of 24 per surgery. MPs were then asked about the type and frequency of issues that arose at their surgeries. Significantly, issues relating to personal welfare featured most prominently and frequently for most respondents. The second most pressing category of cases concerned local issues. Indeed, what is most notable in Table 6 is that personal and local matters emerged most frequently irrespective of the electoral base of the representative or of party allegiance in the House (i.e., whether the respondent was a member of a governing or opposition party). Moreover, in line with findings in the United Kingdom (see Rawlings 1990, 33–34), several issues brought to the attention of Hungarian MPs at their surgeries proved to be outside their immediate policy competence. Hungarian constituents, however, appeared not to have pronounced expectations of their MPs as local promoters, with requests for support for entrepreneurial initiatives or for the protection of employee interests being recorded as fairly infrequent occurrences by respondents.

In asking MPs how they gained information about their constituencies, we found that surgeries and direct meetings with constituents were regarded as the most useful method (on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating very useful and 5 not at all useful, the mean score for surgery was 1.74, sd 0.87, $n = 117$). Specialist media ranked second (mean score 1.92, sd 0.91), ahead of interest and professional organizations (mean score 2.04, sd 0.98) and constituency mail (mean score 2.29, sd 1.04). In part, the emphasis on individual contacts rather than on organized groups again reflected how much less developed the process of interest representation was in Hungary than in western democracies.

TABLE 6
 Frequency and Type of Constituency Issues Raised in
 Respondents' Surgeries, by Source of Electoral Mandate
 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Type of Issue	Source of Mandate			Total Responses
	Constituency/ Direct	Party List	All	
Personal Issues	1.82 (1.18)	2.32 (1.52)	2.04 (1.34)	100
Local Issues	2.22 (1.30)	2.77 (1.72)	2.46 (1.49)	98
Employee Interests	3.85 (1.69)	3.46 (1.64)	3.68 (1.67)	95
Outside Competence	3.70 (1.97)	3.80 (1.93)	3.75 (1.94)	96
Regional Matters	4.00 (1.64)	3.64 (1.82)	3.84 (1.72)	96
Entrepreneurial Assistance	4.34 (1.66)	4.22 (2.04)	4.34 (1.83)	94
Party Issues	5.74 (1.24)	4.70 (1.98)	5.29 (1.67)	93

Note: Responses were ranked on a seven-point scale, with 1 = most often and 7 = least often.

Conclusion

The new democratic Hungarian Parliament of 1990–94 provided a unique laboratory in which to examine the developing process of representation. It was unique in that the parliamentary system resulted from a negotiated revolution and combined elements both from the former regime and from the constitutions of established western liberal democracies. Moreover, unlike parliaments in other east-central European states, the Hungarian Parliament played a significant role in the transition period and has remained at the center of the political system ever since. In practice, Parliament functioned efficiently as a law factory (Ágh 1992, 3): in its first full period (May 1990 to April 1994) it processed some 220 new laws and passed 212 amendments to existing laws. Much of this legislative activity concentrated on constructing a legal and constitutional framework to facilitate transition to a liberal economy and a democratic political system. As a result, social and welfare legislation often took second place, leading to widespread public

belief that Parliament concerned itself too much with ideological disputes or that it spent too much time seeking redress for the sins of the Kádár regime or, indeed, that its consideration of legislation was inadequate (with legislation on compensation and redress declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and many other measures having to be significantly modified because of inadequate parliamentary drafting). One consequence was an increase in the level of public skepticism toward parliamentary activity, with the level of public confidence in Parliament as an institution falling from 61% in November 1989, through 50% in February 1991, to 30% in October 1993.

In these circumstances Hungarian MPs sought to adopt linkage mechanisms to help them garner information from their constituencies. Casework significantly contributed toward how MPs identified their representational roles, including those MPs from party lists with no defined constituency. If anything, the focus on constituency is likely to become more pronounced for many Hungarian MPs in the foreseeable future. At a systematic level, the MP-constituency linkage will be of considerable importance in demonstrating the tangible nature of representation to offset public criticism of partisanship in Parliament. At an individual level, MPs standing for reelection in 1994 were undoubtedly aware of the need for visibility among voters. Those who failed to secure, or who did not seek, a national or regional platform were conscious of the electoral benefits that constituency service and a personal vote might bring. What this article has tried to show is the pattern of MP-constituency linkage in the first democratically elected Hungarian Parliament, the political context within which this pattern was drawn, and the conceptions held by MPs of their representative focus. Future research needs to monitor the developing profile of representational activity and cross-time conceptions of representation in the post-1994 Hungarian Parliament in the light of changing “political properties of the political system in which [the] legislature acts.” (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979, 192).

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NOTES

1. On 1 December 1993, however, Gabor Fodor, one of the founders of the Young Democrats, resigned his seat after he left FIDESz. This was the first occasion when a “defector” left Parliament as a result of a change in partisan allegiance.

2. The question was phrased in this manner to take account of Hungarian society: social stratum is a more exact and neutral term than social class, ethnicity is of considerable importance, and city or regional identification is pronounced.

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