Guinea Bissau

Reference year - 2014

In the case of Guinea-Bissau, documentary analysis included the analysis of PEFA 2009 and 2014 (the final draft of 2014 is accepted by all parties and includes all comments and contributions), as well as the World Bank Indicators for Governance (WBGI) and the Report on Governance in Africa of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA AGRII). During the documentary analysis it was not possible to use the Open Budget Partnership reports on Guinea-Bissau's budget transparency, external control and public participation as background information. This is due to the fact that, as in Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau is not among the countries where the OBS has been carried out. However, this exercise was partially carried out during the formulation mission, allowing project beneficiaries to complete the survey with the technical assistance of the mission.

Due to the disruption of constitutional order in 2012 and subsequent international sanctions against transitional authorities in Guinea-Bissau, the General Elections of April 2014 were organized in accordance with international standards. The formulation mission of Pro PALOP-TL SAI was organized following the stabilization of constitutional order and the improvement of relations with its international partners by the newly elected political authorities in Guinea Bissau.

There is a lack of transparency, external oversight and public participation in the budget process in Guinea Bissau. This evaluation includes information gathered by conducting relevant parts of OBS during the formulation of the annual work plan.

Public Expenditure and Budget reporting:

  1. There are no bank reconciliations.
  2. Poor capacity to collect and process information to verify that resources are effectively allocated (in cash or in kind) to these primary service units (schools, health centers, etc.) and meet approved budget. This exercise has been carried out over the past three years but is still quite weak.
  3. The quality and comprehensiveness of fiscal and budgetary information (current and year-end reports) is still weak and needs to be improved.
  4. The year-end report (CGE) was last produced in 2010 and is not considered public because it has never been audited by the TC (in addition to meeting deadlines).
  5. The Executive's interim review is not produced even for internal purposes.
  6. A final audit of the executive's accounts (audit report or opinion on the CGE) by the TC has never been carried out.
  7. The Citizen's Budget (simplified version of the Approved Budget) has never been produced and is not public.
  8. There is no online and user-friendly access to fiscal and fiscal information during the year (current and year-end reports).
  9. In general terms, compared to 2009, there are no improvements in the findings of PEFA2014 (covering fiscal information from 2009 to 31.12.2013) and informal data in the OBS report on expenditure and budget.

External oversight and audit

  1. The legal framework that defines Court of Auditors financial independence, and ability to remove SAI leadership should be aligned with international standards.
  2. Both the external control of the Court of Auditors and the legislative analysis by Parliament are very weak.
  3. The Court of Audits has never prepared an audit report (Opinion) on the executive's year-end report, which is seriously hampering the publicity and accessibility of the Executive Summary Reports of 2009 and 2010 considered so far as not being public.
  4. The Court of Audits has never submitted any of its audit reports (to public institutions) to the legislature and these audits cover less than 50% of the executive's public spending.
  5. Legislative oversight of the budget is considered to be very limited, irrespective of the theoretical capacity of the parliament to discuss and oversee the executive's fiscal policy and its expenditure information.
  6. Coordination between Parliament and the Court of Auditors and other financial control institutions (e.g. General Inspectorate of Finance, IGF), including sharing of information and access to reports, is non-existent.

Parliamentary budget and expenditure oversight

  1. Parliamentary committees are subject to serious time constraints which make it impossible to discuss effectively the budget law.
  2. The time allotted for parliamentary control and supervision is in conflict with the time allocated to legislation (including legislative revision) of the budget law.
  3. There is a great limitation of technical capacity and in-house expertise (administration and commissions) and access to external capacity of budget / expenditure analysis, macroeconomics and public financial issues.
  4. In general, the rules and procedures that define the ceiling of the budget allocation are very flexible and provide substantial room for maneuver so that the executive can make changes during the implementation process and include these changes in the final report.
  5. There is no consultation or discussion between the Executive and Legislative branches during the formulation of the budget.

Public involvement in the budgetary process (including auditing) and parliamentary oversight

  1. The involvement of the public is non-existent with respect to the oversight of the legislative and judicial budget for external audit of the auditors or Executive budget cycle.